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ABSTRACT 
 Extant literature has addressed empirical insurgent networks inadequately, 
insufficiently accounting for insurgent warfare’s unique characteristics. Specifically, 
existing structural studies of insurgencies—those seeking to understand emergent social 
system patterns—have failed to capture the overlapping nature of competing, 
information-sharing networks in such contexts. This study focuses on the ways by which 
insurgent and authority social networks co-evolve in insurgent warfare. It extends 
previous research in four ways. First, it addresses empirical insurgent networks explicitly, 
which the “dark network” literature has largely ignored. Second, it takes a perspective 
that is consistent with insurgent warfare contexts. Using FARC as a case study, it 
analyzes two competing information-sharing networks at an operational level. Third, this 
study extends the application of Monge and Contractor’s (2003) multitheoretical, 
multilevel (MTML) framework to co-evolving social networks in insurgent warfare, 
which is a perspective that synthesizes complex adaptive systems and social network 
research around key concepts inherently related to co-evolution and helps address gaps in 
extant literature. Finally, it identifies several multilevel, co-evolutionary effects between 
competing social networks in an insurgent warfare context, which challenges approaches 
that treat insurgents networks as completely external structures onto which 
counterinsurgents implement strategies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. INSURGENT WARFARE AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
Insurgent warfare is violent competition, or struggle, between governments and 
insurgents that takes place among and for the control of a populace1 (Galula, 2006; Kilcullen, 
2010; Nagl, 2005). Each side’s ability to acquire and disseminate information about a 
population and its adversaries plays a critical role in a conflict’s outcome (Department of the 
Army, 2014; Galula, 2006; Guevara, 2007; Tse-Tung, 1989). While many means exist for 
both sides to obtain and spread information in operational settings, like social media-based 
interactions (e.g., Twitter), in-person social relations serve as critical conduits for the flow of 
information in social networks, including in insurgent warfare (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; 
Cleveland et al., 2018; Galula, 2006; Guevara, 2007; Kilcullen, 2010; Pye, 1950; Tse-Tung, 
1989; United States Government, 2013, 2014). As individuals exchange information 
pertaining to a populace and enemy in public spaces such as patrols, or private settings such 
as key leader engagements, whether they be combatants (e.g., insurgents or military) and/or 
noncombatants (e.g., civilians), they form information-sharing social networks that each side 
can leverage in the competition with their adversaries (Cleveland et al., 2018; Department of 
the Army, 2017).  
In insurgent warfare, one can observe at least two of these competitive social 
networks that make up a larger social system throughout the duration of an insurgency: 
namely authority information-sharing and insurgent information-sharing networks. Each of 
these networks is built upon cooperative information sharing ties among combatants and 
noncombatants on one side of a conflict (i.e., intra-network ties). However, ties between the 
competing sides (i.e., inter-network ties) form too, such as when civilians provide 
information to both insurgents and soldiers, which means the two networks can intertwine 
through shared “nodes” and form a larger social system (Department of the Army, 2017; 
 
1 This term is used in a broad sense. Insurgencies can take many forms. For instance, O’Neill (2005) 
identifies nine types of insurgents: anarchists, egalitarians, traditionalists, pluralists, apocalyptic-utopians, 
secessionists, reformists, preservationists, and commercialists. Otto Heilbrunn (1962) identified three types 
of insurgencies, namely terrorist wars, small-unit guerrilla wars, and large unit insurgencies (see Arquilla, 
2018). 
2 
Department of the Navy, 2017; Kilcullen, 2013; United States Government, 2016). Though 
these in-person, information-sharing ties may coincide with other types of social relations 
(e.g., family, and shared organizational affiliation ties), they are unique in that while conflict 
relevant information may flow through others, it does not mean it will. For instance, 
insurgents do not always share information about the populace or authorities with their 
family or friends, in part, because of security concerns. It is only when individuals pass or 
exchange information through these other forms of relations that the ties can be regarded as 
information-sharing ones, too.  
Three bodies of relevant research, including counterinsurgency (COIN), social 
system, and social network research, often use terms such as “social networks,” “social 
structure,” “systems,” and “social systems” to describe patterns of interactions, including 
information-sharing ones, that largely define insurgent warfare2 (Cleveland et al., 2018; 
Kilcullen, 2013). However, structural studies of insurgencies—those that seek to understand 
emergent social system patterns—have addressed empirical insurgent networks 
inadequately, insufficiently accounting for the unique characteristics of insurgent warfare, 
such as its competitive nature and overlapping information-sharing networks of insurgents, 
noncombatants, and government personnel. These gaps raise questions about the validity of 
counterinsurgency studies that treat insurgent structures as distinct from others (e.g., civilian 
vs. insurgent networks), and highlight challenges of understanding their dynamics. 
Specifically, while systems research has offered many strategic level insights into nonlinear 
dynamics of counterinsurgency and treats networks as open systems,3 it has overlooked 
empirical social networks in which combatants and noncombatants intertwine and compete 
in operational settings (Baker, 2006; Grynkewich & Reifel, 2006; Johnson, 1982; Mesjasz, 
2015; Schoenenberger et al., 2014).  
 
2 While some researchers define “social structure” differently, the term is used here to refer to patterns 
of connections among individuals (Glanville & Bienenstock, 2009). A “social network” is a set of 
components (e.g., individuals or nodes in graph theory) and the relations among them (Borgatti et al., 2013; 
Robins, 2015; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). They are forms of social systems (Borgatti et al., 2013; Robins, 
2015). Thus, this dissertation uses the terms “social networks” and “social systems” interchangeably and 
“social structure” as a term to describe patterns in them.  
3 Open systems “exchange energy or information with their environment” (Cilliers, 2000, p. 24) and 
their boundaries are not clearly defined.  
3 
Similarly, social network research has failed to account for these same characteristics 
and has focused most of its attention on the broader category of “dark networks” (i.e., illegal 
and covert) rather than insurgent networks specifically (Bakker et al., 2012; Cunningham et 
al., 2016; Everton, 2012; Gerdes, 2015; Morselli, 2014). A major focus of these studies has 
been mapping empirical nefarious social networks and assessing how various “exogenous” 
effects, such as disruption strategies, impact their structure and performance (e.g., ability to 
conduct operations) (Bakker et al., 2012; Carley et al., 2003; Cunningham et al., 2016; 
Enders & Jindapon, 2009; Everton, 2012; Roberts & Everton, 2016, 2011). This research 
often treats insurgent networks as if there are clear boundaries around them that make them 
distinguishable from the populations in which they are embedded, as well as from the 
government networks with which they fight. While this assumption is useful for analyzing 
many types of dark networks (e.g., terrorist networks), analyzing insurgent networks in 
isolation fails to capture how conflict takes place among populations, as well as how 
combatants (i.e., authorities and insurgents) and noncombatants (e.g., civilians) often interact 
to acquire and disseminate information about one another in such settings. Moreover, this 
perspective assumes the “side” to which individuals belong is fixed over time, which is 
problematic because many people switch sides and/or often serve both in insurgent warfare 
(Department of the Army, 2017; Department of the Navy, 2017; Kilcullen, 2013; United 
States Government, 2016).  
These limitations have consequences for understanding the dynamics of information-
sharing social networks in insurgent warfare. A critical task of such efforts is identifying and 
untangling the ways by which individuals form connections—in this case sharing 
information—in response to others and their relationships; that is, the social processes that 
undergird social systems (Borgatti et al., 2013; Lusher et al., 2013; Padgett & Powell, 2012; 
Robins, 2015; Snijders et al., 2010). Analyzing the evolution of even a single social network, 
such as authority or insurgent information-sharing ones, is a difficult task. Individuals join 
and leave networks, as well as form and dissolve ties in response to their social environment, 
such as attempting to access new information through social ties pertaining to their (e.g., 
survive conflict) or their network’s goals (e.g., gain control over a populace). Yet, because 
authority and insurgent networks often interweave in insurgent warfare, it is likely they 
4 
evolve mutually too—or co-evolve—in part, because they are open systems and make up 
part of each other’s social environment. For instance, a prominent civilian leader with a 
history of providing information to the government about insurgent efforts may provide 
insurgents with information about local civilian-military projects after being threatened by a 
government soldier, or an insurgent sympathizer may “switch sides” and offer the 
government information about insurgent weaponry when the latter offers incentives to do so. 
In both cases, the result is a change in a network’s structure. When many of these interactions 
occur, often simultaneously, they combine into a complex set of social processes that help 
drive a network’s dynamics (Lusher et al., 2013; Robins, 2015; Snijders et al., 2010). These 
points suggest both intra- and inter-network social processes may drive an insurgent 
network’s evolution simultaneously. Therefore, this dissertation examines the following 
question: How do information-sharing social networks evolve mutually (i.e., co-evolve) as 
they compete in insurgent warfare?  
In particular, it serves three purposes. The first is to test hypotheses about social 
processes that underly how competing social networks co-evolve in insurgent warfare. 
Because networks are comprised of many levels, this study offers hypotheses about micro 
social processes that likely occur at individual, dyad, triad, and subgroup levels4 within and 
between empirical social networks (Goldstein, 1999; Lichtenstein, 2000; Lusher et al., 2013; 
McKelvey, 1997; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Snijders et al., 2010; Wycisk et al., 2008). Its 
second purpose is to analyze insurgent networks from a perspective on social systems that is 
consistent with insurgency and counterinsurgency literature: namely, social systems 
comprised of competitive, overlapping insurgent, civilian, and counterinsurgent networks in 
operational settings.5 With these points in mind, this dissertation’s final aim is to build upon 
Monge and Contractor’s (2003) framework, which fuses complex adaptive systems and 
social network research through a shared emphasis on co-evolution and related social system 
 
4 These the basic units of analysis in social network research. An actor, which is often referred to as a 
node or vertex in graph theory, can be a person, organization, nation-state, etc. Wasserman and Faust 
(1994), who provide much of the foundation for much of modern day social network research, define dyads 
as subgraphs consisting of two nodes and the possible ties between them, where as they define triads are 
subgroups consisting of three nodes and all ties among them. 
5 This point is related to the idea of social network or social system boundaries, which is a definition 
that determines the entities and relations to be included in a social system.  
5 
concepts, and apply it as a means to address gaps in the empirical study of co-evolving 
networks in insurgent warfare.  
B. MULTITHEORETICAL, MULTILEVEL (MTML) FRAMEWORK: 
FUSING COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL NETWORK 
RESEARCH 
This dissertation utilizes Monge and Contractor’s (2003) multitheoretical, multilevel 
(MTML) analytic framework to study the co-evolution of competing, information-sharing 
social networks in insurgent warfare. This framework blends complex adaptive systems and 
social network research through its emphasis on co-evolutionary social processes that take 
place within and between multilevel social systems. This perspective on co-evolution focuses 
on systems’ micro changes within and between system levels in response to an environment 
and how such dynamics give rise to emergent macro patterns (Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; 
Dooley, 1997; Lichtenstein, 2000; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Porter, 2006; Robins, 2015; 
Snijders et al., 2007). It integrates the two bodies’ shared concepts closely related to co-
evolution as well: namely, network emergence and self-organization (Monge & Contractor, 
2003, p. xii). The former is the “arising of novel and coherent structures” (Goldstein, 1999) 
in dynamic systems from “local” interactions (Holland, 1998; Lichtenstein, 2000; Monge & 
Contractor, 2003), while the latter generally comprises of a broad range of pattern-formation 
processes that attempt to explain the emergence of stable patterns and structure from the 
interactions of a system’s constituent parts (Haken & Portugali, 2016; Kauffman, 1993; 
Monge & Contractor, 2003; Prigogine et al., 1988).  
The framework is multitheoretical in the sense that it argues that researchers should 
draw from a variety of network theories to explain emergent and evolving social systems. 
Specifically, the authors contend that co-evolution and self-organization, which encompass 
a variety of micro social processes, such as reciprocity6 and homophily,7 serve as central 
 
6 Reciprocity is a return in some good or relationship. What is reciprocated depends on the context. 
For instance, person A may provide person B with information who, in turn, reciprocates and provides 
person A with information (Glanville & Bienenstock, 2009; Robins, 2015).  
7 Homophily is the tendency of individuals to form relations with similar others, or those with 
common characteristics or attributes (Lawrence & Shah, 2020; Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; McPherson et 
al., 2001). 
6 
forces driving social network dynamics, often simultaneously. In line with complex adaptive 
systems and social network research, this perspective accounts for both categories of 
processes and focuses on how each one determines a social system’s macro structure 
(Anderson, 1999; Choi et al., 2001; Dooley, 1997; Levin, 1998; Lusher et al., 2013; 
McKelvey, 1997; Monge & Contractor, 2003). The framework is multilevel in the way that 
it enables researchers to account explicitly for social processes that take place at various 
network levels and help undergird larger social systems, including the actor or degree level 
(e.g., behaviors), various structural levels within a network (e.g., dyad, triads, cluster, and 
global), and across social networks (e.g., multiplex relations8).  
In line with Monge and Contractor’s (2003) framework, as well as others’ research 
(Lane, 2006; Padgett & Powell, 2012; Sawyer, 2005), this study draws insights from both 
complex adaptive systems and social network research perspectives to examine co-evolving 
social networks in the context of insurgent warfare. Complex adaptive systems research, 
which accelerated during the 1990s and 2000s and is part of the broader “complex systems” 
domain, builds upon decades of social systems research. While no single definition exists, 
scholars often describe complex adaptive systems as those in which higher level patterns, 
aggregate behaviors, or order emerge from the actions and localized interactions of its 
adaptive components (e.g., individuals) rather than from centralized control; that is, they self-
organize (Anderson, 1999; Gell-Mann, 1994; Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1992; Holland & 
Miller, 1991; Levin, 1998; Mitchell, 2009; Sawyer, 2005). In addition to self-organizing 
behavior, these multilevel systems co-evolve with their environments, often as a result of 
competition for resources (Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; Dooley, 1997; Lichtenstein, 2000; 
McKelvey, 1997; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Porter, 2006). Complex adaptive systems, 
therefore, are different from other complex systems in the sense that individual components, 
often called agents, have cognitive abilities to collect information from their environment 
and adapt accordingly to try to reach their goals or the system’s goals over time (Wycisk et 
al., 2008). They possess many other characteristics too, such as nonlinearity that produces 
unpredictable patterns and order, heterogenous and autonomous agents, radical openness and 
 
8 Multiplex networks comprise of two or more types of relations among any number of same 
individuals. 
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porous boundaries, memory, dispersed interaction, flows between units (e.g., information), 
modular or clustered subsystems, cross-cutting hierarchical organization from self-
organization and co-evolution, far-from-equilibrium dynamics, and novelty (Dooley, 1997; 
Holland, 1992; Holland & Miller, 1991; Levin, 1998; Miller & Page, 2007; Porter, 2006; 
Preiser et al., 2018). 
Like complex adaptive systems research, social network research is a way of thinking 
about social systems (Borgatti et al., 2013; Robins, 2015). Social networks are social systems 
made up of social actors, such as insurgents, civilians, and government personnel, and the 
relations among them (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). A major underlying assumption of this 
research domain is that social systems are unique in that social beings, such as humans, have 
agency9 and are intentional. In other words, individuals can interpret information from their 
social environment and make decisions about how to act and behave (Choi et al., 2001; 
Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Robins, 2015). Social context is important too. A social system 
in which individuals embed, including other actors and relationships, serve as their 
environment and can affect one’s future ties, norms, beliefs, and behaviors, which is why the 
field generally considers both individual and system level factors in analyses (Borgatti et al., 
2013; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Everton, 2012; Robins, 2015). Because of these 
characteristics, it is unlikely that a single theory or law explains all social networks. Instead, 
social network research emphasizes that a social system’s structure is a consequence of 
dynamic social processes among social actors (Lusher et al., 2013; Monge & Contractor, 
2003; Robins, 2015; Snijders et al., 2010), which suggests information-sharing ties in 
insurgent warfare, in part, come into existence between individuals in response to social 
environments comprised of other combatants and noncombatants (Lusher et al., 2013).  
Consequently, social network researchers also emphasize the multilevel nature of 
social networks and have outlined many of the foundational ideas about social processes at 
multiple network levels (Kadushin, 2012; Lusher et al., 2013; Monge & Contractor, 2003; 
Robins, 2015; Snijders et al., 2010). The central idea is that many local, and often nested, 
 
9 In a broad sense, agency is ability to “intervene meaningfully in the course of events” (Choi et al., 
2001), such as choosing to form connections with others, and whereby the “system” does not necessarily 
determine outcomes (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Kadushin, 2012). 
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system effects, combine into a complex set of social processes that undergird social systems 
(Lusher et al., 2013). While many social networks, for example, exhibit underlying social 
processes such as preferential attachment (Barabási, 2016), many other plausible 
mechanisms can help researchers explain social network emergence and dynamics, such as 
structural processes other than preferential attachment (e.g., social exchange10), co-
evolution, multiplexity, social selection (e.g., homophily), and social influence (e.g., 
diffusion). In other words, several social processes may be at play simultaneously and occur 
at different network levels in any given context (Borgatti et al., 2013; Lusher et al., 2013; 
Robins, 2015; Snijders et al., 2010).  
Like complex adaptive systems research, social network researchers assumes that 
social systems are locally emergent in that repeated interactions of social entities give rise to 
emergent structures in which the whole is greater than the mere sum of its parts, including 
instances when multiple social networks overlap to make up a larger social system (Everton, 
2012; Lusher et al., 2013; Padgett & Powell, 2012; Robins, 2015). Moreover, social ties 
function as conduits for the flow of information and resources, although typically social 
network studies do not conceptualize information as Shannon, pragmatic, or semantic11 
(Borgatti & Cross, 2003; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Crossley et al., 2015; Kadushin, 2012). 
Social network researchers recognize that social networks are dynamic as well, which is why 
researchers have increasingly examined how social networks self-organize, albeit in a much 
more implicit manner than complex adaptive systems research, as well as evolve over time, 
including how social networks co-evolve with others (Fujimoto et al., 2018; Lusher et al., 
2013; Rambaran et al., 2015; Robins, 2015; Snijders et al., 2007; Steglich et al., 2006).  
Monge and Contractor’s (2003) MTML framework fuses complex adaptive systems 
and social network research around the two interdisciplinary research bodies’ natural points 
of synthesis, such as shared assumptions (i.e., system components’ interdependence through 
relations), the uniqueness of social systems (e.g., intentionality), and most pointedly, their 
 
10 Social exchange is often indicated by the reciprocal exchange of some material or non-material 
good (Glanville & Bienenstock, 2009).  
11 Shannon information is a the “capacity of a channel through which a message passes,” whereas 
pragmatic information is the “impact of a message on recipients,” and semantic information is, “the 
meaning conveyed by a message” (Haken & Portugali, 2016, p. 1; Mitchell, 2009). 
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shared emphasis on the multilevel nature of social systems in which self-organizing and co-
evolutionary social processes (i.e., multitheoretical) propel emergent structures at different 
levels. By doing so, this framework facilitates the study of co-evolving social networks in 
insurgent warfare and addresses important gaps in existing literature. Specifically, the 
complex adaptive systems perspective’s unique contribution to the topic is that it aids 
analysis from a standpoint on system boundaries that is consistent with insurgency and 
counterinsurgency literature: namely, social systems that encompass open and competitive, 
information-sharing social networks that are comprised of dynamic social beings, 
specifically combatants and noncombatants, who influence and react to their social 
environment. This perspective offers a more realistic depiction of social systems in insurgent 
warfare than existing social network literature on “dark networks” and enables one to 
interpret them in a more complete and useful manner. Social network research’s central 
contribution is its emphasis on identifying local social processes underlying empirical social 
systems. Though extant social network literature has failed to address insurgent networks 
adequately to date, this domain offers the most useful avenue to examine co-evolving, 
empirical social networks in operational settings, which addresses another major gap in the 
study of social systems in insurgent warfare.  
Yet, the two research domains diverge in several notable ways for which one must 
account when leveraging the MTML framework. In addition to historical lineage and scope, 
a notable point of divergence is the extent to which the domains address relevant concepts 
explicitly, such as emergence and self-organization. Such concepts are central to complex 
adaptive systems research while they appear to receive relatively less overt attention in social 
network research. The MTML framework, as well as this dissertation, aligns more closely 
with the former view in that it argues that analyses should account explicitly for these 
concepts, especially when studying co-evolution (Monge & Contractor, 2003). Likewise, the 
two research bodies do not necessarily apply key concepts in the same manner. The concept 
of complex adaptive systems is at a high level of abstraction, and while it offers many insights 
into social systems, many of its concepts and principles in its orbit do not translate seamlessly 
nor are measured easily in the analysis of empirical social systems (Eidelson, 1997; Lansing, 
2003; Sawyer, 2005). This challenge is apparent by the fact that empirical social network 
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studies rarely, if ever, explicitly incorporate and model relevant complex adaptive systems 
concepts and principles, such as bifurcations, self-organized criticality, homeostasis, and 
networks evolving at the edge of chaos (Borgatti et al., 2013; Cilliers, 1998; Eidelson, 1997; 
Kauffman, 1993; Robins, 2015; Root, 2020).  
The two diverge in their main approach for understanding social systems as well. 
Complex adaptive systems researchers commonly leverage computational, agent-based 
models that generate structures and system behaviors based on simulated agent’s decisions 
and interactions rather than map aggregate empirical social systems. While social network 
researchers recognize that individuals have cognition and it is an underlying assumption that 
information flows through social ties (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011), typically they do not model 
them explicitly. Monge and Contractor (2003) rely heavily on complex adaptive systems 
literature and agent-based modeling to illustrate and apply the MTML framework, yet they 
argue and demonstrate that social network models for empirical data are valid approaches 
too for analyzing complex systems (Lusher et al., 2013; Snijders et al., 2010; Snijders et al., 
2007). Recent advances in social network statistical models since the authors published the 
framework have closed the gap between the two by permitting analysts to model dynamic, 
multilevel social processes on empirical social network data (Ripley et al., 2021).  
With these points in mind, this dissertation’s focus, like Monge and Contractor 
(2003), is on co-evolution and inherently related concepts, specifically emergence and self-
organization, that both complex adaptive system and social network research address 
explicitly, albeit to varying extents, and can measure from a structural perspective. 
Nonetheless, little consensus exists about each concept’s meaning and application; therefore, 
this dissertation’s limited goal is to illustrate this framework’s perspective for each concept 
and highlight their relevance to this topic, rather than offer an exhaustive review about 
philosophical debates surrounding each one (Koliba et al., 2016; Lane, 2006; Marcum, 2009; 
Walby, 2007). 
C. MULTILEVEL SOCIAL NETWORKS AND EMERGENCE 
The multilevel nature of social systems is a central aspect of the MTML framework 
and directly related to co-evolution. It is the idea that dynamic social processes take place at 
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multiple levels of analysis (Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; Goldstein, 1999; Levin, 2005; 
Lichtenstein, 2000; Lusher et al., 2013; McKelvey, 1997; Robins, 2015; Wycisk et al., 2008). 
A primary goal of co-evolution studies is to understand how “adaptive changes within and 
between” system levels and environment give rise to emergent patterns and behavior 
(Lichtenstein, 2000, p. 13). Drawing from complexity and social sciences, Monge and 
Contractor (2003) outline various theories that may help researchers hypothesize about social 
system dynamics at different network levels (i.e., individual, dyad, triad, subgroup, and 
global), most of which fall within the categories of self-organizing and co-evolutionary social 
processes.  
The notion of multilevel social systems is inherently related to the concept of 
emergence (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998; Lichtenstein, 2000; Monge & Contractor, 
2003). It is a broad set of perspectives that assumes systems are made up of levels and that 
patterns, structure, and behavior at “higher levels” are greater than the mere sum of 
underlying parts (Wycisk et al., 2008). Focusing on structural emergence, Monge and 
Contractor (2003) claim that local or micro, self-organizing and co-evolutionary processes 
at their defined network levels generate emergent structural patterns at higher ones. At each 
system level, one cannot explain its structure, patterns, and behaviors wholly in terms of 
another level.  
However, the notion of emergence is “less than an organized, rigorous theory than a 
collection of ideas” (Lissack, 1999, p. 112) which argue that dynamic patterns underlie global 
properties, such as behavior and structure (Corning, 2002). While the extent to which a level 
“determines” or “causes” others is a central question in emergence studies, the MTML 
framework accounts for both bottom-up processes, which are viewed as tie formation 
“tendencies” within a network, as well as top-down constraints from existing social 
structures (Kontopoulos, 1993; McKelvey, 1997; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Padgett & 
Powell, 2012; Robins, 2015). It also recognizes that feedback processes can drive dynamics 
at each level (e.g., reciprocity at a dyad level) and “external” influences, such as other social 
networks, may contribute to social system dynamics as well (Monge & Contractor, 2003, p. 
13).  
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D. SOCIAL PROCESSES AND SELF-ORGANIZATION IN THE MTML 
FRAMEWORK  
Self-organization is a central concept to the MTML framework and a pertinent 
concept in complexity science and social network research (Ashby, 1962; Bak, 1996; Haken, 
1977; Kauffman, 1993; Lusher et al., 2013; Maturana & Varela, 1980; Robins, 2015). A 
foundational element of self-organizing behavior is that patterns emerge spontaneously from 
nonlinear dynamics and without the intervention and direction of a “central controller.” 
Monge and Contractor (2003) rely heavily on complex systems science literature and agent-
based modeling to study self-organization, yet they argue and demonstrate that a social 
network research approach is valid for analyzing self-organizing and co-evolving social 
systems. Building on their work and other prominent network studies (Albert & Barabási, 
2002; Barabási, 2002; Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003; Watts, 1999a; Watts & Strogatz, 1998), 
this analysis utilizes a social network research approach to self-organization because of its 
emphasis on empirical social networks. Specifically, it draws from Robins’s (2015, p. 34) 
definition of self-organization, which is structural processes “where the presence of some 
network ties sustains the ongoing presence of other network ties, or encourages them into 
existence.” From this perspective, self-organizing is a category of intra-network, social 
processes that contribute to social network emergence and dynamics (Lusher et al., 2013). 
Thus, the study of co-evolving social networks in insurgent warfare should account for self-
organization to determine the extent to which it, rather than co-evolution, contributes to 
network dynamics (Anderson, 1999; Choi et al., 2001; Dooley, 1997; Levin, 1998; 
McKelvey, 1997; Monge & Contractor, 2003). Common self-organization processes in 
social networks are preferential attachment (actor level), reciprocity (dyad level), and triadic 
closure (triad level), all of which are dynamic and may occur in social networks 
simultaneously.  
Using Robins’s (2015) definition of self-organization, one can imagine self-
organizing behavior in insurgent warfare as combatants and noncombatants exchange 
information. The mixture of civilians and combatants in overlapping networks suggests 
many relations are informal, or naturally occurring ties created to access information, rather 
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than formal ones (Biancani et al., 2014; Kadushin, 2012).12 Informal ties are far more likely 
to define spontaneous interactions and self-organizing than formal ties even though they 
often overlap, embed, are constrained by, and serve the same goals of formal ones (Goldstein, 
1999; Kadushin, 2012, p. 39; Monge & Contractor, 2003, p. 10). While military and many 
insurgents, as well as civilians, tend to maintain formal organizational memberships with 
others, they are rarely, if ever, members of the same organizations during active conflict; 
instead, they appear to develop informal, information-sharing ties when they interact with 
others outside their formal structures. For instance, in 2007, U.S. forces successfully initiated 
informal agreements with tribal leaders in several Iraqi provinces, sometimes called 
“handshake agreements,” to establish information sharing ties, stop violence between the 
two, and fight al-Qaeda and other extremists (Cordesman, 2007; Kuehl, 2009). Competition 
between insurgents and government forces is only likely to fuel self-organizing behavior 
further (Astley, 1985; Cilliers, 1998; Monge & Contractor, 2003). 
E. CO-EVOLUTION AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
This study focuses on co-evolving, competing social networks in insurgent warfare, 
which is a key mechanism within the MTML framework. Like the concepts of emergence 
and self-organization, co-evolution has drawn interest from various research domains. 
Ehrlich and Raven (1964), the biologists who some have credited with coining the term co-
evolution (McKelvey, 1997; Porter, 2006), describe it as the genetic change of one species 
in response to the evolution of another. Initially envisioned for biological applications, such 
as dynamic interactions between plants and herbivores and the study of genetic evolution 
(Kauffman, 1993), it has become a central concept to complex adaptive systems and social 
network research (Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; Dooley, 1997; Lichtenstein, 2000; 
McKelvey, 1997; Porter, 2006; Robins, 2015; Snijders et al., 2007). Scholars have applied it 
to examine how various types of social systems evolve mutually with their environments, 
whether it be firms and/or alliances and organizational networks (Baum & Singh, 1994; Koza 
 
12 In contrast to formal ties, or mandated structures (e.g., formal hierarchy) that guide how 
organizations coordinate activities, processes, and functions, informal social ties emerge naturally through 
voluntary interactions among individuals (Biancani et al., 2014; Kadushin, 2012).The U.S. military’s 
hierarchy is a straightforward example of formal connections. 
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& Lewin, 1998; Lewin et al., 1999), organizational strategy (Dooley, 1997), or social 
networks (Amati et al., 2021; Choi et al., 2001; Daniel et al., 2016; Fujimoto et al., 2018; 
Huitsing et al., 2014; Steglich et al., 2006). 
While various research domains offer insight about co-evolving social systems and 
are not necessarily contradictory, many have operationalized the concept differently. For 
instance, it is common for researchers leveraging a complex adaptive systems perspective to 
study such systems using agent-based models built upon simulated agents driven by schema 
or decision-rules (Carmichael & Hadžikadić, 2019; Lansing, 2003; McKelvey, 1999; Miller 
& Page, 2007; Monge & Contractor, 2003). Yet, however insightful, many complex adaptive 
system principles and model assumptions are difficult to apply and measure in empirical 
social systems (Anderson, 1999; Eidelson, 1997). In fact, while Monge and Contractor 
(2003, pp. 294–295) explore co-evolving organizational networks from a complex adaptive 
systems perspective, they recognize these limitations and argue that several “emerging” 
social network research models, such as stochastic actor oriented models (SAOMs), enable 
researchers to leverage their framework. At the time of the MTML framework’s introduction, 
however, these models were in their infancy and not widely available. 
Social networks researchers have increasingly examined the concept of co-evolution. 
Like complexity and organization sciences, social network co-evolution studies focus on 
how networked actors mutually evolve with their social environments consisting of other 
individuals and relations (Kadushin, 2012; Lazega & Snijders, 2016; Snijders et al., 2010; 
Walby, 2007). Such empirical studies commonly frame co-evolution as the interplay of actor 
behaviors (e.g., drug use) and a single type of relationship (e.g., friendships). The goal of 
such analyses is to untangle, and assess the extent to which, social influence, social selection, 
and self-organizing processes (i.e., purely structural) at multiple levels drive an empirical 
network’s dynamics. However, the multirelational or multiplex nature of social systems, 
such as those comprised of insurgent and authority information-sharing ties, also suggests 
micro social processes can involve multiple types of relations (Porter, 2006). In fact, existing 
research has demonstrated that social relations can interact at many network levels to produce 
structures by influencing the formation, maintenance, or dissolution of another (Amati et al., 
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2021; Fujimoto et al., 2018; Gould, 1991; Granovetter, 1973; Huitsing et al., 2014, 2014; 
Lee & Monge, 2011; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Rambaran et al., 2015). 
Interestingly, as statistical models for the study of empirical networks have become 
more sophisticated, as Monge and Contractor (2003) foretold, researchers have begun to 
consider multiplex dynamics as a form of co-evolution in which different networks are 
mutually constitutive at multiple network levels (Amati et al., 2021; Daniel et al., 2016; 
Ellwardt et al., 2012; Fujimoto et al., 2018; Htwe et al., 2020; Huitsing et al., 2014; Rambaran 
et al., 2015; Stadtfeld et al., 2020; Warren, 2016). Like the interplay of behaviors and ties, 
this approach seeks to untangle inter-network, self-organizing processes from co-
evolutionary ones; however, this perspective characterizes co-evolution as multilevel social 
processes between overlapping social ties/networks in which the presence of one type can 
influence the presence, maintenance, or dissolution of another. This approach to co-
evolution, therefore, focuses on inter-network dynamics rather than the interplay of behavior 
and a single network. Ultimately, this dissertation views co-evolution from this perspective 
in which overlapping authority and insurgent information-sharing structures evolve through 
intra-network, self-organizing processes as well as inter-network, co-evolutionary processes 
at multiple network levels, which is an approach that addresses important gaps within extant 
insurgent warfare literature. In line with the research question, the goal here is to untangle 
and assess the extent to which co-evolutionary processes contribute to empirical network 
dynamics in insurgent warfare. 
F. CASE STUDY: THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF 
COLOMBIA (FARC) INSURGENCY 
To examine the co-evolution of social networks in insurgent warfare, this dissertation 
analyzes competing social networks in the conflict between the Colombian Government and 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Founded in 1964, the FARC is a now 
defunct insurgent organization that until 2016, was one of the oldest insurgent organizations 
in the world (Cunningham et al., 2013; Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, 
2020). Beginning as a Marxist-Leninist group, it evolved into a violent, narcotics trafficking 
organization that coerced the peasant population it promised to protect (Cunningham et al., 
2013; Metelits, 2010). In 2016, the FARC agreed to a peace plan with the Colombian 
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Government after decades of involvement in the illegal drug trade, kidnapping, and 
terrorism, as well as major successes and setbacks. Following the agreement, more than 
11,000 fighters demobilized (Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, 2020), and the 
group become a political party and renamed itself to the Fuerza Alternativa Revolutionaria 
del Común (Common Alternative Revolutionary Force—FARC). 
As an active insurgency, the FARC’s semi-distributed command system enabled it 
to establish social relations with noncombatants who served as critical conduits for 
information about the populace, other groups (e.g., narcotics trafficking groups), and the 
government (Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, 2020; Metelits, 2010; Stanford 
University, 2019). It established information-sharing ties in both urban and rural areas 
through political, informant, recruitment, and other networks. Though the extent to which 
the FARC embedded in local, rural populations varied over the years, it largely drew most 
of its recruits, information, and other resources from this segment of the populace (Metelits, 
2010). It established a presence in Colombia’s cities with the creation of the Clandestine 
Colombian Communist Party (PCCC) and the Bolivarian Movement for the New Colombia 
(MBNC) in the 1990s (Cunningham et al., 2013; International Crisis Group, 2009), as well 
as worked with urban gangs and criminal organizations to cooperate in the drug trade and 
serve as informants in its conflict with the government (Jane’s World Terrorism and 
Insurgency Centre, 2020; Metelits, 2010; Stanford University, 2019). As such, this 
insurgency serves as a useful case study to examine co-evolution in insurgent warfare given 
its historical significance as an insurgency, as well as the embedded nature of information-
sharing networks comprised of insurgents, government, and noncombatants. 
G. METHODOLOGY 
This study takes a social network approach to investigate the dynamic interplay of 
authority and insurgent information-sharing networks in insurgent warfare. It applies a 
longitudinal complete network design to analyze a subset of the broader conflict in Colombia, 
namely competing networks in the Southern Bloc’s area of operations during the January 
2002-April 2003 timeframe. Based on official, unclassified Colombian Government 
“Demobilization Reports,” this dissertation builds (and then analyzes) two longitudinal, 
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overlapping information-sharing social networks comprised of several types of actors, 
including government personnel, civilians, FARC militia members, and then-active and 
demobilized FARC members who shared information to serve the government’s COIN 
efforts and/or the FARC’s objectives (e.g., offering actional information about the FARC 
and providing “insider” government information). Many individuals were embedded in both 
networks simultaneously and at different times. 
Drawing from Monge and Contractor’s (2003, p. 3) description of communication 
networks, as well as Kadushin’s (2012, pp. 39–42) notion of informal ties, this analysis 
defines information-sharing relations as informal connections that are created by the flow of 
messages among individuals. It is important to note four points about this definition. First, 
this definition is consistent with extant COIN literature’s emphasis on the importance of in-
person relations in insurgent warfare (Cleveland et al., 2018; Department of the Army, 2017; 
Department of the Navy, 2017; Kilcullen, 2010; McAdam, 1999; Pye, 1950; Sageman, 
2004). Second, these in-person ties should not be confused with online, social media 
interactions. While social media is often used to disseminate narratives to larger audiences, 
mobilize populations, and can serve as a place where recruitment begins (Benigni et al., 2017; 
Hassanpour, 2014), additional research is needed to examine its specific role in operational 
level social networks, as well as online and offline relational dynamics in insurgent warfare 
(Kane et al., 2014; Robins, 2015). For instance, there is no evidence that social media played 
a role at the operational level in this particular case study, though this is likely due to its time 
frame (i.e., 2002–2003). Third, because this is archival research, this study is unable to assess 
the veracity of information passed through interactions as well as capture message quantity 
(i.e., Shannon information), impact (e.g., pragmatic information), and meaning (i.e., 
semantic information) (Haken & Portugali, 2016). It does, however, consider the frequency 
and duration of interactions (i.e., how many times two individuals shared information and 
for how long) to attempt to model “enduring” ties and address issues pertaining to informant 
accuracy, which reflects one’s ability to recall interactions with others and is described in 
greater detail in Chapter IV. Fourth, like Monge and Contractor (2003, p. 3), the term 
“messages” is used in a broad sense here to refer to data, information, knowledge, and facts 
about the conflict that move from one person in a network to another.  
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This analysis utilizes a multivariate extension of SAOMs to test hypotheses about 
social processes undergirding the co-evolution of competing authority and insurgent 
networks. Generally, SAOMs are models designed to represent network dynamics and 
evaluate them based on the paradigm of statistical inference (Ripley et al., 2021; Snijders et 
al., 2010; Snijders, 1996, 2005; Steglich et al., 2006). The goal of SAOMs is to model 
empirical data on patterns of ties and behaviors and to identify a set of multilevel social 
processes that most likely reflect actor decisions. A common way to employ SAOMs is to 
treat observed networks as dependent variables and incorporate network dynamics, as driven 
by different tendencies, into models as independent variables (e.g., structural effects 
reflecting social processes, actor variables, and dyadic (or tie-based) variables). This 
approach captures how the network itself helps explain its own dynamics; that is, it accounts 
for self-organizing processes along with actor characteristics and behaviors (e.g., attitude, 
performance) that help drive evolutionary processes and undergird emergent structures 
(Ripley et al., 2021; Snijders, 1996). 
While one can regard SAOMs as a form of agent-based model that align somewhat 
with agent-based modeling commonly used in complex adaptive systems research, these 
models are designed for empirical relational data and often used in social network research. 
They assume actors make decisions to create, maintain, or terminate ties to others, yet social 
actors are influenced by the networks in which they embed. However, the authors (Ripley et 
al., 2021, p. 9) are clear that, “actor oriented does not imply the assumption that they actors 
make decisions in any real sense,” nor do they, “reflect a commitment to or belief in any 
particular theory of action elaborated in the scientific disciplines.” Rather, this model class’s 
purpose is to help researchers explore and develop theories of networks at various levels 
from an actor perspective, recognizing that, like other regression models, SAOMs do not 
solve causal questions through modeling alone (Ripley et al., 2021).  
This study uses a multiplex SAOM extension to examine dependencies between the 
competing networks. This extension, which is consistent with the MTML’s definition of 
network levels, uses similar modeling and statistical procedures as traditional SAOMs, but it 
produces three categories of parameters: uniplex ones for each network that reflect intra-
network, self-organizing processes; actor level, or covariate parameters to show effects for 
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actor characteristics; and multiplex parameters that network represent co-evolutionary, social 
processes (Fujimoto et al., 2018; Huitsing et al., 2014; Rambaran et al., 2015; Ripley et al., 
2021; Snijders et al., 2013). As with standard SAOMs, the models treat networks as 
dependent variables, while structural mechanisms at various levels (e.g., dyad, triad, and 
cluster) serve as independent variables for estimating self-organizing tendencies. The second 
set incorporate the effects of actor attributes on each network, whereas one can obtain the 
third set of parameters after combining the networks into a multiplex network, and 
subsequently testing for co-evolutionary dynamics at various levels.  
This dissertation examines multilevel co-evolutionary processes between competing 
networks in insurgent warfare. To establish context, Chapter II describes counterinsurgency 
and insurgency theory and establishes the important roles that competition, populations, and 
information play in insurgent warfare. Chapter III presents the MTML framework as a means 
to examine dynamic social processes within and between social networks. Guided by Monge 
and Contractor (2003), it offers perspectives on network emergence, self-organization, and 
co-evolution, as well as hypothesizes about social processes that can help drive competing 
networks’ dynamics in insurgent warfare. Chapter IV describes this study’s use case, 
methodology, and modeling procedures, while Chapter V summarizes and discusses the 
results of the analysis. The final chapter, Chapter VI, presents this study’s contributions and 
conclusions as well as describes its limitations and offers suggestions for future research.  
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II. COMPETITION, INFORMATION, AND SOCIAL NETWORKS 
IN INSURGENT WARFARE 
According to Field Manual (FM) 3–24/MCWP 3-33.5 (Department of the Army, 
2014), an insurgency is “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or 
challenge political control of a region.” Throughout history, insurgents have challenged 
governments to gain control over populations (Thompson, 1967). However, it becomes 
clear after a brief historical review that each insurgency is quite unique based on the context 
in which it occurs. According to David Galula (2006),13 a variety of factors shape the 
nature of insurgencies, such as their relationship with the authorities they seek to replace, 
whether they are rural or urban, and their ideology. Inspired by Galula’s work, FM 3-24 
(Department of the Army, 2014) offers additional elements that influence an insurgency’s 
characteristics, including its leadership and objectives, the nature of external and internal 
support it receives, the phasing and timing of the conflict, and its organizational structure 
and modus operandi. These works highlight why insurgencies pose significant challenges 
for counterinsurgents to grasp their underlying causes, as well as respond effectively to 
their complexity.  
The U.S. government defines counterinsurgency (COIN) as, “comprehensive 
civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and 
address its root causes” (Department of the Army, 2014, p. 2).14 Scholars and practitioners 
have addressed a variety of theoretical and practical topics pertaining to insurgencies, such 
as their characteristics (Galula, 2006; O’Neill, 2005), how to analyze them (United States 
Government, 2018a), how they begin and end (Paul et al., 2013) , and what factors make 
them successful (or unsuccessful) (Paul et al., 2013). Foundational works by classical 
COIN scholars (Galula, 2006; Gann, 1971; Taber, 1965; Thompson, 1967; Trinquier, 
2006), as well as more contemporary scholars (Berman et al., 2018; Kilcullen, 2010, 2013), 
 
13 Galula’s book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, was originally published in 1964.  
14 Though debates remain about the most useful definition of COIN, many scholars describe it as a 
comprehensive reaction to insurgent attempts to seize power (Galula, 2006; Kilcullen, 2015; Paul et al., 
2016). It is, however, beyond this dissertation’s scope to enter this debate.  
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are commonly referenced resources in official U.S. government publications. For instance, 
FM 3-24 (2014) and Joint Publication (JP) 35, Countering Threat Networks (2016), include 
lessons learned from recent insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in large part, draw 
from the insights of these leading thinkers.  
Building on this literature, the study of social networks in insurgent warfare will 
benefit by accounting for its competitive nature in which insurgents, authorities, and 
noncombatants (i.e., civilians) interact and exchange information. In its essence, insurgent 
warfare is competition between governments and insurgents that takes place among and 
for the support and control of a populace (Galula, 2006; Guevara, 2007; Kilcullen, 2010; 
Nagl, 2005; Tse-Tung, 1989). Because populations play a central role in conflict, 
information plays a decisive role in a conflict’s outcome (Galula, 2006; Guevara, 2007; 
Tse-Tung, 1989). The centrality of information is why scholars address vital topics such as 
information operations (IO), as well as the capabilities that can enable them, such as 
military information support operations (MISO) and civil-military operations (CMO). 
While numerous means exist to acquire and disseminate information in operational 
environments, such as social media interactions (e.g., Twitter and Facebook), in-person 
social relations serve as critical conduits for the flow of information in social networks, 
including those in insurgent warfare (Cleveland et al., 2018; Galula, 2006; Guevara, 2007; 
Kilcullen, 2010; Pye, 1950; Tse-Tung, 1989). As individuals exchange information 
pertaining to a population or enemy in public spaces, such as patrols, or private settings, 
such as key leader engagements and intelligence reporting, whether they be combatants 
(e.g., insurgents or military) and/or noncombatants (e.g., civilians), they form information-
sharing social networks that each side can leverage in the competition with their adversaries 
(Cleveland et al., 2018; Department of the Army, 2017; Department of the Navy, 2017).  
This chapter begins with a brief discussion about two major approaches of COIN 
that lay the groundwork for the study of social systems in insurgent warfare. The two 
approaches, known as population-centric and enemy-centric viewpoints, diverge in notable 
ways; however, the nature of insurgent warfare highlights how noncombatants play central 
roles in such conflicts regardless of approach. Next, this chapter outlines the practical and 
theoretical roots of contemporary COIN, especially regarding competition and the 
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population-centric paradigm, which has emerged as the dominant, Western approach to 
COIN. Next, it describes the important role that information plays in insurgent warfare for 
combatants and noncombatants, as well as how offline, in-person social networks serve as 
important conduits for information exchanges within such competitive contexts. While 
systems and social network research domains have looked at insurgencies and related 
networks (e.g., terrorist networks and social movements) from “system” perspectives, they 
have not fully captured the competitive nature of insurgent warfare nor have they paid 
adequate attention to empirical social systems in such contexts. It closes by addressing 
these limitations and presenting a perspective on network boundaries that accounts for the 
competitive context in which combatants and noncombatants seek information and form 
overlapping structures.  
A. COIN PARADIGMS 
Two dominant COIN philosophies exist: namely population-centric and enemy-
centric (Kilcullen, 2010; Paul et al., 2016). The population-centric view emphasizes the 
centrality of the populace for COIN success. It views the populace as an important source 
of survival for insurgencies, and therefore, focuses on luring it away from insurgents. This 
approach, often seen as a reaction to Mao Tse-tung’s (1989) influential writings on 
guerrilla warfare, is rooted in the views of classical COIN theorists, such as David Galula 
(2006), who believed that controlling populations deprives insurgents of the support and 
resources (e.g., recruits, information) they need to supplant authorities successfully. As 
contemporary COIN thinker David Kilcullen (2010) and others have pointed out (Gventer, 
2014; Porch, 2013), this does not equate to being “nice” to populations; rather, it is about 
providing incentives to those who support authorities while imposing costs on those who 
do not. 
The enemy-centric approach, on the other hand, views COIN more like 
conventional warfare in the sense that defeating the enemy militarily is the 
counterinsurgent’s main objective. As Paul (2016) explains, it is often described 
synonymously with the “draining-the-sea” approach in which brutality against insurgents, 
as well as civilians, can weaken an enemy rapidly by “draining” an area of all potential 
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insurgent inputs, such as information, recruits, and other resources. As with a population-
centric approach, several variations of the enemy-centric approach exist, such as targeting 
key leaders (i.e., deception), attrition, and attacking insurgents’ strongholds. Kilcullen 
(2007, para. 2) explains that while one can summarize the population-centric approach as, 
“first control the population, and all else will follow,” the enemy-centric view suggests the 
opposite, “first defeat the enemy, and all else will follow.”  
These two philosophies lie at the epicenter of contentious debates in this domain. 
As COIN regained significant attention during the height of the insurgency in Iraq, scholars 
and practitioners contemplated which approach would enable the U.S. to prevent further 
conflict and instability in the country. Many population-centric thinkers argued that enemy-
centric approaches alienate populations and lead to greater insurgent support, and in fact, 
are responsible for creating many of the challenges the U.S. faced in Iraq (Paul et al., 2016). 
As the population-centric view gained increasing attraction around the time of the “Surge” 
in Iraq (2007-2008), several experts expressed concern that apparent successes in Iraq led 
many to mythologize counterinsurgency practices, which they contend are risky and 
expensive, and that long-term nation building efforts rarely succeed in producing long-term 
stability (Gentile, 2013; Gventer, 2014; Porch, 2013). Adding fuel to this debate is that 
each view can claim historical successes and failures, which highlights that 
counterinsurgents can implement each approach effectively and counterproductively (Paul 
et al., 2016).  
However, the dichotomy between population and enemy-centric approaches is 
likely a false one, especially from a Western perspective (Paul et al., 2016). As a collection 
of activities designed to address “irregular threats,” namely insurgencies,15 COIN differs 
conceptually with “traditional” warfare by placing an emphasis on populations rather than 
on territory. While the population-centric view is straightforward in its emphasis on 
noncombatants, the enemy-centric view is less so, but it still appears to recognize the 
population’s importance to successful COIN. The idea is that because insurgents hide 
 
15 In addition to COIN, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats (2010) outlines four other 
activities to address irregular threats: namely counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign 
internal defense (FID), and stability operations (SO).  
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among the populace, counterinsurgents need information from noncombatants to identify 
and locate insurgents. According to McCormick’s (Forthcoming; Wilson, 2006) “Diamond 
Model,” for example, counterinsurgents have an information disadvantage compared to 
insurgents, which means they must strengthen their ability to access operationally useful 
information from the population before attacking the enemy’s infrastructure and members. 
A counterinsurgent’s use of excessive force within the context of enemy-centric COIN also 
may result in more insurgents, which is counterproductive to successful COIN.  
Moreover, researchers and official U.S. military documentation recognize that 
COIN is likely to be more effective with an appropriate balance of the two approaches 
(Department of the Army, 2014; Paul et al., 2016; Trinquier, 2006). Counterinsurgents can 
apply the two simultaneously, or to the same insurgency at different points in time because 
of the dynamic nature of insurgencies (Kilcullen, 2007). As seen in Tel Afar, Iraq, in 2005, 
the U.S. and Iraqi forces phased in aspects of both approaches known as “clear, hold, and 
build,” which in a general sense, involves clearing a contested area through security 
operations, and then holding that territory by providing security and protecting populations 
from insurgents (Gangs and Guerillas: Ideas from Counterinsurgency and 
Counterterrorism, 2011). During the build phase, counterinsurgents seek to provide 
economic incentives and “good-governance” to obtain (or maintain) legitimacy with the 
population.16  
B. COMPETITION FOR CONTROL OF A POPULACE 
In the foreword of an updated version of Galula’s seminal book, Counterinsurgency 
Warfare: Theory and Practice (Galula, 2006, p. viii), COIN specialist John Nagl states, 
“An insurgency is a competition between insurgent and government for the support of the 
civilian population, which provides the sea in which the insurgent swims.”17 This succinct 
statement encapsulates the central importance of competition, or struggle, as well as the 
 
16 In other words, “Since irregular warfare is a context for legitimacy and influence over the relevant 
populations, the populations carry particular weight as both the battleground and object of the conflict” 
(Department of Defense, 2010, p. 13) 
17 This quote refers to Mao’s work on guerrilla warfare. See translated version (Tse-Tung, 1989). 
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significance of populations in insurgent warfare.18 Several scholars and practitioners have 
echoed this theme and described insurgent environments as competition for and among a 
populace (Berman et al., 2018; Herrington, 1982; McCormick et al., 2007; Metelits, 2010; 
Race, 1972). In War Comes to Long An (1972), Jeffrey Race discusses the notion of 
“balance of forces” in Vietnam, which he describes as, “the relative ability of contending 
forces to enforce their will on their opponents” (Race, 1972, p. 144). Using insights from 
interviews with former insurgents and government personnel, he outlines several factors 
that altered the power dynamic between the two sides of the conflict, such as sheer numbers 
on each side, technological factors (e.g., weaponry), organizational factors (structure and 
coordination), morale factors, as well as several others. Similarly, Berman et al. (2011) 
developed a model of insurgency as a three-way struggle over information among 
insurgents, government, and civilians. Within the competitive space, or areas in which state 
and non-state (i.e., civilians and insurgents) actors compete, the authors’ results suggest 
improved services for the Iraqi population reduced insurgent violence. 
Start Herrington (1982), who like Race, served as a military officer in Vietnam, 
describes consequences of competition on the Vietnamese populace during the war. He 
writes (1982, p. 44), “Virtually every hamlet in Vietnam had at least one clandestine 
informant who would not hesitate to report to the Vietcong the name of a farmer who 
warned the Americans about a booby trap.” Certainly, this type of situation is not limited 
to Vietnam. Claire Metelits’ (2010) interesting research examines similar dynamics in 
Colombia, specifically relations between insurgents and civilians. Her fieldwork 
demonstrates that insurgents shape their strategy toward local communities according to 
the extent to which they face competition from other groups. Though one cannot assume 
the generalizability of her findings, competition and rivalry are so central to her research 
that she concludes that, “the existence of rivalry, not resources, is central to the insurgent-
civilian dynamic” (Metelits, 2010, p. 191). Several other authors have described the effect 
that competition has on populations as well (Berman et al., 2011; Cleveland et al., 2018; 
Kilcullen, 2013). For instance, Kilcullen (2013) explains that when state and non-state 
 
18 I am not arguing, however, that adversaries compete for every location within an active insurgency.  
27 
competition puts civilians in between two competing systems, populations adopt survival 
strategies, such as fleeing, passivity, autarky, hedging, swinging, commitment, and self-
arming.  
However, the end state of competition may be for control of a population rather 
than, as Nagl stated, its support (Department of the Army, 2014; Galula, 2006; Kalyvas, 
2006; Trinquier, 2006). Kilcullen (2013) advocates for a “theory of competitive control” 
in which civilians, insurgents, and states compete for control. Just as importantly, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), government contractors (e.g., Blackwater), and other 
types of actors play substantial roles in conflict. Based on a theory of normative systems,19 
he suggests that non-state groups, just like governments, can generate popular support as 
well as control and mobilize populations by creating predictable environments through a 
system of governance. They can compete with the state’s system of laws and control by 
using a combination of persuasive, administrative, and coercive actions. One can see how 
the Taliban’s “shadow governments,” or the “civil organizations” that Che Guevara (2007) 
outlined,20 reflect this notion about control. Kilcullen suggests insurgents can “win an 
area” with unpopular laws and rules21 because they may resolve disputes and provide law 
and order effectively, which perhaps creates an unhappy, yet predictable, level of order for 
local populations. Gen (Ret.) Charles Cleveland and his colleagues (2018) make a similar 
claim by arguing that U.S. leadership must develop strategies that account for people, 
connectivity, and competition in light of the prevalence of irregular warfare, including in 
insurgent warfare. 
 
19 Kilcullen (2013, p. 132) defines normative systems as a “set of rules correlated with a set of 
consequences.” 
20 Che Guevara (2007, p. 9) states something similar. He writes, “We must come to the inevitable 
conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he takes up arms responding to the angry 
protest of the people against their oppressors, and that he fights in order to change the social system that 
keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and misery.” 
21 As he points out, the Taliban had many archaic rules when they first seized Kabul in the 1990s, 
such as banning music in public, playing with birds, dancing, and music at weddings, etc. (Kilcullen, 2013, 
pp. 146–147). 
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C. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE POPULACE 
The notion that the populace is central to insurgent warfare is rooted in “classical” 
insurgent and counterinsurgent literature. Prominent insurgent thinkers, such as Mao Tse-
tung (1989), Che Guevara (2007), and Carlos Marighella (2002),22 emphasized the central 
role of populations in their writings on guerrilla warfare. Mao, who led the Chinese 
Revolution of 1949 and inspired the adoption of Maoism across the globe, famously 
compared guerrillas to fish and the populace to the water in which they swim. The idea is 
that insurgents require at least passive support from populations to survive (Taber, 2002; 
Tse-Tung, 1989). Che Guevara made similar claims. For instance, in an effort to distinguish 
between bandits and guerrillas, he writes, “They have all the characteristics of a guerrilla 
army, homogeneity, respect for the leader, valor, knowledge of the ground, and, often, even 
good understanding of the tactics to be employed. The only thing that is missing is support 
of the people; and, inevitably, these gangs are captured and exterminated by the public 
force” (Guevara, 2007, p. 9). Moreover, he emphasizes the importance of peasants and 
farmers in providing supplies to guerrilla forces, as well as outlines how guerrillas should 
establish hospitals to take care of the people in an area (2007, pp. 65–69). Similarly, Carlos 
Marighella (2002, p. 36), a prominent Brazilian guerrilla warfare thinker, states, “One of 
the permanent concerns of the urban guerrilla is his identification with popular causes to 
win public support.”  
A handful of “classical” COIN thinkers have substantially impacted contemporary 
Western views of COIN as it pertains to maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of a populace. 
Galula (2006), a French officer who served in several theaters such as Algeria in the 1950s, 
is often credited as the foundational COIN thinker who placed the importance of the 
populace over killing insurgents (Paul et al., 2013). For example, his first “law” of COIN 
is that “the support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as the 
insurgent” (2006, p. 52). Throughout Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice 
(2006, p. viii), he restates a population’s central role to successful COIN with statements 
 
22 This list of insurgent thinkers is by no means and exhaustive list of prominent individuals. For 
example, Arquilla (2011) provides an excellent historical account of many irregular warfare actors that 
came well before those listed here.  
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such as, the “counterinsurgent cannot achieve much if the population is not, and does not 
feel, protected against the enemy.” His influence on contemporary thinkers is apparent in 
Gen. (Ret.) David Petraeus’s guidance as then Commander of the (U.S.-led) International 
Security Assistance Forces (COMISAF) in which he outlined his own twenty-four “rules” 
of COIN, such as “serve and secure the population,” “live among the people,” and “consult 
and build relationships, but not with those who just seek us out” (Gangs and Guerillas: 
Ideas from Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism, 2011, p. 104). Unsurprisingly, the 
2007 version of FM 3-24 lists the book as one of “The Classics” in its “Annotated 
Bibliography” section (United States Government, 2007).  
Galula is not alone, however, in influencing today’s COIN thinking. Roger 
Trinquier, another French officer who served in Indochina (1946-1954) and Algeria (1954-
1962), argued a population’s support is the most important objective in what he called 
“modern warfare.” At the time of its release, his book Modern Warfare: A French View of 
Counterinsurgency (2006),23 provided a cautionary tale for U.S. efforts in Vietnam in that 
military tactics and battlefield successes would not lead to victory if it did not address the 
insurgency’s political dimension and obtain the population’s unconditional support. 
Counterinsurgents, according to Trinquier, must assure the people their protection, as well 
as create and train organizations among the populace capable of identifying enemies. 
Robert Taber’s War of the Flea (2002)24 makes similar claims about the centrality of the 
populace in guerrilla warfare. He argues that the population is key to the entire struggle 
between guerrillas and governments. Specifically, he contends that the guerrilla is “of the 
people” in the sense that the civilian populace serves as “his camouflage, his 
quartermasters, his recruiting office, his communications network, and his efficient, all-
seeing intelligence service” (2002, pp. 11–12). Without support and aid from the people, 
Taber argues, guerrilla operators cannot survive.  
 
23 Trinquier’s book, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, was originally published 
in 1964. 
24 Taber (2002, p. 20) famously uses the analogy of a flea and dog in that, “the guerrilla fights the war 
of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog’s disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, 
ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war goes on long enough, the dog succumbs to 
exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on which to close its jaws or rake with its 
claws.” 
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Sir Robert Thompson and Sir Gerald Templar, both of whom worked closely during 
the Malaya Emergency (1948-1960), are two British COIN thinkers who have inspired 
modern, population-centric views of COIN (Fitzsimmons, 2008). Thompson argued that 
counterinsurgents should have a clear political aim and security forces must employ 
offensive operations against insurgents, yet operate within the law, as well as impose 
control measures over a populace, including its physical separation from insurgents 
through resettlement. Specifically, he contended that “strategic hamlets,” which the British 
employed in Malaya, as did the U.S. in Vietnam, could minimize the effectiveness of 
underground organizations, and unite noncombatants against insurgents. Thompson also 
believed in the use of “minimum force” and that counterinsurgents could gain the 
population’s support and undermine an insurgency with good governance and providing 
services, such as improving health care and education (Fitzsimmons, 2008; Thompson, 
1967). 
Templer, whose perspective aligns with Thompson’s, introduced the concept 
“hearts and minds” in the early-1950s based on British experiences in Malaya.25 He 
apparently remarked that, “The answer (to the uprising) lies not in pouring more troops 
into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people” (Dixon, 2009). This concept lies 
at the heart of population-centric warfare. Often seen as a response to Mao’s approach to 
guerrilla warfare, it prioritizes civilian welfare and less coercive tactics over violent 
approaches. By doing so, Templar suggests that counterinsurgents will improve their 
chances of securing a population’s support. As commissioner and director of operations in 
Malaya, he shifted British approaches of “collective punishment” to the protection of the 
community through physical separation of the populace and insurgents, among other 
things.26 According to scholar Kalev Sepp (2005), Templer strove for political and social 
equality of all Malays through his actions, such as granting Malay citizenship to over a 
million Indians and Chinese, requiring Britons to register as Malay citizens, elevating the 
 
25 According to Sepp (2005, p. 12), President John Adams coined this phrase in 1818 regarding the 
American Revolution. 
26 Moreover, he addressed coordination issues between intelligence, civilian, and military serves, and 
shifted from large-scale operations to small-unit operations. 
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public role of women, and constructing schools, clinics, and police stations, to name just a 
few. Many scholars have credited this approach to Britain’s “success” in Malaya (Nagl, 
2005), which led many to believe that public services would win over populations during 
the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (United States. et al., 2014).  
However, scholars and practitioners have spent considerable time describing the 
true meaning of the “hearts and minds” model, as well as its utility in insurgent warfare. 
The former has implications for how much consent and coercion counterinsurgents should 
apply in practice (Dixon, 2009). Support and control are not necessarily the same thing. In 
their important study, RAND’s Leites and Wolf (1970) viewed “hearts and minds” as a 
cost-benefit trade off rather than a focus on a population’s inherent preferences. They argue 
that combinations of coercion and reward can be effective in countering guerrillas and that 
constraining insurgent behavior is more likely to be effective than attempts to persuade 
populations with economic aid. FM 3-24 (United States Government, 2007) echoes this 
sentiment by describing “hearts and minds” as convincing a populace that their best 
interests rest in successful COIN, and that counterinsurgents can protect them and 
resistance is pointless. In his critique of the model from a British perspective, Dixon (2009, 
p. 363) defines “hearts” as “winning the emotional support of the people” and “minds” as 
“the people as pursuing their rational self-interests.” Drawing from Britain’s experience in 
Malaya and the U.S.’ involvement in Vietnam as examples, he claims the phrase may be 
useful in public relations to justify operations, but it is not a useful guide for how to conduct 
them.  
Several scholars have argued that historical accounts of the “hearts and minds” 
model have been misguided. For instance, critics contend that the British, in fact, used 
highly coercive measures during its “successful” Malaya campaign (Dixon, 2009; Gentile, 
2013; Porch, 2013). They point to the Briggs Plan (1950) that forcibly resettled hundreds 
of thousands of Malaya’s Chinese population, as well as enacted harsh laws during the 
campaign, including strict curfews, identity cards and movement restrictions, arson of 
homes of communist sympathizers, mandatory death penalty for carrying arms, and 
imprisonment for providing insurgents with supplies. This suggests that the phrase 
disguises what really happened in Malaya and, in fact, that this so-called “successful” 
32 
campaign may provide empirical support for coercive COIN approaches rather than 
population-centric methods (Dixon, 2009; Porch, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the population remains at the center of insurgent warfare regardless 
of one’s position in these debates. In the Malaya Campaign, for example, it was the 
populace to which the British applied both coercive and consensual tactics in efforts to 
separate it from insurgents and “win” the competitive space. Therefore, while these debates 
serve as a useful background for this study, taking a side is beyond its scope. What is more 
pertinent is that civilians are caught between competing systems, and because of that, they 
need information to survive. They are not alone, however. Insurgents and authorities must 
acquire and disseminate information in support of their operations as well; in fact, insurgent 
warfare is very much a battle of ideas.  
D. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN INSURGENT WARFARE 
While acquiring material resources, such as money and weapons, is critical to 
insurgencies, several prominent insurgent thinkers have recognized that information about 
populations and one’s adversaries is also a crucial resource (Guevara, 2007; Tse-Tung, 
1989). Mao, for example, outlined the significance of collecting information from 
noncombatants in his book, On Guerrilla Warfare (1989). In his first phase of guerrilla 
warfare known as “organization, consolidation and preservation of base areas,” he explains 
that trained and committed “volunteers” must set out in small groups to “persuade” and 
“convince” local noncombatants to provide them with supplies, recruits, and information 
(Tse-Tung, 1989, p. 21). As guerrillas establish footholds in areas, he pressed that they 
must establish invasive intelligence-based networks through which they can extract 
information from all noncombatants, regardless of their age, sex, and profession. These 
networks can provide guerrillas with intelligence critical to their operations, including 
knowledge about physical terrain, local noncombatants, government strength and morale, 
as well as grant them the initiative to attack at will. At the same time, Mao argued that 
guerillas must do everything they can to deny information to their enemies (Tse-Tung, 
1989).  
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Inspired by Mao, insurgents have sought actionable information through various 
means. Che Guevara (2007), for instance, contends that gaining timely and accurate 
information from noncombatants about enemies is critical to insurgent operations. He 
writes (2007, p. 81), “Nothing gives more help to combatant forces than correct 
information. This arrives spontaneously from the local inhabitants, who will come to tell 
its friendly army, its allies, what is happening in various places; but in addition it should 
be completely systematized.” As seen recently in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, 
insurgents also often use violence and torture to extract information from noncombatants, 
as well as acquire useful information (e.g., government troop movements, morale) through 
infiltration, which is especially the case when a population’s allegiance in divided (Pirnie 
& O’Connell, 2008; Trinquier, 2006, p. 80). For instance, Sunni insurgents in Iraq have 
obtained useful information by infiltrating the Iraqi government and army, and the Taliban 
has successfully infiltrated the Afghan army and police as seen with “green on blue” 
violence.27  
Disseminating information is just as important to insurgents as collecting 
information. More specifically, propaganda is a key political tool that insurgents must 
employ to succeed. Throughout history, insurgents have used words and imagery to 
influence target audiences. Propaganda serves as a useful means for insurgents to 
communicate messages to noncombatants and create narratives about “illegitimate” 
authorities, contentious issues (e.g., political, cultural), as well as offer their own solutions 
to address root causes of conflict. Though delivery mechanisms have changed over time, 
from the printing press during Mao’s time, to contemporary uses of social media by groups 
such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), insurgents have been explicit about 
propaganda’s foundational importance to insurgent warfare. Mao (1989) and Guevara 
(2007) paid considerable attention to propaganda at both local and national levels in their 
respective works, as have contemporary “insurgents,” such as ISIS and al Qaeda, who have 
leveraged global media and social media successfully to reach regional and international 
audiences (Benigni et al., 2017; Ibrahim, 2007). 
 
27 See the Long War Journal’s site for more information, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/
2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php. 
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COIN literature emphasizes the significance of information to operations as well. 
As FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (2014, p. 20) states, “counterinsurgents must gather, analyze, 
and disseminate civil information pertaining to the population.” Information from 
noncombatants, which counterinsurgents can process into intelligence, is thought to help 
improve both offensive and defensive operational effectiveness because it helps them 
understand the identity, networks, and locations of insurgents (Galula, 1964; Kalyvas, 
2006; McCormick, Forthcoming). Berman et al. (2018) elaborate on the significance of 
operational level information with the notion of information-centric warfare. They contend 
that the U.S. should focus its future efforts on acquiring information about insurgents from 
the people rather than attempting to win their “hearts and minds.” The authors offer 
practical advice, such as recommending that practitioners enable information sharing by 
creating safe mechanisms for noncombatants to do so (e.g., cell towers), and they argue 
that counterinsurgents can improve their operational effectiveness and exploit insurgents’ 
relative weakness in firepower and mobility with better information from civilians. Others 
have offered additional benefits of obtaining reliable information from the population as 
well, such as that well-informed soldiers can take more thoughtful and confident actions as 
they interact with the populace (Libicki et al., 2007).  
An authority’s ability to communicate effectively to a local population can have a 
major impact on whether the population will be willing to cooperate against an insurgency. 
Nagl goes as far as saying that, “the control of information is strategically decisive in 
counterinsurgency,” and it is therefore crucial for counterinsurgents to fight an information 
war because the key terrain is “the political loyalty of the people who inhabit that space” 
(Galula, 2006, p. ix). Like insurgents, governments utilize information, and process it into 
intelligence, to achieve their goals.28 The importance of information strategy and tactics is 
why scholars address vital topics such as information operations (IO) and information 
warfare (IW) along with capabilities that can enable them, such as public affairs (PA), 
information assurance (IA), military information support operations (MISO), military 
 
28 The rules for using information, however, are not the same for both sides. According to Galula 
(2006), insurgents can lie, cheat, and exaggerate to delegitimize the authorities and seek control over the 
population, whereas the authorities must remain accountable if they want the populace to see them as a 
legitimate governing entity, which is a critical characteristic in COIN. 
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deception (MILDEC), and civil-military operations (CMO) (United States Government, 
2014). The U.S. military conducts extensive training in this domain, and releases doctrine 
through official publications, many of which address both transmitting and receiving 
various forms of information to and from populations. For example, JP 3-13 Information 
Operations (2014) and JP 3-57 Civil-Military Operations (2013) outline guidance on such 
operations, both of which can be in support of counterinsurgency operations. 
Existing COIN literature recognizes that in-person, social relations are critical 
conduits of information about a populace and enemies in operational environments. Pye’s 
(1950) noteworthy research on the Malaya Communist Party (MCP) in the 1940s highlights 
how the party disseminated pro-Communist information through personal relationships. 
Through his analysis of interviews with surrendered insurgents, he describes how the MCP 
used front organizations to provide noncombatants with information from a Communist 
perspective (1950, p. 177). Haim’s (Forthcoming) recent research on family networks in 
the Philippines aligns with Pye’s findings in the way that information obtained from friends 
and family in surrounding villages can shape noncombatant views of local military control. 
Such research parallels studies in other domains in which personal relationships are critical 
for recruitment and conversion (McAdam, 1999; Sageman, 2004; Stark & Bainbridge, 
1980), as well as publications that focus on related topics such as the “human domain,” 
“countering threat networks,” and “network engagement,” which recommend developing 
in-person, trust-based networks for the purpose of acquiring information and enabling 
operations (Cleveland et al., 2018; Department of the Army, 2017; Department of the 
Navy, 2017; Kilcullen, 2010; United States. et al., 2014).29  
E. SOCIAL NETWORKS AND SYSTEMS IN INSURGENT WARFARE 
In the competition for the control over the populace, one can observe information-
sharing social networks as individuals, whether combatant or noncombatant, exchange 
information through in-person social relations. In other words, such relations serve as 
 
29 For instance, Cleveland et al. (2018, p. 180) state in reference to irregular warfare of which COIN is 
a main activity, “Military power can no longer be measured singularly by counting tanks and airplanes. 
Connections and how information and resources flow between actors across networks matters as much, if 
not more, than the number of individuals fighting units.” 
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important mediums through which individuals present and share knowledge or facts about 
conflict. When a soldier questions a civilian about potential insurgents, or when a civilian 
voluntarily provides information to an insurgent, they form a social connection. As more 
and more of these and similar types of interactions take place, and in many cases become 
repeated interactions, they collectively form the basis of larger social structures. Therefore, 
the literature often uses terms such as “social networks,” “social structures,” and “social 
systems” interchangeably to describe such patterns of interactions. Two recent examples 
include Cleveland et al. (2018, p. 19), who claim civilian and other networks make up 
social systems that define the “human domain,” and Kilcullen (2013), who paints a picture 
of “future warfare” in which local leaders, militants, and civilians comprise urban networks 
nested and connected to broader regional and global structures. This type of language 
appears rooted in social systems and social network research, as well as empirical evidence 
in practice. However, each research domain has failed to capture unique characteristics of 
insurgent warfare that may contribute to social network dynamics.  
Several renowned scholars and practitioners have described insurgent 
environments as comprised of systems (Department of the Navy, 2017; Johnson, 1982; 
Kilcullen, 2010, 2013). Most notably, Kilcullen’s (2010, 2013) work echoes several themes 
within the social systems research in which counterinsurgents’ actions can cause 
unintended consequences as a result of interconnectivity and feedback with adversaries and 
populations. The well-known notion of the “strategic corporal” reflects this perspective in 
insurgent warfare. Other researchers have offered insightful system models to examine the 
interconnected challenges posed by violent networks, including insurgent networks (Baker, 
2006; Grynkewich & Reifel, 2006; Kenney, 2007; Mesjasz, 2015; Schoenenberger et al., 
2014). Like Kilcullen, these scholars emphasize the negative consequences that arise from 
certain counter-network policies and actions, most of which counterinsurgents can avoid 
by analyzing feedback processes within insurgent systems. However, seldom have system 
scholars examined the effects of counter-network actions at an operational level of 
insurgent warfare, which is where substantial interaction takes place among authorities, 
local populations, and insurgents. Furthermore, systems scholars have largely overlooked 
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empirical social systems, including in-person information-sharing networks that are critical 
to insurgent warfare outcomes.  
Like system research, the social network domain has paid relatively little attention 
to empirical, insurgent networks. This is unfortunate given COIN’s emphasis on social 
networks along with practitioners’ explicit description of social network analysis (SNA) as 
a useful intelligence tool in COIN (Cleveland et al., 2018; United States Government, 
2007). To date, much of the “dark network” literature has focused on criminal and terrorist 
networks (Cunningham et al., 2016; Everton, 2012; Gerdes, 2015; Morselli, 2014). For 
instance, Gerdes’ (2015) edited volume, Illuminating Dark Networks: The Study of 
Clandestine Groups and Organizations, offers many insights into the challenges and 
opportunities of studying such networks, but it contains only a single chapter addressing 
insurgent networks directly. At least two factors appear to have contributed to this trend. 
First, access to rich, unclassified data on insurgent networks is difficult to obtain. Second, 
a growing interest in nefarious online, social media-based networks and their use of 
platforms like Twitter and YouTube to recruit, disseminate propaganda, and globalize their 
activities, seems to have overshadowed offline network studies that could capture insights 
about operational level insurgent networks (Benigni et al., 2017; Carley, 2015).  
A major focus in the study of “dark networks” (i.e., illegal and covert networks) 
has been on the examination of various “exogenous” effects (e.g., counter-network 
operations) on such networks (Bakker et al., 2012; Carley et al., 2003; Cunningham et al., 
2016; Enders & Jindapon, 2009; Everton, 2012; Roberts & Everton, 2016, 2011). These 
studies imply that a violent network’s structure is tied to tradeoffs between performance 
and resilience. For example, some research suggests that centralized networks can operate 
more efficiently in some contexts (e.g., mobilizing people and resources) (Arquilla, 2009), 
but they may be vulnerable to targeting strategies that focus on key members (Bakker et 
al., 2012; Sageman, 2004; Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States, 2003). Other scholars, specifically Roberts and Everton (2016, 2011), 
have been more explicit about possible exogenous effects, such as disruption strategies, on 
terrorist networks, and have provided insights about a variety of kinetic and non-kinetic 
strategies that can be used. Yet, current social network literature generally has not 
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incorporated empirical, authority networks into analyses (Stys et al., 2020), and while a 
few exceptions exist (Diviák et al., 2019; Kenney, 2007; Papachristos & Smith, 2014; Stys 
et al., 2020), researchers have largely treated illicit networks as separate from populations, 
thereby missing potentially important interactions among all “sides” that may underly 
network emergence and dynamics (Everton & Cunningham, 2015; Gerdes, 2015; 
Koschade, 2006; Krebs, 2002; Morselli, 2014). This gap is particularly pertinent to 
insurgent warfare in which conflict takes place among and for a populace. In Figure 1, the 
networks on the left depict the analysis of social networks in isolation and highlight a 
choice of boundaries that misses important ties among various types of actors. The image 
to the right provides a more realistic, yet imperfect, illustration of overlapping social 
networks in insurgent warfare in which combatants and noncombatants have ties.  
 
Figure 1. Distinct Networks vs. Overlapping Networks 
As with many criminal settings, the lines between nefarious and other types of 
networks in insurgent warfare are often murky, in part, because they overlap with 
legitimate social circles (Diviák et al., 2019; Papachristos & Smith, 2014; Stys et al., 
2020).30 Ultimately, their embedded nature presents unique challenges for classifying 
 
30 The extent to which an insurgency embeds in a local population will vary (Sarbahi, 2014).  
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actors into neat categories such as “insurgent,” “government,” and “civilian” groupings. 
Frameworks of insurgencies comprising of active insurgents, auxiliaries, guerillas, 
underground, and civilian supporters (passive and active) reflect this idea. Gventer (2014), 
who spent considerable time in Iraq during the active insurgency, describes the Iraq War 
as a “honeycomb of conflict” in which rogue members of Iraqi security forces, multifarious 
sectarian, terrorist, and criminal groups, as well as several outside powers, contributed to 
violence that plagued the country during the height of turmoil. Kilcullen (2013) describes 
a similar phenomenon in Afghanistan in which noncombatants perpetrated violence based 
on tribal grievances rather than on behalf of the Taliban. Herrington’s (1982) work on 
Vietnam demonstrates that this phenomena is not limited to recent conflicts. He highlights 
dense connectivity among insurgents, politicians, and noncombatants that made the lines 
between the groups often difficult to ascertain.  
A few recent official U.S. military publications have begun to capture this idea by 
drawing attention to the important role that all types of actors, such as civilians, play in 
insurgent warfare. Specifically, the U.S. Army (2017) and Marine Corps (2017) have both 
published texts on “network engagement”31 in response to the limitations of kinetic, 
“attack the network” focused approaches that dominated Iraq and Afghanistan for 
substantial periods throughout the conflicts. Both broadened the scope of network-based 
activities beyond attacking “threat” networks by emphasizing the importance of engaging 
“friendly,” “neutral,” and “unknown” networks. And both offer definitions for each 
network based on individual and group support (or lack therefore) for U.S. objectives and 
provide examples of potential entities that may fall within each category. For instance, the 
Army’s version lists host nation military forces and government officials as potentially 
“friendly” entities and business leaders in “neutral” human networks (Department of the 
Army, 2017). 
 
31 The Marine Corps (2017) uses JP 3-25’s (2016, p. x) definition of network engagement, which is 
“interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat networks, conducted continuously and simultaneously at the 
tactical, operational, and strategic levels to help achieve the commander’s objectives within an operational 
area.”  
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Both documents also highlight the challenges of binary thinking when categorizing 
individuals into networks. For example, based off recent lessons from Iraq and elsewhere, 
the authors of the Army’s version describe how individuals may embed in multiple social 
circles with statements such as, “Some network functions, entities, groups, organizations, 
and member’s activities span the friendly, neutral, and threat realms, making networks 
complex and difficult to understand” (Department of the Army, 2017, p. 22). FM 3-24 
(2014) and JP 3-25 Countering Networks (2016) allude to the same idea that entities may 
connect various types of networks. While these publications offer some of the most useful 
descriptions of social networks in operational environments to date, they fail to pay explicit 
attention to heart of the problem: boundary specification, which makes untangling 
competing social networks based on existing guidance quite difficult.  
As such, structural analysis of insurgent networks will benefit by setting system 
boundaries accounting for their competitive, information-sharing networks of all types of 
actors. Operational level networks consist of many types of individuals with various 
motivations who exchange information with one another that may benefit one or more sides 
of a conflict. It is appropriate, therefore, to define individuals’ network membership(s) 
based on the side(s) for which they seek and provide information in the competition 
between state and insurgents. While in many cases individuals may serve only one side of 
the conflict, such as a U.S. soldier deployed overseas, others can benefit both. For example, 
a civilian may provide insurgents with information simply out of fear, while subsequently 
passing useful information to counterinsurgents about their interaction with insurgents, or 
vice-versa.  
Accounting for the overlapping nature of competing networks in insurgent warfare, 
therefore, is important too and suggests analysts should take a broader, macro system view 
that insurgencies embed in larger social systems. Individuals who exchange information 
through social ties on behalf of insurgents and authorities, regardless of their true 
allegiances or how one categorizes them, serve as critical nodes intertwining open, 
competitive social networks. One cannot partition individuals into separate networks in 
operational environments without violating a fundamental assumption of “social networks” 
and “systems” research: interdependence. Furthermore, a perspective that does not account 
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for how insurgencies embed in larger social systems prohibits one from identifying and 
untangling all the ways by which all the relevant types of individuals (i.e., insurgents, 
government, and civilians) form connections in response to their social environments. In 
other words, it limits one’s ability to understand social processes that undergird and drive 
social system dynamics (Borgatti et al., 2013; Lusher et al., 2013; Robins, 2015).  
In such settings, therefore, one can observe at least two overlapping, in-person 
social networks that make up a larger system and seek to acquire and disseminate 
information about a populace and adversaries as a part of efforts to compete for control 
over a populace: namely authority information-sharing and insurgent information-sharing 
networks.32 While some scholars have presented similar arguments by demonstrating the 
role of “brokerage networks” in which covert and overt networks are mutually constitutive 
(Stys et al., 2020), and by highlighting how legitimate and illegitimate networks intersect 
(Diviák et al., 2019; Papachristos & Smith, 2014), they have not explored this characteristic 
in the context of insurgent warfare.  
In Figure 2,  the network on the left depicts boundaries based on the side(s) for 
which individuals exchange information in the competition between state and insurgents 
and ignores if an actor is civilian, insurgent, or government. The network on the right shows 
the proposed model of overlapping social networks in which civilians, insurgents, and 
authorities seek information and boundaries are not chosen based on actor categories. This 
depiction represents the larger social system of competing social networks. The presence 
of relations between clusters pushes and pulls actors into new network positions, whereby 
some civilians, for example, appear in different clusters than before.  
 
 
32Indeed, as Gventer (2014) highlighted with the notion of “mosaic war,” the number of competing 
structures may vary depending on the context but at least two must exist for a competition to exist. 
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Figure 2. Competing Information Networks 
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III. MTML FRAMEWORK 
This dissertation utilizes Monge and Contractor’s (2003) multitheoretical, 
multilevel (MTML) analytic framework to study the co-evolution of competing, 
information-sharing networks in insurgent warfare. This framework encourages a broader 
system view of competing networks and blends complex adaptive systems and social 
network research through its emphasis on co-evolutionary social processes that take place 
within and between multilevel social systems. It integrates the two bodies’ shared concepts 
closely related to co-evolution as well: namely, network emergence and self-organization 
(Monge & Contractor, 2003, p. xii). The framework is multitheoretical in the sense that it 
argues that researchers should draw from a variety of network theories to explain emergent 
and evolving social structures within macro social systems. Specifically, the authors argue 
that co-evolution and self-organization, which encompass a variety of multilevel social 
processes, such as reciprocity and triadic closure, serve as forces driving system emergence 
and dynamics, often simultaneously. In line with complex adaptive systems and social 
network research, this perspective accounts for both categories of processes and focuses 
on the extent to which each one determines a social system’s macro structure (Anderson, 
1999; Choi et al., 2001; Dooley, 1997; Levin, 1998; McKelvey, 1997; Monge & 
Contractor, 2003). This framework is multilevel33 in the sense that it enables researchers 
to account explicitly for social processes at various social network levels, including those 
pertaining to the actor level (e.g., behaviors), various structural levels within a network 
(e.g., dyad, triads, subgroup, and global), and across social networks that make up larger 
social systems (e.g., multiplex relations).  
To understand the MTML framework and its application to co-evolving social 
networks, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the two interdisciplinary fields that 
serve as its foundation and highlight the extent to which they overlap and offer useful 
perspectives to examine this dissertation’s topic. Over the last few decades, progress in 
 
33This is not necessarily the same as “multilevel” network analysis in which researchers analyze 
associations between individuals and collectives, such as organizations, thereby linking together micro and 
macro levels through a meso level. See Lazega and Snijders (2016). 
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complex adaptive systems and social network research has improved the understanding of 
social structures and the mechanisms driving their evolution. These broad, overlapping 
domains have offered useful perspectives on multilevel network dynamics, although 
separately in most cases (Anderson, 1999; Dooley, 1997; Lusher et al., 2013; McKelvey, 
1997; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Snijders et al., 2010; Wycisk et al., 2008), and have 
described scale-free properties (Albert & Barabási, 2002; Barabási, 2002; Barabási et al., 
1999; Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003), small-world effects (Watts, 1999a, 1999b, 2003; Watts 
& Strogatz, 1998), and actor level mechanisms for tie formation in social networks (e.g., 
homophily) (McPherson et al., 2001), to name a few. The two research bodies also account 
for the unique nature of social networks, such as agency, as well as share and address a 
constellation of interrelated concepts inherently tied to co-evolution for which one should 
account when studying the concept, such as network emergence and self-organization 
(Monge & Contractor, 2003; Robins, 2015; Sawyer, 2005).  
This chapter begins with a description of social systems theories upon which 
complex adaptive systems is built for its application to social settings. This section’s 
purpose is to outline common complex adaptive system characteristics and illustrate how 
the MTML framework applies them to social systems. Next, it describes social network 
research and highlights its emphasis on empirical social networks, which are forms of 
social systems. After these background sections, it outlines how the MTML framework 
synthesizes the two research bodies around mutual assumptions, concepts such as co-
evolution and self-organization, and a shared focus on multilevel structures. It also 
incorporates more recent scholarly work and developments that bolster key MTML themes. 
In doing so, the MTML framework offers a useful perspective that fills important gaps in 
the study of social network dynamics in insurgent warfare. 
As Lane (2006) and others contend (Koliba et al., 2016; Marcum, 2009; Walby, 
2007), while co-evolution and related concepts (e.g., emergence and self-organization) 
form a cluster of associated ideas and fuse various research domains, little consensus exists 
about their meaning and application. With these concepts and constraints in mind, this 
chapter’s limited goal is to illustrate this study’s perspective for each concept and highlight 
their relevance to this topic, rather than offer an exhaustive review about their history and 
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resolve philosophical debates surrounding each one. It continues by addressing multilevel 
social networks and structural emergence in which social systems comprised of competing 
social networks emerge from self-organizing and co-evolutionary micro social processes, 
which is consistent with central ideas within complex adaptive systems and social network 
research. In line with Monge and Contractor’s (2003) framework, the limited goal here is 
to illustrate how macro social structures emerge from micro, social processes/interactions 
at different levels, as well as present this study’s perspective on the concept’s relationship 
to the notion of multilevel networks, such as “micro-” and “macro-determination.” 
Next, it describes this study’s perspective on self-organization. A common theme 
in social system-based, co-evolution studies is that one should account for self-organization 
to determine the extent to which it, rather than co-evolution, contributes to network 
dynamics (Anderson, 1999; Choi et al., 2001; Dooley, 1997; Levin, 1998; McKelvey, 
1997; Monge & Contractor, 2003). Monge and Contractor (2003) rely heavily on complex 
systems science literature and agent-based modeling to address this topic yet they argue 
and demonstrate, like others (Kilduff et al., 2006; Robins, 2015; Snijders et al., 2007), that 
social network research is a valid and useful approach to examine the topic. Building on 
their work and other prominent network studies, as well as more recent works (Albert & 
Barabási, 2002; Barabási, 2002; Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003; Lusher et al., 2013; Robins, 
2015; Snijders et al., 2010; Watts, 1999a; Watts & Strogatz, 1998), this analysis 
incorporates the latter perspective on self-organization because of its emphasis on 
empirical social networks rather than on simulated ones. From this perspective, self-
organizing is a category of intra-network, micro social processes that contribute to social 
network emergence and dynamics.  
This chapter then outlines this dissertation’s perspective on co-evolutionary social 
systems. Initially envisioned for biological applications (Ehrlich & Raven, 1964), such as 
genetic evolution (Kauffman, 1993), organization scientists and social network researchers 
have applied the concept broadly to examine how various types of social systems evolve 
mutually with their environments. This perspective places it attention on systems’ micro 
“adaptive changes within and between” (Lichtenstein, 2000, p. 13) system levels in 
response to an environment and how such dynamics give rise to emergent macro patterns 
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(Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; Dooley, 1997; McKelvey, 1997; Porter, 2006; Robins, 2015; 
T. A. B. Snijders et al., 2006). However, while various domains offer insight about co-
evolving social systems and are not necessarily contradictory, many have operationalized 
the concept differently. Ultimately, this dissertation views co-evolution from an empirical 
social network perspective in which overlapping authority and insurgent information-
sharing structures evolve through intra-network, self-organizing processes as well as inter-
network, co-evolutionary processes at multiple network levels. Finally, this review will 
outline hypotheses about social processes that likely drive the co-evolution of competing 
networks in insurgent warfare.  
A. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS RESEARCH 
Complex adaptive social systems research builds upon decades of investigation into 
social systems. Offering one perspective on social system theories history, Sawyer (2005) 
describes three waves during which specific theories dominated:34 structural functionalism 
(1950s-1960s), social systems derived from general systems theory (1960s-1980s), and 
complex adaptive systems (1990s-2010s). According to the author, the first wave, or 
structural functionalism, is most associated with Talcott Parsons (1951) who provided 
insights into social system concepts, such as feedback and emergence. Influenced by 
cybernetic concepts of self-regulation through negative feedback, the idea of functional 
analysis is to identify how social systems maintain themselves in the face of changing 
environments (Monge & Contractor, 2003). This line of inquiry, however, has encountered 
significant criticism for its emphasis on control and “structure-preserving” behavior even 
when societies could make important changes to benefit their people and address systemic 
problems, such as racial or economic inequality. Other criticisms include Parson’s 
emphasis on society’s hierarchical nature, which critics contend is not a good reflection of 
modern society (e.g., the economy) (Sawyer, 2005; Walby, 2007). 
 
34 Sawyer’s approach is not the only one (for example, see Wycisk et al. (2008)), and I am not 
suggesting it is without its limitations. For instance, the waves do not match up precisely with the timeline 
of seminal publications for each theory and the waves do not replace one another linearly but build upon 
one another; however, Sawyer’s waves serve as a useful way to categorize the evolution of systems 
theories.  
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The second wave, which includes major influences such as general systems theory 
(GST) (von Bertalanffy, 1972), cybernetics (Wiener, 1948), as well as living systems 
Miller, 1995) and chaos theories,35 is an assortment of related work that contributed to 
substantial progress on nonlinear dynamics, as well as offered insights into open systems 
(e.g., insurgent networks); that is, those systems that interact and exchange “matter” (e.g., 
money, information, and recruits) with their external environment (e.g., a populace). In this 
body of work, researchers sought to develop universal laws of all systems, ranging from 
microsystems to the world system (Sawyer, 2005, p. 14). Most notably, the biologist 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s work on GST and open systems theory (OST) emphasized the 
scientific examination of “wholes” and contended that systems laws manifest themselves 
as “logical homologies” to all phenomena. He defined systems as, “a set of elements 
standing in interrelation among themselves and with the environment” that can be 
“expressed mathematically in different ways” (von Bertalanffy, 1972, p. 417). His 
framework of open systems has informed decades of research, including co-evolution 
studies, and is why “systems thinking”36 permeates many research domains today.  
Norbert Wiener (1948), based on developments in self-regulating and goal seeking 
machines (i.e., teleological systems), information theory,37 and computer technology, 
introduced the term “cybernetics” to describe a field of science that sought to find 
generalities related to the “control and communication in machines and animals” (Drack 
& Pouvreau, 2015, p. 526). This interdisciplinary field38 emphasizes the regulation and 
control of systems through feedback between system and environment (Ashby, 1962). An 
 
35 In general, when applied to “chaotic systems,” it is the notion that “even minuscule uncertainties in 
measurements of initial position and momentum can result in huge errors in long-term predictions of these 
quantities” (Mitchell, 2009, p. 20) A common example is the so called, “butterfly effect,” in which a small 
change in initial conditions can lead to radical change in a later state of the system. Prigogine and Stengers’ 
(1988) work highlight the discovery of order from “chaos.” When compared to complex systems, which are 
built up from large numbers of interacting components, chaotic systems may have very few interacting 
subunits but interact in such a way that produces very intricate dynamics.  
36 Systems thinking is way of thinking about the world and understanding problems using a systemic 
approach; that is, by focusing on relationships and interdependencies among entities.  
37 This term refers to Shannon’s Information Theory (see Mitchell (2009)).  
38 Cybernetics is not as “monolithic” as it appears here. According to Drack and Pouvreau (2015), one 
can distinguish between first order and second order cybernetics. For instance, first order emphasized 
negative feedback where the second included positive feedback.  
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important assumption is that all machines and living systems have goals and purpose, and 
they will strive to achieve them as they interact with and adapt to their surrounding 
environments. In an oversimplified sense, when a system’s environment alters its course 
away from reaching its goal, the system’s “controller” must adjust to get the system back 
on track toward its goal. A system’s controller, therefore, requires information and 
feedback from the environment (i.e., a “signal”) to do so.39 Naturally, this domain has 
played a role in the social sciences and the development of complex adaptive systems 
research, including co-evolutionary studies (Sawyer, 2005).  
However, second wave theories have several limitations when applied to social 
systems. In addition to facing similar criticisms that Parsons received, several scholars have 
pointed out that while the second wave provided useful concepts to look at social systems, 
such as nonlinearity, it failed to recognize their qualitative differences from the biological 
and other systems around which many theories developed (Cilliers, 2000, 2001; Eidelson, 
1997; Padgett & Powell, 2012; Sawyer, 2005). Specifically, critics suggest that social 
systems are more open and “complex” than “simpler” complex systems, such as the brain 
and insect colonies, and human agency is an important aspect of social systems for which 
studies must account (Levin, 2002; Robins, 2015). As such, translating many concepts 
from biological systems to social systems poses many challenges. For instance, Miller’s 
(1995) notion of “living systems” and Maturana and Varela’s (1980) “autopoiesis”40 are 
essentially biological models that others adopted to view society (Sawyer, 2005, p. 20). As 
Padgett and Powell (2012, pp. 56–57) contend, the use of such models offers only moderate 
applicability to social systems that are “more open” than other types of complex systems. 
For example, they note that autopoietic systems emphasize autonomy and self-enclosure, 
which is contrary to real-world social networks, which intersect and exchange information, 
as well as transform one another.  
Complex adaptive systems research, which accelerated during the 1990s and 2000s 
and is foundational to the MTML framework, represents the third wave of social system 
 
39 Common analogies to describe cybernetics are thermostats and a Captain steering a ship.  
40 Autopoiesis means “self-making” (Capra, 1996, p. 97) 
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theories (Sawyer, 2005). Like the broader category of “complex” systems, basic complex 
adaptive system features include individual components (e.g., individuals) and relations 
whereby in the whole’s behavior is more than the mere sum of its parts. While no single 
definition exists, scholars often describe these dynamical systems as those in which higher 
level patterns, aggregate behaviors, or order emerge from the actions and localized 
interactions of its adaptive components (e.g., individuals and organizations) rather than 
from centralized control; that is, they self-organize (Anderson, 1999; Gell-Mann, 1994; 
Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1992; Holland & Miller, 1991; Levin, 1998; Mitchell, 2009; 
Sawyer, 2005).41 In addition to self-organizing behavior, these multilevel systems, and 
thus their subcomponents (i.e., subsystems and individual components) too, co-evolve with 
their environments as a result of competition for resources (Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; 
Dooley, 1997; Lichtenstein, 2000; McKelvey, 1997; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Porter, 
2006). Complex adaptive systems, therefore, are different from other complex systems in 
that individual components, often called agents, have cognitive abilities to collect 
information from their environment and act accordingly to try to reach their goals or the 
system’s goals over time; hence, they and the systems in which they embed adapt (Wycisk 
et al., 2008).  
A foundational and well-known aspect of complex adaptive systems is nonlinearity 
and feedback that produces unpredictable patterns and order, but they often possess other 
characteristics too, such as heterogenous and autonomous agents, radical openness and 
porous boundaries, memory, dispersed interaction, flows between units (e.g., information), 
modular or clustered subsystems, cross-cutting hierarchical organization from self-
organization and co-evolution, far-from-equilibrium dynamics, and novelty (Dooley, 1997; 
Holland, 1992; Holland & Miller, 1991; Levin, 1998; Miller & Page, 2007; Porter, 2006; 
Preiser et al., 2018). Naturally, many commonly referenced complex adaptive systems 
include the human brain, immune system, ant colonies, ecosystems, economies, societies, 
and social networks, such as supply networks, competitive firms, and teams (Choi et al., 
2001; Dooley, 1997; Koza & Lewin, 1998; Levin, 1998; Lewin et al., 1999; Mitchell, 2009; 
 
41 For instance, a leading CAS thinker, John Holland (2006, p. 1), defines such systems as, “systems 
that have a large number of components, often called agents, that interact and adapt or learn.”  
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Porter, 2006; Preiser et al., 2018; Root, 2020; Stacey, 1995; Wycisk et al., 2008). Some 
have described how insurgencies and other nefarious networks possess many of these 
characteristics, yet fall short of explicitly adopting a complex adaptive systems framework 
(Department of the Navy, 2017; Kenney, 2007; Kilcullen, 2013). 
Though no single set of criteria exists for a social system to qualify as a complex 
adaptive system, authority and insurgent information-sharing networks meet many, if not 
all, commonly used criteria to describe them. They are nonlinear, feedback systems 
because when two individuals interact with one another, it often leads to mutual reactions 
that have consequences for them. Similarly, both networks consist of individuals with 
different motivations and characteristics (i.e., heterogenous) who work together through 
cooperative information sharing relations, and as such, informal information-sharing 
networks emerge without a central controller or deliberate organizing. While the presence 
of military hierarchies suggests some structure is imposed or formal in insurgent warfare, 
interactions among combatants and noncombatants within each network are often informal 
and bottom-up in insurgent warfare rather than top-down and forced (Pirnie & O’Connell, 
2008). They are dynamic too. Individuals die and defect, as well as form and dissolve ties 
during an insurgency. Both networks, regardless of context, are likely to maintain some 
degree of modularity due to repeated interactions among component parts; for example, 
shared organizational affiliations (e.g., military or insurgent unit) and similar geographic 
proximity (e.g., same area of operation) create opportunities for individuals to share 
information and establish relationships (Kadushin, 2012; McPherson et al., 2001). 
Moreover, each side’s social network’s open nature and porous borders are apparent in that 
they intertwine as they compete for and among a populace (Department of the Army, 2017; 
Gventer, 2014; Herrington, 1982; Kilcullen, 2013).  
As insurgent and authority information-sharing networks interconnect, they make 
up a larger social system that maintains common complex adaptive system characteristics. 
Heterogeneity remains apparent in such systems comprised of cooperating and competing 
civilians, insurgents, authorities, and everyone in-between. As subsystems of a larger 
system, each network is likely to maintain a modular structure through their respective 
components’ repeated interactions. Because the networks intertwine, yet are not fully 
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connected, one can assume individuals on each side of the conflict interact more frequently 
within their subsystem than with others in an adversarial one (hence, modular patterns). 
Individuals simultaneously learn and adapt to friend and foe based on local information 
passed through in-person, information-sharing relationships. On the one hand, no single 
“controller” organizes the broader system consisting of insurgents, authorities, and 
civilians, which suggests macro system patterns emerge, in part, from self-organizing 
processes. On the other, because the competing social networks intertwine in a competitive 
context for information, it is likely that “feedback loops emerge, that, in turn, force co-
evolving adaptive responses” within and between each one (Wycisk et al., 2008, p. 113); 
in other words, they co-evolve too.  
An important topic in the study of complex adaptive systems is the extent to which 
self-organization and environmental conditions determine a system’s features, such as its 
macro structure (Anderson, 1999; Carmichael & Hadžikadić, 2019; Choi et al., 2001; 
Dooley, 1997; Levin, 1998; McKelvey, 1997; Monge & Contractor, 2003). For instance, 
Choi et al. (2001) claim that three foci become evident when studying such systems: 
internal mechanisms (e.g., agents and self-organization), environment, and co-evolution. 
While the line between internal and external forces is not always clear due to the open 
nature of social systems (Root, 2020), this perspective’s main point is that system 
components’ parallel actions within the system itself—that is self-organizing behavior—
as well as feedback between agents and their social environments—or co-evolutionary 
behavior—drive the emergence of macro behavior and structure. While some argue that 
co-evolution is at the heart of self-organizing behavior, in part, because self-organization 
requires systems to import energy from outside the system (Kauffman, 1993; McKelvey, 
2002), the MTML framework maintains that one should account for both internal, 
structural behavior as well as the impact of system-environment interactions.  
While the set of tools varies across domains that have adopted a complex adaptive 
systems perspective, many researchers have embraced computational methods, specifically 
“agent-based models,” to model such systems (Carmichael & Hadžikadić, 2019; Miller & 
Page, 2007; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Ripley et al., 2021). This “bottom-up” approach 
permits researchers to create and explore how agent interactions, such as local social 
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processes, generate emergent patterns, order, and behavior (e.g., social norms and 
language) within an environment. It characterizes agents as following sets of rules, or 
schema,42 that represent social rules that one believes exist in the real-world (e.g., in 
insurgent warfare) and that govern agent interactions and can affect other agents, their own 
rules, and their environment. Thus, agent-based modeling, as well as similar approaches 
like multi-agent systems (MASs), enable researchers to conduct “thought” experiments 
about several relational mechanisms simultaneously, and account for important social 
system characteristics, such as their multilevel nature and human intentionally. Researchers 
can compare their results to empirical systems and data as well (Anderson, 1999; Koliba 
et al., 2016; Lansing, 2003; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Sawyer, 2005).43 In other words, 
unlike approaches that focus on mapping aggregate, empirical social system structures, 
such as social network analysis, or interacting system variables, like in system dynamics, 
agent-based models focus on simulated agents’ decisions and do not assume to know a 
real-world’s system structure but rather seek to generate it (Miller & Page, 2007).  
B. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL NETWORK RESEARCH 
Like complex adaptive systems research, social network research is a way of 
thinking about social systems that are made up components (i.e., social actors or nodes in 
graph theory) and the relations among them (Borgatti et al., 2013; Robins, 2015; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994). One can trace modern social network studies back to Jacob L. 
Moreno’s and Helen Jennings’ sociometric studies in the 1930s (Freeman, 2004; Moreno, 
1932, 1934; Moreno & Jennings, 1938). From the 1930s onward, several universities began 
research programs that continue to develop the foundation of social network research by 
focusing on different aspects of data collection and analysis techniques, visualizations, and 
mathematical and computational models (Freeman, 2004). These early efforts underly its 
interdisciplinary nature. In fact, similar to the complex adaptive systems domain, social 
 
42 For instance, one simple rule might be that an agent may change his attitude about a topic based on 
the sum of attitudes about the topic among his alters with whom he communicates weighted by the amount 
the agent communicates with each of his neighbors (Monge & Contractor, 2003, p. 127).  
43 In terms of studying information-sharing social networks, such an approach permits researchers to 
model information inputs and outputs, such as the timing of inputs and the type of information that flows in 
a network (Miller & Page, 2007). 
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network research has become an engrained scientific institution with its own journals 
(Connections, Social Networks, and Journal of Social Structure) and conferences (e.g., 
Sunbelt), as well as methods and software (e.g., UCINET, Pajek, and ORA).  
Overlapping with this research body is “network science,” which is a commonly 
used term to describe researchers who systematically examine interdependent entities that 
form complex structures (e.g., social networks). It is common to find references to several 
prominent network scientists mentioned in complexity science books, and vice-versa. 
Based on the seminal work of notable researchers, such as Milgram’s (1969) notion of a 
“small world” and Granovetter’s (1973) concept of “weak ties,” several renowned 
scientists have fused complex systems and network research domains under the network 
science umbrella through attempts to identify unifying principles of all networks. Watts 
and Strogatz’s (1998) research is a good example. Their influential work on “small-worlds” 
highlights that the random rewiring of ties among networked entities can have a substantial 
impact on average path distances among nodes in a structure. Though the authors looked 
at simple, “regular” networks, one can observe many real-world structures, social and 
otherwise, that possess small-world properties. In fact, Barabási and his colleagues have 
contributed substantially to the study of networks through their work on scale-free 
structures (Albert & Barabási, 2002; Barabási, 2002; Barabási et al., 1999; Barabási & 
Bonabeau, 2003). Specifically, they identified that networks of all sorts, such as the World 
Wide Web and transportation networks (e.g., airline industry), possess “scale-free” 
properties whereby the presence of “hubs” lead to small-world structures as well as 
clustering/modular patterns.  
Like “second wave” systems critics, social network scholars emphasize the unique 
nature of human social systems from others, such as transportation networks (Everton, 
2012; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Padgett & Powell, 2012; Robins, 2015; Sawyer, 2005). 
Many argue, like rational choice theorists in other fields, that social systems are unique in 
the sense that social beings, such as humans, have agency and intentionality. While diverse 
perspectives on agency and “intentionality” exist, a major assumption is that individuals 
can interpret information from their social environment and make decisions about how to 
act and behave (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Robins, 2015). Social context is important 
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too. A social system in which individuals embed, including other actors and relationships, 
serve as their environment and can affect one’s future ties, norms, beliefs, and behaviors, 
which is why the field generally considers both individual and system level factors in 
analyses (Borgatti et al., 2013; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Everton, 2012; Robins, 2015).  
Because humans have agency and are embedded in unique social environments, it 
is unlikely that a single theory or law explains all social networks.44 Instead, social network 
research emphasizes that a social system’s structure is a consequence of dynamic social 
processes among social actors (Lusher et al., 2013; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Robins, 
2015; Snijders et al., 2010). Social ties, such as information-sharing ties in insurgent 
warfare, come into existence between individuals in response to social environments. For 
instance, a civilian living in an area with an active insurgency may offer useful information 
to another noncombatant who has provided him with information in the past about 
insurgents operating in his neighborhood, thereby forming a reciprocal information-sharing 
relationship. Yet, dependencies involving several actors and ties may create relatively 
complex local structures beyond the simple pairs of individuals (i.e., dyad level), or at 
“higher levels.” In the case of the information-sharing civilians, the probability that either 
one knows the highest-ranking government commander operating in their neighborhood is 
low. However, if one of the civilians establishes an information-sharing relationship with 
one of the commander’s soldiers, then his chances of establishing a tie with the commander 
increase substantially (i.e., triad level) (Lusher et al., 2013).  
Consequently, social network researchers also emphasize the multilevel nature of 
social networks and have outlined many of the foundational ideas about social processes 
at multiple network levels (Kadushin, 2012; Lusher et al., 2013; Monge & Contractor, 
2003; Robins, 2015; Snijders et al., 2010). The central idea is that many local, and often 
nested,45 system effects combine into a complex set of social processes that undergird 
 
44 This view is a predominant view but not the only one about the role of agency and culture 
(Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Everton, 2012, pp. 29–30). Structural Determinism, for example, gives no 
credence to human agency and culture, while Structural instrumentalism assumes human agency is 
important. The views here align more with Structural Constructionism in which culture and agency as well 
as structure are important.  
45 For instance, reciprocity between two individuals can be nested inside a triad.  
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social systems (Lusher et al., 2013). While many social networks, for example, exhibit 
underlying social processes such as preferential attachment (Barabási, 2016), many other 
plausible mechanisms can help researchers explain social network emergence and 
dynamics, such as self-organizing processes other than preferential attachment (e.g., social 
exchange), co-evolution, multiplexity, social selection (e.g., homophily), and social 
influence (e.g., diffusion). In other words, several social processes may be at play 
simultaneously and occur at different network levels in any given context, which is a point 
at the heart of the MTML framework and one that has become more apparent in social 
network research over the last two decades (Borgatti et al., 2013; Lusher et al., 2013; 
Robins, 2015; Snijders et al., 2010).  
In addition to placing an emphasis on multilevel social systems, social network and 
complex adaptive systems research share key assumptions and address many of the same 
concepts. Like the latter perspective, social network research assumes that social networks 
are locally emergent in that repeated interactions of social entities give rise to emergent 
structures in which the whole is greater than the mere sum of its parts, including in 
instances when multiple social networks overlap to make up a larger social system 
(Everton, 2012; Lusher et al., 2013; Padgett & Powell, 2012; Robins, 2015). As seen in the 
vast amount of diffusion and “social capital”46 studies, social network researchers assume 
social ties function as conduits for the flow of information and resources, although typically 
social network studies do not conceptualize information as Shannon, pragmatic, or 
semantic (Borgatti & Cross, 2003; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Crossley et al., 2015; Everton, 
2012; Kadushin, 2012). They recognize that social networks are dynamic as well. Like 
complex adaptive systems research, this domain’s researchers have increasingly examined 
how social networks self-organize, albeit in a much more implicit manner, as well as evolve 
over time, including how social networks co-evolve with others (Fujimoto et al., 2018; 
Lusher et al., 2013; Rambaran et al., 2015; Robins, 2015; Snijders et al., 2007; Steglich et 
al., 2006). Thus, it too recognizes nonlinearity within social systems and attempts to 
capture it through models for empirical social networks, such as SAOMs, that permit 
 
46 Many definitions exist, but in a broad sense, social capital is the idea that social networks have 
value for individuals, such as access to information and resources (Kadushin, 2012, p. 162). 
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researchers to untangle self-organizing social processes from co-evolutionary ones (Lusher 
et al., 2013; Snijders et al., 2010; Snijders et al., 2007).  
C. SUMMARY: MTML’S SYNTHESIS OF COMPLEX ADAPTIVE 
SYSTEMS OF SOCIAL NETWORK RESEARCH 
Monge and Contractor’s (2003) MTML framework fuses complex adaptive 
systems and social network research around the two interdisciplinary research bodies’ 
natural points of synthesis, such as shared assumptions (i.e., system components’ 
interdependence through relations), the uniqueness of social systems (e.g., human 
intentionality), and their shared emphasis on the multilevel nature of social systems in 
which self-organizing and co-evolutionary social processes (i.e., multitheoretical) propel 
emergent and dynamic structures at different levels. By doing so, this framework facilitates 
the study of co-evolving social networks in insurgent warfare, as well as addresses 
important gaps in existing literature. Specifically, the complex adaptive systems 
perspective’s unique contribution to the topic is that it aids analysis from a standpoint on 
system boundaries that is consistent with insurgency and counterinsurgency literature: 
namely, social systems that encompass open and competitive, information-sharing social 
networks that are comprised of dynamic social beings, specifically combatants and 
noncombatants, who influence and react to their social environment. This perspective 
offers a more realistic depiction of social systems in insurgent warfare than existing social 
network literature on “dark networks,” including insurgent ones, and enables one to 
interpret them in a more complete and useful manner. Social network research’s central 
contribution is its emphasis on identifying local social processes that undergird empirical 
social systems. Though extant social network literature has failed to address insurgent 
networks adequately to date, this domain offers the most useful avenue to examine co-
evolving, empirical social networks in operational settings, which addresses another major 
gap in the study of social networks in insurgent warfare.  
With these contributions in mind, social network and complex adaptive systems 
domains diverge in several notable ways for which one must account when leveraging the 
MTML framework. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the two research bodies differ 
in their historical lineage and scope. For instance, von Bertalanffy (a biologist), as well as 
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contemporary network scientists such as Barabási (a physicist), sought to establish unified 
system theories (Sawyer, 2005). Social network researchers, on the other hand, have been 
less eager to do so, in part, due to their emphasis on the importance of context in the study 
of social systems. Another notable point of divergence is the extent to which the domains 
address relevant concepts explicitly, such as emergence and self-organization. Such 
concepts are central to complex adaptive systems research while they appear to receive 
relatively less overt attention in social network research.47 The MTML framework, as well 
as this dissertation, aligns more closely with the former in the sense that it argues that 
analyses should account explicitly for these concepts, especially when studying co-
evolution (Monge & Contractor, 2003).  
Most importantly, the two research bodies do not necessarily apply key concepts in 
the same manner. Like with other social system models, the concept of complex adaptive 
systems is at a high level of abstraction, and while it offers many insights into social 
systems, many of its concepts and principles do not translate seamlessly nor are measured 
easily in the analysis of empirical social systems (Eidelson, 1997; Lansing, 2003; Sawyer, 
2005). This challenge is apparent in the fact that empirical social network studies rarely, if 
ever, explicitly incorporate and model relevant complex adaptive systems concepts and 
principles, such as bifurcations, self-organized criticality, homeostasis, and networks 
evolving at the edge of chaos (Borgatti et al., 2013; Cilliers, 1998; Eidelson, 1997; 
Kauffman, 1993; Robins, 2015). One reason for this might be that several scholars have 
cautioned against relying too heavily on metaphors from other types of systems, such as 
biological systems, that may “muddy” concepts and confuse aspects of social systems 
rather than enlighten (Eidelson, 1997; Padgett & Powell, 2012; Sawyer, 2005).  
Similarly, they diverge in their main approach for understanding social systems. 
Complex adaptive systems researchers commonly leverage computational, agent-based 
 
47 The complexity domain spends considerable time diving into these concepts’ philosophical 
implications, but social network research appears to accept them simply as key assumptions of most social 
systems. For instance, see Emergence (https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hzze20/current) and The Journal 
of Complexity (https://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-complexity). A few exceptions in social 
network research exist, however. For instance, Lusher et al. (2013) and Robins (2015) address self-
organization explicitly.  
58 
models that generate structures and system behaviors based on simulated agents’ decisions 
and interactions rather than map aggregate empirical social systems. While social network 
researchers recognize that individuals have cognition and it is an underlying assumption 
that information flows through social ties (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011), typically they do not 
model them explicitly. One practical explanation for this is that collecting such data is often 
impossible for context specific, empirical studies, especially archival studies (Tasselli et 
al., 2015).48 Monge and Contractor (2003) rely heavily on complex adaptive systems 
literature and agent-based modeling to illustrate and apply the MTML framework, yet they 
argue and demonstrate that social network models for empirical data, such as ERGMs and 
SAOMs, are valid approaches too (Lusher et al., 2013; Ripley et al., 2021; Snijders et al., 
2010; Snijders et al., 2007).49 As described in Chapter 4, recent advances in SAOMs since 
the authors published the framework place this model class at the intersection of the two 
domains by permitting analysts to model dynamic, multilevel social processes on empirical 
social network data.  
With these points in mind, this dissertation’s focus, like Monge and Contractor 
(2003), is on co-evolution and inherently related concepts, specifically emergence and self-
organization, that both complex adaptive system and social network research address 
explicitly, albeit to varying extents. Nonetheless, little consensus exists about each 
concept’s meaning. Therefore, it is important to describe the MTML’s perspective on each 
one, as well as highlight how this dissertation diverges from it (Hodgson, 2000; Koliba et 
al., 2016; Lane, 2006; Marcum, 2009; Walby, 2007). 
 
48 Other reasons certainly exist. For example, social network researchers, in part, focus on empirical 
networks because they emphasize the importance of context in which social networks embed. In fact, 
researchers from both domains appear to recognize the context-dependent nature of social systems, which 
suggests it is difficult to fully specify human “behavior” behind bottom-up processes (Miller & Page, 2007; 
Robins, 2015). This dissertation does not argue that one approach is superior to the other.  
49 In fact, the two approaches complement one another. For instance, researchers often apply 
computational models and then compare them to empirical network data.  
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D. MULTILEVEL SOCIAL NETWORKS AND STRUCTURAL 
EMERGENCE 
The multilevel nature of social systems is a central aspect of the MTML framework 
and directly related to co-evolution. It is the idea that dynamic social processes, such as co-
evolutionary and self-organizing ones, take place at multiple levels of analysis (Benbya & 
McKelvey, 2006; Goldstein, 1999; Levin, 2005; Lichtenstein, 2000; Lusher et al., 2013; 
McKelvey, 1997; Robins, 2015; Wycisk et al., 2008). For instance, Lichtenstein (2000, p. 
13) describes a primary goal of co-evolution studies is to understand “adaptive changes 
within and between” system levels and environment that give rise to emergent patterns and 
behavior. Though scholars give the term “multilevel” various meanings (Lazega & 
Snijders, 2016), Monge and Contractor (2003, p. 21) take a structural approach and define 
“levels” as individual, dyad, triad, subgroup, and global levels. They contend that 
“explaining” social system dynamics requires one to recognize their multilevel nature, as 
well as incorporate theoretical perspectives that occur at these various levels. Drawing from 
complexity and social sciences, they outline various theories that may help researchers 
hypothesize about social system dynamics at different network levels, most of which fall 
within the categories of self-organizing and co-evolutionary processes. Figure 3 depicts 
various network levels, as well as example hypotheses pertaining to each one.  
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Adapted from Monge and Contractor’s (2003) social system levels and hypotheses. The 
latter are a subset of potential hypotheses that one can incorporate into the MTML 
framework and do not necessarily align with the “configurations” depicted in the “Social 
System Level” column. It is also important to note the visual examples for each level are 
not the sole way to depict each one. For instance, one can depict the triad level as an open 
triad in which only two ties are present and there are many ways to depict and measure 
subgroups.  
Figure 3. Social System Levels and Example Hypotheses 
The notion of multilevel social systems is inherently related to the concept of 
emergence, which is the “arising of novel and coherent structures” (Goldstein, 1999) in 
dynamic systems from “local” interactions (Holland, 1998; Lichtenstein, 2000; Monge & 
Contractor, 2003).50 It is a perspective that assumes systems are made up of levels and that 
patterns, structure, and behavior at “higher levels” are greater than the mere sum of 
underlying parts (Root, 2020; Wycisk et al., 2008). Taking a structural perspective of 
emergence, Monge and Contractor (2003) contend that local or micro, self-organizing and 
co-evolutionary processes at their defined network levels help generate emergent structural 
patterns at higher ones. At each system level, one cannot explain its structure, patterns, and 
behaviors wholly in terms of another level. For instance, one cannot explain scale-free 
 
50 Though no consensus exists among scholars, common characteristics of emergent properties are 
novelty, that is, features not previously observed in the system, dynamical processes at lower levels, 
unpredictability, and irreducibility (Cilliers, 1998; Corning, 2002; Sawyer, 2005).  
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networks, a common global property in networks, with a single social process such as 
preferential attachment, or by simply adding up all social processes occurring at actor, 
dyad, triad, and subgroup levels.  
However, as Lissack (1999, p. 112) points out, the notion of emergence is “less 
than an organized, rigorous theory than a collection of ideas” that a system and its 
properties, such as its structure, emerge from interactions of its component parts (Corning, 
2002). A major debate has been the extent to which levels “determine” or cause others 
(Miller & Page, 2007; Monge & Contractor, 2003). Kontopolous (1993) offers a useful 
view for network emergence and identifies five epistemic perspectives relating to micro-
macro determination: namely, reductionism, construction or compositional emergence, 
holism, hierarchy, and heterarchy. As Monge and Contractor (2003, p. 15) point out, the 
“reductionist” and “holist” viewpoints are the most extreme versions on the continuum of 
perspectives. The former implies that lower levels completely determine higher levels, and 
therefore, researchers can investigate and explain macro phenomena solely in terms of 
lower level phenomena. Yet, this point of view has many critics who claim it ignores 
potential “top-down” effects on individuals and their relations, such as existing social 
norms and social structures (Monge & Contractor, 2003; Sawyer, 2005). Similarly, the 
construction or compositional emergence perspective emphasizes bottom-up “causality,” 
as well as contextual factors (Holland, 1998). From a network perspective, this point of 
view contends that interactions among lower level components give rise to the next level 
up in a network.  
Contrary to bottom-up perspectives, “holism” is the view that investigation and 
explanation of systems and their properties is insufficient; that is, it best encapsulates the 
notion that the “whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” A commonly used example 
demonstrating this perspective are water’s emergent properties. The argument is that one 
cannot explain water’s effect on say, fire, by looking at its individual components: namely, 
hydrogen and oxygen (i.e., H2O). Individually, the two components fuel fire; however, 
when combined in a certain manner they form properties with the opposite effect (Everton, 
2012). From a network perspective, this view focuses on how structure constrains 
individual behavior.  
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The validity of these views is widely discussed, and while some scholars take a side 
on this matter, many consider aspects of both top-down and bottom-up approaches as valid 
perspectives for explaining social systems (Everton, 2012; Lane, 2006; Levin, 1998; 
McKelvey, 2002; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Root, 2020; Sawyer, 2005; Tasselli et al., 
2015). Adherents to this viewpoint assume that feedback occurs between levels so that 
micro level interactions may shape global structures, yet the macro level then constrains 
future interactions, and so on (Rickles et al., 2007).51 One can see how this view applies to 
insurgent warfare in which interactions among individuals give rise to larger structures, 
while at the same time structure constrains individuals’ behaviors and actions. For instance, 
a civilian may share information with government forces, but is less likely to continue to 
do so if close family members become deeply embedded in an active and violent 
insurgency. Padgett and Powell (2012, p. 2) take a similar perspective about the evolution 
of actors and their relations, so much so, that their mantra is, “in the short run, actors create 
relations; in the long run, relations create actors.” In the case of a civilian sharing 
information with government soldiers, the authors would likely suggest the civilian’s 
decision to form a collaborative relationship with the government in the short-term may 
ultimately shape the civilian’s allegiances and actions in the long-term.  
The concept of “hierarchy” is inherently tied to the notion of levels. Like the 
concepts of complexity and emergence, hierarchy is a topic about which little consensus 
exists. Lane (2006), for example, outlines four different types of hierarchy as they relate to 
complexity, namely order,52 control,53 level, and inclusion. The last two are particularly 
relevant for the MTML framework. The author describes “level hierarchy” as a form of 
ontological organization of entities (Lane, 2006, p. 82). This view accounts for both 
bottom-up and top-down determination and appears in several social contexts, such as 
economic hierarchies comprising of individuals who make up departments, which then 
 
51 The point here is not to make a “chicken and egg” claim about which comes first. Rather, this 
perspective suggests both top-down and bottom-up effects have impacts.  
52 An order hierarchy, according to Lane (2006, p. 84) is “an ordering induced by the values of a 
variable defined on some set of elements.”  
53 Lane (2006, p. 85) defines this is as a “who gives orders to whom” type of hierarchy. For example, 
the U.S. Army reflects a control system such as the Army.  
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make up firms, and so on. Inclusion hierarchies, on the other hand, refer to Simon’s (1962) 
views on complex systems that they are organized into “Chinese boxes.” This position 
holds that each “box,” or hierarchy, contains other boxes, and that entities interact primarily 
with entities on the same level. In other words, this is a top-down point of view in which 
systems are nested within larger systems, a perspective that appears to have inspired others 
using the notion of “systems of systems”(Capra, 1996). Critics of this perspective, 
however, have pointed out that complex system hierarchies are not clearly defined or as 
nested as they are often portrayed (Cilliers, 2001; Padgett & Powell, 2012; Walby, 2007).  
Guided by Monge and Contractor (2003), this aligns more with the final perspective 
on structural emergence: heterarchy (Kontopoulos, 1993). In this sense of the term, 
heterarchies are far more complex than Simon’s notion of fully nested hierarchies. These 
“tangled composite structures,” or partially nested ones, have “multiple overlapping, 
relations across levels” (Kontopoulos, 1993; McKelvey, 1997; Monge & Contractor, 2003, 
p. 15). This perspective accounts for both top-down constraints and bottom-up influence, 
as well as feedback processes driving dynamics internal to each level (Monge & 
Contractor, 2003, p. 13). For example, two insurgents may share information reciprocally, 
thereby driving structure at a dyad level. Yet, they may also have information sharing 
relationships with many others that create local structures at “higher levels” (e.g., triad 
level), all of which occur within a larger existing structure that constrains behavior. Finally, 
because social networks are open systems connected to others, and thereby import and 
export material and non-material goods (e.g., information, recruits, and money) with one 
another, this perspective accounts for the possibility of “external” influences on one or 
more levels. This framework, therefore, suggests that internal, self-organization and co-
evolutionary processes, such as in the case of interconnected, competing networks, can 
influence a system’s dynamics (Contractor et al., 2006).  
 
E. SOCIAL PROCESSES AND SELF-ORGANIZATION IN THE MTML 
FRAMEWORK 
Self-organization is a central concept of complex adaptive systems research, as well 
as to the MTML framework (Kauffman, 1993; Keller, 2005; Levin, 2002; Monge & 
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Contractor, 2003). While various definitions exist, it generally comprises of a broad range 
of pattern-formation processes that attempt to explain the emergence of stable patterns and 
structure from the interactions of a system’s constituent parts, whether they be chemical 
elements, social actors, or other system entities (Haken & Portugali, 2016; Kauffman, 
1993; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Prigogine et al., 1988). A foundational element of self-
organizing behavior is that patterns emerge spontaneously from nonlinear dynamics and 
without the intervention and direction of a “central controller.”54 Leading scholars and 
ideas within biology and complexity science, such as Haken’s (1977) “synergetics,” 
Varela’s (1980) concept of “autopoiesis,” Bak’s (1996) notion of “self-organized 
criticality,” as well as others (Ashby, 1962), have made substantial contributions to the 
body of work and inspired scientists in other fields. 
In particular, Stuart Kauffman’s (1993) renowned work is a commonly referenced 
example in the study of self-organizing behavior in complex social systems (Lansing, 2003; 
McKelvey et al., 2013; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Stacey, 1995).55 In fact, Monge and 
Contractor (2003) illustrate self-organizing behavior in organizational networks largely 
from Kauffman’s perspective. While an exhaustive summary of his work and contributions 
is beyond this dissertation’s scope, one of his central claims is that self-organization, in 
addition to Darwinian natural selection, produces order in living systems through simple 
processes/rules. Using the notion of “fitness landscapes”56 to study genes’ evolutionary 
behavior, he argues that the fitness of any trait is likely determined by neighboring genes 
 
54 Hence, the “self” in “self-organization.” Unlike “chaotic” structures, self-organized patterns emerge 
from complexity, rather than the other way around (Allen et al., 2011; Anderson, 1999). 
55 As Lansing (2003, p. 183) and others (Mitchell, 2009; Monge & Contractor, 2003) explain, 
Kauffman’s work has offered important insights for biology, such as that “natural selection is not the sole 
source of order” in living systems, as well as for mathematics and physics, namely the notion that 
complexity is present within simple systems. Yet, it also has inspired the study of social systems in the 
sense that complex global patterns may emerge spontaneously from local interactions (Lansing, 2003).  
56 He describes “fitness” from an evolutionary biologist’s perspective. He states an organism’s fitness 
has components, such as fecundity and fertility, that lead to reproductive success. He states (1993, p. 37), 
“These include complex issues such as the frequency of each genotype variant of the organism in the 
population, the density of each genotype variant in a region, and even the entire ecosystem with which each 
organism interacts.” Fitness values are assigned to each gene and the fitness of the genotype is the average 
of all traits that make up the genotype. Assigning these values generates a fitness landscape, which can be 
smooth or rugged, showing the fitness of all possible combinations of genetic traits. Populations of genes 
“attempt to optimize their fitness by finding, selecting, and retaining the best genotypes” (Monge & 
Contractor, 2003, p. 265) 
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through epistatic connections, which impose constraints on the adaptability of the linked 
traits.  
Kauffman formalized this notion with the NK model (and an NK(C) model for co-
evolution) and explored the association between genes’ average connectedness and an 
organism’s ability to evolve (Lansing, 2003). In this model, the number of elements (“N”), 
such as genes, are connected through some number of links (the average across the system 
is “K”), like epistatic connections. The latter is a measure of complexity and can range 
from K=0, whereby no genes are connected, to K=N-1, when all genes are connected. 
Using random NK Boolean networks,57 each element (think strings of Christmas tree 
lights) in the network has two possible states (on or off), which is determined in accordance 
with its neighbors’ states and implemented in a model as simple rules. For instance, a basic 
rule might be that if all of one element’s (or node’s) neighbors are in an “on” state, it will 
turn “on” too. The networks are random in the sense that element connections, element 
states, and decision rules are assigned randomly throughout the network. Consequently, a 
system’s global behavior depends on the way it is wired (Mitchell, 2009; Stacey, 1995). 
Ultimately, Kauffman’s simulations found that the networks exhibited three 
“regimes” of behavior: ordered, chaotic, and complex. In ordered regimes, when K is small 
(e.g., K=1), simple and stable behavior emerges as the majority of elements’ behaviors 
“freeze” (e.g., stay “on”) and form a large, connected cluster while leaving some isolated 
elements whose activities fluctuate. Self-organization is difficult, if not impossible, in these 
cases because many elements and links in the system are largely fixed (Monge & 
Contractor, 2003, p. 270). In chaotic regimes, where K is large (K = N-1), there is no cluster 
of frozen elements and small changes in the system’s initial conditions can cause 
behavioral “avalanches” across the system whereby patterns do not repeat; that is, it 
exhibits random behavior in which element states change chaotically (e.g., lights switch 
each other on and off). In this regime too self-organization is difficult, yet in this case, it is 
because there is no order in the system. The final regime—or complex one (K=2)—is a 
 
57 As Mitchell (2009, p. 283) states, “A Boolean rule is one that gets a number of inputs, each equal to 
0 or 1, and from those inputs it produces an output of 0 or 1. “  
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“transition region” between ordered and chaotic regimes in which clusters of stability (i.e., 
frozen behaviors) emerge but rather isolated elements unleash avalanches of change 
(Kauffman, 1993). In other words, he discovered that system behavior is largely dependent 
on K and neither ordered nor chaotic networks transmit information and therefore cannot 
adapt; however, the complex networks—that is, those at the “edge of chaos”—can do both. 
It is in the complex regime that self-organized behavior emerges (Lansing, 2003; Mitchell, 
2009; Stacey, 1995).  
Because not all systems are thought to self-organize (e.g., some may be chaotic), 
extant literature has sought to outline self-organizing system characteristics. Prior to 
Kauffman’s work, Prigogine and Glansdorff (1971) offered criteria for describing such 
systems, such as autocatalysis,58 mutual causality among parts, matter and energy 
exchanges with it environment (i.e., open systems), and far-from-equilibrium 
characteristics (Monge & Contractor, 2003, p. 89). Similarly, Cilliers (1998, p. 91), a 
prominent complexity scholar, described them as open systems that adapt to their 
environment, emerge without a priori design, are non-linear in nature, consist of 
components operating on local information, possess “memory,” and become increasingly 
complex over time. As Haken and Portugali (2016) explain, self-organization requires 
exchanges or information, matter, and/or energy with a surrounding environment.59 
Understandably, several foundational works have incorporated the concept of self-
organization into the study of open, social systems that meet many of these characteristics, 
such as organizations (Monge & Contractor, 2003; Stacey, 1995; Volberda & Lewin, 2003) 
and ecological systems (Keller, 2005; Levin, 2005). More recently, Root (2020) has 
 
58 Monge and Contractor (2003, p. 95) describe it as, “the capabilities of the parts of a system to self-
create and self-renew independent of the forces from the outside.”  Drawing from its chemical origins of 
study, Padgett and Powell (2012, p. 8) define it as, “a set of nodes and transformations in which all nodes 
are reconstructed through transformations among nodes in the set.”  
59 Specifically, the authors illustrate how self-organizing processes are linked to Shannon, pragmatic, 
and semantic information, as well as information adaptation, or the interplay of Shannon information and 
the other two forms. As outlined in Chapter 1, they describe Shannon information “capacity of a channel 
through which a message passes,” whereas pragmatic information is the “impact of a message on 




described economics systems, specifically in Europe and China, as self-organizing, 
complex systems.  
The work of several renowned network scholars has inspired a shift in the study of 
self-organizing social systems from system regimes to empirical social processes that drive 
structural changes (Barabási, 2002, 2016; Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973, 1983; Watts & 
Strogatz, 1998). Building on these works, recent social network research has focused self-
organization on how empirical social networks constitute emergent structural patterns built 
upon underlying social processes, or micro patterns of interaction, within the constraints of 
existing structure and devoid of a central “controller.” In his insightful book, Robins (2015, 
p. 34) encapsulates this domain’s more precise, structural view of self-organization by 
defining it as structural processes “where the presence of some network ties sustains the 
ongoing presence of other network ties, or encourages them into existence.” Such processes 
are considered “purely structural” and “internal” to a network (Lusher et al., 2013; Robins, 
2015). From this perspective, common examples of self-organizing behavior are 
reciprocity, triadic closure, and preferential attachment, all of which are dynamic and may 
occur simultaneously to produce complex structures. Beyond identifying such processes in 
empirical networks, the challenge is explaining the extent to which each one is present. 
Recent developments in ERGMs (Lusher et al., 2013) and SAOMs (Snijders et al., 2010) 
have provided researchers with the means to do just that. Thus, this dissertation updates 
Monge and Contractor’s (2003) application of self-organization to incorporate this 




Examples of structural, “micro configurations” that reflect dynamic self-organizing, social 
processes. While such processes can occur at “higher levels,” this figure depicts a selection 
of basic examples only at two levels: dyad and triad. 
Figure 4. Examples of Self-Organizing, Social Processes 
Existing literature offers little guidance about self-organizing behavior in insurgent 
warfare. Using Robins’s (2015) definition of self-organization, however, this study 
contends that self-organization is likely prevalent in insurgent warfare as combatants and 
noncombatants exchange information. The mixture of these actors in overlapping networks 
suggests many relations are informal rather than formal ones. Informal ties, which are 
naturally forming ties often created to complete tasks and access information and resources, 
are far more likely to define spontaneous interactions and self-organizing behavior than 
formal ties, even though they often overlap, embed, are constrained by, and serve the same 
goals of formal ties (Biancani et al., 2014; Brennecke & Rank, 2016; Goldstein, 1999; 
Kadushin, 2012; Monge & Contractor, 2003). While military and many insurgents, as well 
as civilians, tend to maintain formal organizational memberships, they are rarely, if ever, 
members of the same organizations during active conflict; instead, they appear to develop 
informal, information-sharing ties when they interact with others outside their formal 
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structure, which is often built on local information rather than from “order” imposed on 
them from a “central controller.”60  
Furthermore, the bottom-up and competitive nature of information collection in 
operational environments is likely to facilitate self-organizing behavior (Astley, 1985; 
Cilliers, 1998; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Pirnie & O’Connell, 2008). Unlike 
conventional warfare, information collection in insurgent warfare is primarily a bottom-up 
process based on reporting from units operating in the field who maintain contact with 
noncombatants in competitive public spaces, such as during patrols, and in private settings, 
like key leader engagements, to name just a few (Pirnie & O’Connell, 2008). In such cases, 
individuals who exchange information often help connect the competing, open social 
networks, and serve as conduits of information inputs into their respective “side.” 
Moreover, some scholars contend that competition is a precondition for self-organizing 
behavior (Cilliers, 1998), which is likely when the demand for resources (e.g., information) 
exceeds supply (Astley, 1985; Monge & Contractor, 2003). Actionable information is in 
high demand in insurgent warfare and the consequences of failing to acquire and 
disseminate information successfully can be disastrous (e.g., injury and death). One can 
expect, therefore, self-organizing behavior within such competitive contexts in which 
actors develop informal relations to exchange information and meet their operational 
objectives.  
F. EVOLUTION, CO-EVOLUTION, AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
Like the concepts of emergence and self-organization, co-evolution has drawn 
interest from various research domains and is a foundational aspect of the MTML 
framework. Ehrlich and Raven (1964), the biologists who some have credited with coining 
the term co-evolution (McKelvey, 1997; Porter, 2006), described it as genetic change of 
one species in response to the evolution of another. Others have outlined various forms of 
 
60 Volberda and Lewin (2003, pp. 2126–2127) make a similar point about self-organization in formal 
organizations, like businesses. They state that self-organization does not mean “that managers are not 
necessary or that they have demised roles. It means that no central controller is necessary, and it requires a 
fundamental departure from command-and-control philosophy of traditional hierarchical bureaucratic 
organizations.” 
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co-evolution (Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; McKelvey, 2002), such as “predator/prey,” and 
“symbiotic” co-evolution.61 Initially envisioned for biological applications, such as 
dynamic interactions between plants and herbivores and the study of genetic evolution 
(Kauffman, 1993), organization scientists and social network researchers have applied the 
concept to examine how various types of social systems evolve mutually with their 
environments. This perspective places its attention on systems’ micro adaptive changes 
within and between system levels in response to an environment and how such dynamics 
give rise to emergent macro patterns (Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; Dooley, 1997; 
Lichtenstein, 2000; McKelvey, 1997; Porter, 2006; Robins, 2015; Snijders et al., 2007). As 
such, co-evolution has become a central concept to complex adaptive systems and social 
network research and scholars have applied it to various social system settings, whether it 
be firms and/or alliances and organizational networks (Baum & Singh, 1994; Koza & 
Lewin, 1998; Lewin et al., 1999), organizational strategy (Dooley, 1997), or social 
networks (Amati et al., 2021; Choi et al., 2001; Fujimoto et al., 2018; Huitsing et al., 2014; 
Steglich et al., 2006).  
Co-evolution extends evolutionary theory, which is essentially a theory of change 
(Abatecola et al., 2016; Kauffman, 1993; McKelvey, 1997; Monge & Contractor, 2003). 
While an exhaustive review of evolutionary theory is beyond this study’s scope, its 
foundations and application to organizations and organizational networks—especially 
among population ecology theorists—serves as a useful background for co-evolution 
research (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Lee & Monge, 2011; Lewin et al., 1999; McKelvey, 1997, 
2002). It contends that basic mechanisms driving organizational evolution occur through 
random and intentional variation, which it can select and then retain through institutional 
procedures in efforts to improve survivability in the face of competition. Specifically, three 
broad categories of processes, which often occur simultaneously, serve as the basis for 
evolutionary systems in organizational contexts: namely variation, selection, and retention. 
 
61 McKelvey (McKelvey, 2002) lists eight forms of co-evolution. For instance, “predator/prey” co-
evolution could be tit-for-tat increases in a prey’s speed, which in turn, requires the predator to run faster, 
and so on. The “symbiotic” form occurs through symbiotic, sometimes mutually beneficial, relations.  
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A fourth process, competition for resources, drives organizational evolution as well 
(Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Monge & Contractor, 2003).  
According to Aldrich and Ruef (2006), variation is the counterpart to stability and 
in an organizational context it is any departure from routine or tradition. It can be 
intentional or unintentional (i.e., blind, or random). The former are variations that are the 
result of organizations trying to solve problems, whereas the latter occur via chance and 
without preplanning (Monge & Contractor, 2003). For instance, an example of intentional 
variation could be when an insurgent organization, through imitation of other organizations 
and/or trial and error, realizes improvised explosive devices (IEDs) slow down a militarily 
superior government and inflict casualties, which may lead them to pay large sums of 
money to individuals willing to plant them on highways that authorities use frequently. 
Blind variation may result from insurgents obtaining new information sources without 
planning it, such as segments of the population who offer them information after 
experiencing government oppression. Certainly, organizations need not benefit from one 
or the other; they can profit from both types simultaneously.  
Evolutionary selection, not to be confused with social selection, is an organization’s 
attempt to choose variations that provide it benefits and minimize harm. Some variations, 
for example, help insurgent organizations acquire legitimacy and resources, while others 
may degrade their operational effectiveness. An insurgent group’s successful use of IEDs, 
which they can plant in secret and thereby reduce the risk of bodily harm to its members, 
may lead to influxes in external resources, while leadership infighting after re-organization 
may lead to a decline in performance and resources. Beneficial variations may then transfer 
to other organizations through mimicry or vicarious learning (Monge & Contractor, 2003, 
p. 289). Certainly, organizations may select harmful variations in the short term because in 
many cases it is impossible to know what will benefit them and what will not (Monge & 
Contractor, 2003).  
According to Monge and Contractor (2003, p. 249), retention is the process by 
which a “selection variant becomes an integral part of the organization, an accepted routine, 
an innovative competency, or a new trait.” Continuing with the IED example, an insurgent 
organization’s continued success of paying locals to implant IEDs on highways may 
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replace more risky confrontations with militarily superior government forces and lead them 
to develop an organizational-wide procedure for local insurgent cells. Retention, like the 
other evolutionary processes, occurs within the context of competition for scarce resources 
within organizations, between them, and between populations62 (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; 
McKelvey, 1997). Like Cilliers (1998), Monge and Contractor (2003, p. 251) explain that 
organizations compete with one another over resources in order to survive, as well as 
flourish, in times during which resources become scarce. They must evolve within this 
competitive context to succeed.  
Over time, co-evolution has become a prominent focus in the study of organization 
and organizational network evolution (Abatecola et al., 2016; Porter, 2006). Like with the 
concept of self-organization, Kauffman’s (1993) inspirational work extends evolutionary 
theory to include co-evolution as a source of order. While his NK model considers the 
evolution of a single population or species, his NK(C) model addresses the co-evolution of 
multiple populations. As with his NK model, co-evolving systems can behave in ordered, 
chaotic, and complex regimes. The “N” (i.e., number of genes) and “K” (average 
connectedness/complexity) parameters remain defined the same in his model extension, 
yet it also accounts for the number of interconnected species (i.e., “S” parameter) as well 
as number of links between them (i.e., “C” parameter). This model, therefore, connects 
different species’ fitness landscapes (Kauffman, 1993; McKelvey et al., 2013; Monge & 
Contractor, 2003). These inter-species links constrain populations and have consequences 
for them, such as producing local optima for the interlinked systems but not necessarily for 
each species. He contends that when internal complexity (or K) is greater than between 
population complexity (i.e., S x C), the interconnected populations may reach an optimal 
level rather efficiently, but they may not reach one for a long time when the opposite is 
true (i.e., K < S x C). When species co-evolve into a system-wide optimal level, the entire 
co-evolving ecosystem attains the edge of chaos. Thus, his NK(C) model extends to the 
 
62 Monge and Contractor (2003, p. 252) describe populations, such as a set of organizations, as those 
that share common features (e.g., communication nets across a set of organizations) or specializations (e.g., 
breweries). For instance, they give an example of how telephone companies in the early 1900s collaborated 
and made up a population.  
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principle that systems at the edge of chaos can adapt and sustain the highest level of fitness 
(Kauffman, 1993, pp. 279–280).  
While his innovative work has well-known limitations for the study of social 
systems,63 it appears to have inspired the study of co-evolving social systems from various 
perspectives (Lansing, 2003; McKelvey, 1999; McKelvey et al., 2013; Monge & 
Contractor, 2003; Snijders et al., 2007). One example is the community ecology 
perspective,64 which frames co-evolution as a means to explain how organizations 
compete and cooperate with each other for scarce resources at various levels, such as 
between organizational populations and communities (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Astley, 1985; 
N. Contractor & Monge, 2002; Monge & Contractor, 2003). At one “level,” organizations 
within the same population (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) joint task forces) 
compete and cooperate for resources (e.g., funding) to “survive” in a shared “niche” (e.g., 
federal law enforcement). At another level, they compete with other populations for 
resources too (e.g., other intelligence agencies), whereby they become interconnected and 
make up a broader community (e.g., “intelligence community”). Ultimately, this 
community interacts and competes with others (e.g., telecommunications and social media 
companies) (Contractor & Monge, 2002; Lee & Monge, 2011). A major focus of these 
interactions has been on two forms of relations that drive dynamics: namely, ties of 
commensalism and symbiosis (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Monge & Contractor, 2003). The 
former refers to cooperation (often known as mutualism) to outright competition for 
resources between similar entities, whereas symbiotic relations refer to mutual 
interdependence between dissimilar entities, often based on functionality.65  
 
63 For example, one commonly reference limitation is that the NK(C) model assumes K is a constant 
value, which is highly unlikely in social systems (Monge & Contractor, 2003). McKelvey (1999) offers a 
section discussing additional issues with “translating” Kauffman’s model to social systems.  
64 Community ecologists examine multiple populations of different organizations. Various definitions 
exist for both populations and communities. Monge and Contractor (2003) suggest populations refer to 
types of organizations and communities may refer to populations joined by ties of commensalism and 
symbiosis through some geographical and temporal boundary. Community ecology essentially subsumes 
population ecology by adding community level evolutionary mechanism and connects populations with 
their environments (Monge & Contractor, 2003, pp. 256–257) .  
65 Aldrich and Ruef (2006, p. 244) go further in their description of organizational relations by 
offering eight possible types commensalism, symbiosis, and dominance between organizational 
populations. 
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Drawing from evolutionary biology, several organizational scientists have made 
substantial contributions to the advancement of the co-evolution perspective since the 
1990s (Abatecola et al., 2016; Baum & Singh, 1994; Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; Choi et 
al., 2001; Dooley, 1997; Koza & Lewin, 1998; Lichtenstein, 2000; McKelvey, 1997, 1999, 
2002; Porter, 2006; Tasselli et al., 2015; Volberda & Lewin, 2003; Wycisk et al., 2008). 
Like Kauffman’s (1993) work, this domain contends that one cannot understand 
organizational evolution without accounting for connectivity and simultaneous evolution 
of environment, which depending on one’s perspective, can consist of individuals and 
groups within an organization and/or external organizations (McKelvey, 1997, 1999; 
Volberda & Lewin, 2003). According to Lichtenstein (2000, p. 13), the essential goal of 
co-evolution research is to understand “adaptive changes within and between all levels of 
organizational and environmental interactions,” whereby shifting micro interactions 
produce macro patterns. For instance, employees within an organization may form 
networks and mutually influence one another as they interact, and as that happens over 
time, groups may emerge that establish norms and rules, which, in turn, influence the 
individuals. In addition to such “horizontal” co-evolution, so-called “vertical” co-evolution 
may arise when emergent groups become subsumed under another group (or manager) with 
a new set of rules and norms (McKelvey, 2002). Moreover, these types of co-evolution 
occur within larger systems of interconnected organizations. Others have examined co-
evolution as the interplay of the individual, operational, and strategic levels in 
organizations (Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; Monge & Contractor, 2003), while some have 
explored how individuals in organizations shape networks through their characteristics and 
cognitions, which in turn influence and affect them (Schulte et al., 2012; Tasselli et al., 
2015).  
In addition to multiple levels, scholars have argued that co-evolutionary social 
systems possess certain traits. Porter (2006) offers six defining characteristics in an effort 
to translate co-evolution from a biological context to an organizational one: namely, 
specificity, reciprocity, simultaneity, genetic fixing/permanent structural change, boundary 
crossing, and organic. In short, co-evolution takes place when evolution is mutual and 
concurrent between organizations. Volberda and Lewin (2003) make a similar claim in the 
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sense that there must be interconnected, heterogenous agents in systems with the ability to 
learn and adapt. Additionally, system components must be motivated to co-evolve (i.e., 
facing some sort of constraint) and some event must initiate or trigger co-evolutionary 
processes. Other related traits include competition among entities, multi-directional 
causality, non-linearity, feedback and interdependence, and history dependence (Benbya 
& McKelvey, 2006; McKelvey, 1997, 1999; Volberda & Lewin, 2003).  
While many of these insightful works have been qualitive, many scholars argue that 
both complex adaptive systems and social network research offer useful approaches for 
studying co-evolution in computational contexts (Dooley, 1997; Lichtenstein, 2000; 
McKelvey, 1999; Monge & Contractor, 2003). These approaches are relevant, because as 
Monge and Contractor (2003) and Porter (2006) contend, co-evolutionary studies require 
multilevel, multi-theory, and multi-method approaches. For instance, Monge and 
Contractor (2003, p. 273) illustrate Kauffman’s NK(C) model by looking at the emergence 
of co-evolving belief systems and strategic practices among competing organizations. Yet, 
however insightful, many complex adaptive system principles and model assumptions, 
including those like “fitness landscapes,” are difficult to apply and measure in empirical 
social systems (Anderson, 1999; Eidelson, 1997). In fact, while Monge and Contractor 
(2003, pp. 294–295) explore co-evolving organizational networks from a complex adaptive 
systems perspective and employ Kauffman’s approach, they recognize these limitations 
and argue that several “emerging” social network research models, such as ERGMs and 
SAOMs, enable researchers to leverage their framework. At the time of the MTML 
framework’s introduction, however, these models were in their infancy and not widely 
available.66  
G. SOCIAL NETWORK RESEARCH: EVOLUTION AND CO-EVOLUTION 
Perhaps inspired by organizational and complex systems research, social network 
researchers have examined the evolution of empirical social networks (Breiger et al., 2003; 
Robins, 2015; Snijders et al., 2010). Specifically, social network researchers have 
 
66 Interestingly, their use has begun to appear in organization scientist journals to study co-evolution, 
such as team members’ perception and their ties (Schulte et al., 2012).  
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increasingly applied longitudinal network models, especially SAOMs, to explore which 
social processes undergird social networks. With an emphasis on social structure, such 
studies typically examine how individual level mechanisms (e.g.., homophily) and 
multilevel self-organizing processes (e.g., reciprocity and triadic closure) drive network 
dynamics rather than focus on evolutionary mechanisms such as variation, selection, 
retention, and competition for resources (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Snijders et al., 2010). 
Cunningham et al. (2015), for example, examine the evolution of the Noordin Top Terrorist 
network using SAOMs. The authors hypothesize about several self-organizing and 
individual level factors driving the social network’s structural evolution, including 
transitive ties, alter degree, and selection processes based on similar roles and nationalities. 
Others have used SAOMs to study topics ranging from the evolution of drug trafficking 
networks (Bright et al., 2019) to corporate interlock networks (Withers et al., 2018). 
However, few social network evolution studies have employed the MTML framework 
explicitly and scant research has incorporated the notion of competitive networks in such 
models. 
Social network researchers have increasingly examined the concept of co-evolution 
as well. Like complexity and organization sciences, social network co-evolution studies 
focus on how networked actors mutually evolve with their social environments, which is 
defined as other actors and relations (Kadushin, 2012; Lazega & Snijders, 2016; Snijders 
et al., 2010; Walby, 2007). Such empirical studies commonly frame co-evolution as the 
interplay of actor behaviors (e.g., drug use) and a single type of relationship (e.g., 
friendships). The goal of such analyses is to untangle, and assess the extent to which, social 
influence, social selection, and self-organizing processes (i.e., purely structural) at multiple 
levels drive an empirical network’s dynamics. Snijders et al. (2006) examine the degree to 
which social influence and selection account for the co-evolution of alcohol consumption 
and tobacco use among adolescent friends, while simultaneously considering self-
organizing dynamics, such as reciprocity (i.e., dyad level) and preferential attachment (i.e., 
individual level). Others have applied this approach to other contexts, such as co-evolving 
tastes in entertainment (e.g., music, books, and movies) and friendships (Lewis et al., 
2012). 
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However, many real-world, social networks are comprised of multiple, overlapping 
relations; that is, they are multiplex or multirelational. For instance, two insurgents in the 
same operational cell may share information because they trust each other (i.e., shared 
“affiliation,” “information sharing,” and “trust” ties). Several studies have taken this 
perspective and have looked at multiplex insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks for 
various purposes (Bright et al., 2015; Diviák et al., 2019; Everton & Cunningham, 2013, 
2015; Papachristos & Smith, 2014; Roberts & Everton, 2011; Stys et al., 2020), including 
internetwork associations (Campana & Varese, 2013; Faulkner & Cheney, 2013). In fact, 
social network research has long recognized that overlapping relations, such as informal 
and formal systems, interact and often shape one another (Kadushin, 2012; McKelvey, 
2002). The key point is to identify which relations are relevant and help define an 
“environment” in a given context.  
The presence of overlapping relations has implications for system emergence and 
dynamics, including co-evolution (D’Agostino & Scala, 2014). Padgett and Powell (2012) 
make a substantial contribution to this topic. The authors examine how the emergence of 
macro-outcomes, especially innovation, is a product of feedback and transformative 
processes among social networks. Drawing from the concept of “autocatalysis,”67 they 
look at co-evolution among interacting self-organizing social systems. While illustrating 
many empirical case studies, Padgett and Powell (2012, p. 3) contend “interaction among 
autocatalytic networks is the key to generating novelty,” and that connected networks 
transform one another rather than merely transmit material and non-material goods (e.g., 
information) through relations. For instance, they describe how information is transformed 
through communication protocols; that is, they explain that information injected from one 
overlapping network to another can transform organizations. To illustrate such 
transformational processes, they outline eight network “folding mechanisms,” such as 
transposition and re-functionality whereby “relations and relational protocols developed in 
one autocatalytic network are inserted into another and reproduced there” (Padgett & 
 
67 While the authors describe it as self-referencing behavior, they claim that resource exchanges with 
the outside can takes place. In fact, Padgett and Powell (2012, p. 8) describe “autocatalytic networks” as 
those of transformation in which multiple self-referencing networks connect and transform one another.  
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Powell, 2012, p. 12). Hence, Padgett and Powell’s emphasis on multiple, self-organizing 
and interacting networks in evolutionary processes aligns well with the MTML framework, 
as well as with the increasingly popular domain of multilayer systems that often describes 
cascades and percolation within and across networks, including how a system’s level of 
connectivity is positively related to information flows (Aleta & Moreno, 2019; Boccaletti 
et al., 2014; D’Agostino & Scala, 2014; De Domenico et al., 2015; Dickison et al., 2016; 
Kivela et al., 2014; Pandit et al., 2013; Root, 2020).  
The multirelational nature of social networks, as well as their open nature in which 
they intertwine with others, also suggests micro social processes can involve multiple 
networks (Porter, 2006; Snijders et al., 2013). In fact, existing research has demonstrated 
that social relations can interact at many network levels to produce structures by 
influencing the formation, maintenance, or dissolution of another (Amati et al., 2021; 
Fujimoto et al., 2018; Gould, 1991; Granovetter, 1973; Huitsing et al., 2014, 2014; Lee & 
Monge, 2011; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Rambaran et al., 2015; Ripley et al., 2021). For 
example, Gould (1991) analyzed insurgency in a seventh century Paris Commune and 
demonstrated substantial interplay between formal and informal relations in mobilization 
processes. Several practical publications have offered similar insights by recognizing how 
multiple social networks can interact to produce outcomes in operational settings 
(Department of the Army, 2017; U.S. Marine Corps, 2017).  
Interestingly, as statistical models for the study of empirical networks have become 
more sophisticated, as Monge and Contractor (2003) foretold, researchers have begun to 
consider multiplex dynamics as a form of co-evolution in which different networks are 
mutually constitutive at multiple network levels (Amati et al., 2021; Ellwardt et al., 2012; 
Fujimoto et al., 2018; Htwe et al., 2020; Huitsing et al., 2014; Rambaran et al., 2015; Ripley 
et al., 2021; Stadtfeld et al., 2020; Warren, 2016). Like the interplay of behaviors and ties, 
this approach seeks to untangle inter-network, self-organizing processes (or “uniplex”) 
from co-evolutionary ones; however, this perspective characterizes co-evolution as 
multilevel social processes between overlapping, multiplex social ties/networks in which 
the presence of one type can influence the presence, maintenance, or dissolution of another. 
For example, Rambaran et al. (2015) leveraged SAOMs to examine the structural interplay 
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of friendship and antipathy relations among adolescents in two U.S. middle schools. 
Controlling for self-organizing processes underlying each network, the authors 
incorporated several “between-network”—or co-evolutionary effects—at dyad and triad 
levels, and found support for several of them, such as “sharing a common enemy promotes 
friendship” and “sharing the same friend may result in antipathy” (Rambaran et al., 2015, 
p. 174). This approach to co-evolution, therefore, focuses on inter-network dynamics rather 
than the interplay of behavior and a single network. Figure 5 depicts a sample of multilevel 
social processes, including examples of self-organizing and co-evolutionary processes, that 
may undergird the emergence and dynamics of social systems comprised of authority and 
insurgent-information sharing networks in insurgent warfare.  
 
This figure depicts only a few examples of multilevel social processes, including intra- and 
inter-network processes; that is, self-organizing and co-evolutionary processes. 
Figure 5. Examples of Multilevel, Social Processes 
Consistent with the MTML framework, this dissertation views co-evolution from 
the multiplex perspective for at least two reasons. The first is that it focuses on modeling 
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empirical social network dynamics, which fills an important gap in extant insurgent warfare 
literature. The second is that it enables the analysis of social systems comprised of multiple 
relations/networks. As previously described, one can observe at least two interconnected 
structures competing for control and legitimacy over a populace during an insurgency: 
namely authority information-sharing and insurgent information-sharing networks. When 
considered in isolation, both social networks consist of cooperative,68 information sharing 
ties among combatants and noncombatants on one side of a conflict (i.e., intra-network 
ties). This study contends that self-organization, as defined by Robins (2015), is prevalent 
in these networks because of the bottom-up and informal nature of many information 
exchanges in insurgent warfare. The competitive context in which each network operates 
is only likely to enable self-organizing behavior further (Astley, 1985; Cilliers, 1998; 
Monge & Contractor, 2003; Pirnie & O’Connell, 2008). However, the networks’ open 
nature and the presence of ties between the competing sides (i.e., inter-network ties), such 
as when a civilian provides information to both networks, suggests they are interconnected 
through individuals embedded in both structures. When taken together, and consistent with 
co-evolution studies in across domains (Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; Kauffman, 1993; 
Lichtenstein, 2000; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Porter, 2006; Snijders et al., 2007), these 
characteristics suggest each network, which combine into a larger social system, contains 
intra-network, self-organizing processes and inter-network, co-evolutionary processes at 
multiple network levels. By accounting for both categories of processes, this perspective 
offers a realistic depiction of the structural emergence of social systems in insurgent 
warfare. Figure 6 depicts the progression from the analysis of individuals networks to the 
examination of a larger social system consisting of competing networks. 
 
68 I recognize that individuals “on the same side” can compete with one another too but the act of 
sharing information is a cooperative action.  
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The last network represents a more realistic depiction of social networks in insurgent 
warfare in which they intertwine and compete through shared nodes whose affiliations do 
not fit into neat categories. The dotted lines between layers correspond to the same node in 
different networks. 
Figure 6. Progression from Distinct Networks to MTML Perspective 
H. MULTILEVEL HYPOTHESES: SELF-ORGANIZATION AND CO-
EVOLUTION IN INSURGENT WARFARE 
Existing literature offers little guidance about how social network co-evolution can 
occur within insurgent contexts. Nevertheless, several prominent theoretical mechanisms, 
as well as empirical interactions described in insurgency literature, offer some direction 
about the types of processes that may drive network dynamics at the individual/degree, 
dyad, triad, and other levels. For instance, theories pertaining to network “closure” 
(Granovetter, 1973, 1983) and the emergence of “hubs” (Barabási, 2002, 2016; Capra, 
1996; Kadushin, 2012; Robins, 2015; Root, 2020) appear, in part, to help frame many 
observed social interactions in variety of insurgent warfare contexts (Kuehl, 2009; 
Montgomery & McWilliams, 2009; Wilson, 2006). The key is to hypothesize which intra- 
and inter- network processes or tendencies might be at play in a struggle between authority 
and insurgent information-sharing networks. Therefore, while this study primarily attempts 
to unravel associations underlying co-evolutionary patterns between competing networks, 
it will offer several hypotheses about intra-network processes as well.  
1. Self-Organizing, Intra-Network Processes 
It is likely that several multilevel, social processes will help drive the creation and 
maintenance of cooperative information-sharing among individuals within both competing 
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networks. Granovetter’s (1973) well-known notion of a “forbidden triad” captures the role 
that strong ties can play in the emergence of new relations at a triad level. It suggests strong 
ties among two pairs of actors in a triad are likely to lead to network “closure.” For instance, 
if individual A in a triad maintains an enduring information-sharing relationship with 
individual B, and the latter has a strong contact in actor C, it follows that individuals A and 
C will end up sharing information eventually (Everton, 2012).69 Put simply, individuals 
are likely to form ties with “a friend of a friend.” This process can lead to dense, local 
substructures that can amplify and transmit information efficiently (Kadushin, 2012), 
which can be beneficial in competitive contexts like insurgent warfare. Evidence in places 
like Iraq and the Philippines suggests counterinsurgents have developed close relations, 
including information-sharing ones, with segments of local populations and host 
governments in efforts to improve relations between the two over time (Kuehl, 2009; 
Montgomery & McWilliams, 2009; Wilson, 2006).70 Thus, the first hypothesis is that 
“closure” will occur within each information-sharing social structure (information closure 
hypothesis). This hypothesis pertains to the triad level (Figure 7).  
 
A shared between contact between two individuals leads to a direct tie between them in the 
same network (“closure”). 
Figure 7. Information Closure Hypothesis 
 
69 Many forms of local clustering can emerge if one is able to capture the direction of relations. 
Papachristos et al. (2013), for example, accounts the emergence of such “dominance hierarchies” in his 
study of inter-gang violence. 
70 Certainly, one may question if such ties can persist over the long term in many insurgent contexts. 
Relationships among U.S. troops and some tribal leaders in Iraq, for example, did not endure and may be 
described better as relationships of convenience (Cordesman, 2007; Montgomery & McWilliams, 2009). 
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Similarly, closure can occur at “higher levels” in which individuals could share 
multiple contacts before establishing an information-sharing relationship directly. Extant 
literature has offered useful examples demonstrating the important role that preexisting 
relations and trust play in people’s participation in high-risk activities, such as social 
movements and covert networks (McAdam, 1986; Pye, 1950; Sageman, 2004). While little 
attention has been paid to the number of ties required to engage in such activities, it is 
likely that multiple shared contacts can help “vet” others before establishing a relationship 
with them, especially when violence helps define one’s environment. In the context of the 
FARC in Colombia, for example, both the government and insurgents were concerned 
about potential “collaborators” with their adversaries. As official demobilization reports 
indicate, the FARC were concerned about operational security so much so that they 
regularly resorted to violence against those who even knew people who collaborated with 
the government. The government was explicitly concerned about “collaborators,” too. 
Officials who interviewed demobs asked them repeatedly about their knowledge of 
government personnel who might have collaborated with insurgents. In other words, rather 
than relying on a single “friend,” as with closure at a triad level, it may benefit individuals 
to form ties with others if they are “a friend of friends.” When closure occurs at such 
“higher levels,” it offers an additional benefit in the sense that information can transmit 
efficiently within larger clusters beyond the triad level (Kadushin, 2012). Thus, the second 
hypothesis is that “higher-order” closure (i.e., cluster level) will occur within each 




Individuals who share multiple contacts in the same network will share information 
(higher-order closure). Note the two dots at the top of each diagram indicate the potential 
presence of 3 or more shared contacts. 
Figure 8. Information Cluster Hypothesis 
Because information is critical to outcomes in insurgent warfare (Berman et al., 
2018; Guevara, 2007; McCormick, Forthcoming; Tse-Tung, 1989; United States 
Government, 2018a), it is likely individuals will seek to establish as many information-
sharing relationships within their network as possible. Insurgents, counterinsurgents, and 
civilians require information for numerous purposes, many of which overlap, such as 
survival and intelligence gathering and analysis. The development of information-sharing 
ties, through in-person interactions, can take place in a variety of situations, ranging from 
spontaneous ones, such as civilians approaching soldiers, to planned yet informal 
interactions, such as key leader engagements. However, individuals often gravitate toward 
others who already maintain many social ties and who may already possess attractive skills, 
information, and resources (Barabási, 2002, 2016; Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003; Capra, 
1996; Kadushin, 2012; Robins, 2015; Root, 2020). One can expect, therefore, some form 
of this “preferential attachment” in information-sharing networks in which “the rich get 
richer;” that is, well-connected individuals, or “hubs,” attract others to form ties with them 
(Barabási, 2016; Robins, 2015). The famous “80/20 Rule” (i.e., Pareto Principle) in which 
20% of nodes maintain approximately 80% of the relations reflects the essence behind this 
commonly observed process (Barabási, 2016; Capra, 1996). Therefore, the final self-
organizing hypothesis is that information-sharing hubs will emerge in each network 
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(information hubs hypothesis). This hypothesis relates to the degree or actor level (Figure 
9).  
 
Well-connected individuals will continue to acquire new contacts.  
Figure 9. Information Hubs Hypothesis 
2. Co-Evolutionary Processes Between Insurgent and Authority 
Networks 
Authority and insurgent networks compete over the control of a populace (Galula, 
2006; Kilcullen, 2010; Nagl, 2005). Consequently, the two sides often attempt to establish 
contacts with civilians and other individuals who can provide them with information 
critical to their objective of understanding and controlling a population (Department of the 
Army, 2014; Galula, 2006; Guevara, 2007; Tse-Tung, 1989). When the two sides compete 
over the same populace in the same geographic area, they can come into close “social 
distances” of one another whereby only a few individuals separate them, ultimately leading 
the social systems to exhibit a “small world” effect (Travers & Milgram, 1969; Watts, 
1999b, 2003). Going a step further, the two networks can intertwine directly through shared 
information contacts, such as when people “play both sides” during a conflict (Department 
of the Army, 2014, 2017; Kilcullen, 2010; Montgomery & McWilliams, 2009; U.S. Marine 
Corps, 2017; Wilson, 2006). For instance, civilians may share information with insurgents 
and authorities out of fear or for opportunistic reasons, whereas insurgents might provide 
a government information to acquire some benefit while maintaining contacts with 
insurgents. While it is almost unheard of for U.S. personnel to support an adversary, 
authorities in several contexts have played and switch sides (Department of the Army, 
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2017; Kilcullen, 2013; Kuehl, 2009; Wilson, 2006). Thus, in the competitive space for 
information in insurgent warfare, the first co-evolutionary hypothesis is that an 
information-sharing relationship in one network will lead to a tie in the other network 
(information multiplexity hypothesis). This hypothesis pertains to the dyad level (often 
called dyadic entrainment) (Figure 10).  
 
The presence of one type of tie will lead to the other. The dotted line represents the newly 
created, competing network tie.  
Figure 10. Information Multiplexity Hypothesis 
As with intra-network closure, it is likely that closure will occur between the 
competing networks. However, the potential motivations for closure between two 
competing networks are likely different than what would occur within each network. In the 
case of competing networks, it would serve each side well to infiltrate the other because 
establishing a single information sharing contact in an adversary’s network could offer 
value insight into their operations, personnel, weaponry, etc. Because dense networks can 
transmit information efficiently (Kadushin, 2012), establishing an information source 
embedded in dense portions of an adversary’s network could offer additional benefit than 
doing so with peripheral actors. In a broad sense, infiltration and recruitment of enemy 
personnel has been observed in many insurgent warfare contexts (Pirnie & O’Connell, 
2008; Trinquier, 2006), including recent examples of “green on blue” violence in 
Afghanistan where Taliban insurgents posed and trained as Afghan government personnel 
(e.g., Afghan Police) to inflict government and U.S. casualties. While trust and internal 
control mechanisms (e.g., operational security procedures) will be present in both authority 
and insurgent networks to prevent infiltration and defection, it is likely both sides will try 
to infiltrate the other anyway (United States Government, 2007). Thus, the next hypothesis 
is that closure will occur between the competitive networks at the cluster level (mixed 
information cluster hypothesis) (Figure 11).  
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Mixed closure whereby one network “closes” the other. The dotted line represents the 
newly created, competing network tie.  
Figure 11. Mixed Information Cluster Hypothesis 
Due to insurgent warfare’s nature, competition for the allegiance of hubs is likely 
to occur between insurgents and authorities. As previously described, prominent insurgents 
and COIN theorist have described the importance of the populace in a conflict’s outcome 
(Galula, 2006; Guevara, 2007; Taber, 2002; Trinquier, 2006; Tse-Tung, 1989). It is likely 
insurgents and authorities will seek out well-connected individuals embedded in the 
populace, especially if they believe those individuals have relations with key individuals 
or groups and can exchange information with many others (Department of the Army, 2017; 
United States Government, 2007, 2016; U.S. Marine Corps, 2017). For instance, in 2007, 
U.S. forces successfully initiated informal agreements with well-connected tribal leaders 
in several key provinces, sometimes called “handshake agreements,” to establish 
information-sharing ties, stop violence between the two, and fight al-Qaeda and other 
extremists (Cordesman, 2007; Kuehl, 2009). In doing so, tribal members joined the 
authority information-sharing network even if they maintained ties with segments of the 
insurgency. Who engages well-connected individuals can vary, too. As previously 
described, various types of actors (e.g., civilians, insurgents, and militia) can exchange 
information in insurgent warfare. Hence, it is hypothesized that individuals from both 
networks will attempt to exchange information with well-connected individuals, or hubs, 
who maintain many connections with their adversaries (competitive hubs hypothesis). This 




Well-connected individuals in one network will be sought out by their competitor. The 
dotted line represents the newly created competing network tie.  
Figure 12. Competitive Hubs Hypothesis 
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IV. DATA, MODELS, AND OPERATIONALIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To examine the co-evolution of social networks in insurgent warfare, this study 
analyzes competing social networks in the conflict between the Colombian Government 
and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). This context serves as a useful 
case study to examine co-evolution in insurgent warfare given its historical significance as 
an insurgency, as well as the embedded nature of networks comprised of insurgents, 
government, and noncombatants. Like in other contexts, social relations served as 
important conduits of information for the FARC during its years as an active insurgency. 
The FARC’s semi-distributed command system enabled it to create informal ties and 
establish political, informant, recruitment, criminal, and other networks throughout 
Colombia. While the group drew much of its recruits, information, and resources from rural 
populations over the years, it also established clandestine networks and militias throughout 
the country, corrupted politicians, and worked with urban criminal and other illicit 
organizations (International Crisis Group, 2005; Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency 
Centre, 2020; Metelits, 2010; Stanford University, 2019).  
To investigate the dynamic interplay between authority and insurgent information-
sharing networks, this study applies a complete network design based on information 
exchanges at an operational level in the southern Colombian geographic area during the 
January 2002-April 2003 timeframe. This context is interesting in that the FARC’s 
Southern Bloc, a historically prominent FARC command, operated heavily in the southern 
Colombia; nevertheless, while during this period of time the FARC remained relatively 
powerful, it faced several, substantial setbacks (International Crisis Group, 2005, 2008; 
Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, 2020; Stanford University, 2019). Guided 
by the MTML framework, this research leverages SAOMs to test hypotheses about 
multilevel co-evolutionary dynamics of the two competing networks. Specifically, it uses 
a multiplex, or multivariate, model extension to test hypotheses about both intra-network, 
self-organizing and inter-network, co-evolutionary social processes. The data set was built 
from a unique set of archival records from official, unclassified Colombian Government 
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reports on demobilized FARC members, which offer rich data on informal relationships 
among demobilized individuals, then-active FARC members, militia members, local 
leaders, government, and other actors.  
This chapter continues with a brief overview of the FARC beginning with its 
emergence in the 1960s through its transition into a political party in 2016. This section’s 
goal is to establish this study’s empirical setting, rather than provide an exhaustive 
summary of the FARC’s history. The following section describes the role of information 
and social networks as it pertains to the FARC’s insurgency. Next, this chapter describes 
this study’s relational data and network boundaries. This section defines relational ties and 
networks, as well as outlines how this study handles the multiplex nature of these two 
competing networks. The following section provides an in-depth description of SAOMs, 
the modeling procedures, and explains the multivariate extension used to test the 
hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter. Finally, this chapter closes by addressing 
issues regarding informant accuracy, inter-coder reliability, and external validity for the 
study of social networks.  
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FARC 
Founded in 1964, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (or Las Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [FARC]) is a now defunct insurgent organization 
that until 2016, was one of the oldest, and at some points in its history, the largest, insurgent 
organizations in the world (Cunningham et al., 2013). Beginning as a Marxist-Leninist 
group in southeastern Colombia, it evolved into a violent, narcotics trafficking organization 
that coerced the peasant population it promised to protect (Cunningham et al., 2013; 
Metelits, 2010). FARC was rooted in self-defense organizations that emerged from the 
period of violent conflict known as, “La Violencia” (1948-1958). As the government 
increasingly targeted these groups in early-1960s, the core remnants coalesced into the 
Bloque Sur (Southern Bloc), which changed its name to the FARC in 1966. The FARC, 
which served as the Communist Party of Colombia’s armed wing, acted as an alternative 
governing authority in portions of the country by collecting taxes, providing social 
services, and establishing police and judicial systems. This status gave them the power to 
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address local disputes and social conflicts, as well as investigate criminal activities 
(Metelits, 2010).  
By the early-1980s, the FARC began engaging in “strategic kidnapping,”71 and the 
illegal drug trade by taxing traffickers and producers in exchange for protection and other 
guarantees (Metelits, 2010). At their seventh conference in 1982,72 however, the FARC 
made a strategic decision to expand its offensive military capabilities in the context of a 
severe economic downturn in Colombia. This new plan pushed them deeper into the drug 
trade. As Metelits (2010, p. 102) points out, drug-related income allowed the FARC to 
expand from twenty-seven fronts (i.e., geographic units) in 1989, to sixty by 1999. 
However, relations between the FARC and many traffickers soured throughout the decade 
and gave rise to other so-called self-defense groups (e.g., MAS-Muerto a los 
Secuestroseros) that often fought alongside the Colombian military against the FARC. One 
such group, founded in the late-1990s, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia—AUC), expanded throughout the country, and like the 
FARC, became involved heavily in narcotics trafficking and committed human rights 
abuses against civilians (International Crisis Group, 2005; Stanford University, 2019).  
Several other important events in the FARC’s history occurred during the 1980s. 
In 1982, the FARC began exploratory peace talks with the Government of Colombia under 
President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986). Along with several other groups, such as the 
Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the 19th of April Movement (M-19), and the National 
Liberation Army (ELN), FARC agreed to a ceasefire and condemned kidnapping, 
terrorism, and blackmail in exchange for government commitments to improve education 
and address other socioeconomic issues. The 1984 agreement, known as the Uribe Accords, 
created the space for the FARC to form the Union Patriótica (Patriot Union [UP]) political 
 
71 The FARC kidnapped ranchers and farmers who it considered “ideologically illegitimate.” 
Eventually, they began kidnapping government officials and other prominent individuals to fund its 
expansion into urban areas (Metelits, 2010, p. 97). 
72 Though this analysis uses the acronym, FARC, throughout this summary, the FARC changed its 
name in 1982 to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) to emphasize 
its renewed objectives. The group changed it again to the Fuerza Alternativa Revolutionaria del Común 
(Common Alternative Revolutionary Force [FARC]), after agreeing to demobilize and become a political 
party.  
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party and address long-lasting issues affecting rural populations, such as land reform. The 
UP had many notable electoral successes73 during the latter half of the decade and 
expanded its reach into urban areas through unions and student groups; however, 
conservative paramilitary and allied security forces elements assassinated and kidnapped 
thousands of its members (Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, 2020; Metelits, 
2010; Stanford University, 2019).  
Throughout the 1990s, the FARC became increasingly powerful within the country, 
as well as formalized its international outreach to foreign audiences (The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011). The FARC’s strength and lethality improved during 
the decade, as indicated by a ballooning membership and bold attacks on military bases, to 
the point that then-President Pastrana (1998-2002) granted it a 42,000 square kilometer 
demilitarized zone in 1998. During this time, the FARC expanded its involvement in drug 
trade activities, worked more closely with groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (PIRA), and became increasingly coercive toward local populations by committing 
human rights abuses (e.g., extrajudicial killings, forced recruitment of child soldiers, and 
kidnappings74) (Cunningham et al., 2013; Metelits, 2010; Stanford University, 2019). The 
FARC’s International Front (or International Committee - COMINTER), established in 
1993, simultaneously portrayed its guerrillas as freedom fighters, enabled it to improve its 
transnational trafficking systems, and disseminated propaganda to foreign entities that 
highlighted the government’s human rights abuses. Ultimately, COMINTER helped the 
FARC establish presence in approximately two-dozen Latin American (e.g., Ecuador and 
Colombia) and European countries over the next two decades (The International Institute 
 
73 The UP won 350 local council seats, 23 deputy positions, 9 seats in the House, and 6 seats in the 
Senate. The party reemerged but lost its legal status in the early-2000s (Metelits, 2010; Stanford University, 
2019).  
74 While they increasingly become involved indiscriminate kidnapping, they continued kidnapping 
prominent estate owners, businesspeople, and politicians. 
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for Strategic Studies, 2011). Most notably, FARC built upon existing relations with Cuba, 
and solidified relations with regimes in Ecuador and Venezuela.75  
However, the FARC began facing military and political setbacks in the late-1990s 
and early-2000s, both internationally and domestically. In 1997, the U.S. Government 
placed the FARC on the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), thereby setting the 
stage for further involvement in Colombia. The U.S. initiated Plan Colombia a few years 
later, in 2000, with the goal of injecting substantial resources to combat the Colombian-
based drug trade and reestablish government control over the country. That same year, 
approximately a quarter of the Colombian population protested the FARC and its violence 
against civilians in the “No Más” protests, which drew substantial international media 
coverage. In 2002, Alvaro Uribe ran successfully for the presidency on an aggressive 
platform to confront the FARC. The Uribe administration’s (2002-2010) military 
operations, as well as paramilitary operations by groups like the AUC, reduced the FARC’s 
territorial control, depleted its ranks, and killed several members of its leadership council, 
or “Secretariat,” including Tomás Media Caracas (aka Negro Acacio) in 2007, who 
oversaw its drug trade, and its second-in-command, Luis Edgar Devia Silva (aka Raul 
Reyes) in 200876 (International Crisis Group, 2008; Stanford University, 2019). 
Furthermore, the FARC’s use of terrorism, continued involvement in the drug trade, and 
numerous civilian kidnappings, such the Southern Bloc’s kidnapping of then-Presidential 
candidate, Ingrid Betancourt, shed its popular support, as indicated by a subsequent wave 
of “No Más” protests in 2008.  
In 2010, President Uribe’s Minister of Defense, Juan Manel Santos (2010-2018), 
became the newly elected president and restarted exploratory peace talks with the FARC. 
 
75 The FARC reportedly made financial contributions to Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa’s 
campaign in 2006 and Venezuela began providing it with funding, arms, safe havens, and other resources 
during the early-2000s, so much so, that it ultimately became a proxy of Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian 
movement and an asset to his regime who maintained adversarial relations with Colombia (The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011). 
76 The FARC lost two other important leaders in 2008. Manuel Jesús Muñoz (alias Iván Ríos) was 
killed by one of his own bodyguards in 2008, and its founder, Manuel Marulanda died of a heart attack. 
Just two years later, under the Santos Administration, the Colombian military killed the FARC’s military 
commander, Briceño Suárez Rojas (aka Mono Jojoy). 
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After years of negotiations, as well as several setbacks, the final agreement between the 
two came to fruition in 2016. Following the agreement, more than 11,000 fighters 
demobilized (Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, 2020), and the group became 
a political party and renamed itself the Fuerza Alternativa Revolutionaria del Común 
(Common Alternative Revolutionary Force—FARC). The accord’s main points focused 
on land reform, political participation, cessation of hostilities, reintegration of FARC 
members into civil society, reparations, and formalizing verification mechanisms (Stanford 
University, 2019). As of mid-2020, the party’s president, Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri (aka 
Timochenko), remains committed to the peace accord. However, several members have 
rejected the accords, such as Luciano Marín Arango (aka Iván Márquez), and a few 
thousand former fighters who have remained active in drug trafficking activities or formed 
splinter groups.77 
C. FARC’S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE DURING ITS INSURGENCY 
As an active insurgency, the FARC’s maintained a formal, hierarchical command 
structure across Colombia, in both rural and urban portions of the country (Cunningham et 
al., 2013). The FARC’s executive command consisted of a seven-person Secretariat, which 
commanded its approximately thirty-member Estado Mayor Central (EMC) (General 
Staff). Both bodies shaped strategies and operational policies, as well as coordinated and 
directed the activities of subordinate commands (Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency 
Centre, 2020; Stanford University, 2019). It had five geographical blocs, or commands 
(i.e., Eastern, Southern, José María Córdoba, Caribbean, and Middle Magdalena), as well 
as two joint commands (i.e., the Joint Central and Joint Western Commands). Each bloc 
and joint command, which had a commander who served on the EMC, consisted of several 
fronts. The number of fronts across all blocs ranged from sixty to seventy-seven (Jane’s 
World Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, 2020). Finally, the FARC maintained a series of 
specialized mobile columns, such as the Southern Bloc’s Teófilo Forero Mobile Column 
(TFMC), that focused on specific tasks, such as regaining territory and serving as the 
 
77 For example, one group is “Segunda Marquetalia” (https://insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-
crime-news/segunda-marquetalia/).  
95 
FARC’s special operations units (Cunningham et al., 2013; International Crisis Group, 
2009; Stanford University, 2019). Figure 13 depicts the FARC’s approximate geographical 
distribution of its blocs around the mid-to-late 2000s timeframe.78  
 
Figure 13. Southern Bloc’s Area of Operation. Source: Colombian National 
Police (2012) 
D. THE FARC’S INFORMATION AND INFORMAL SOCIAL NETWORKS 
The FARC, both as an active insurgency and a political party, has used various 
means to communicate to Colombian and international audiences. As an insurgency, it used 
illegal radio stations, published newspapers and websites, printed pamphlets, produced 
handbooks, and released videos to disseminate propaganda (Jane’s World Terrorism and 
 
78 The Colombian National Police provided this map and information. The “ink spots” are not meant 
to suggest the FARC maintained complete control over those areas; rather, they were suspected to have a 
presence in those areas.  
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Insurgency Centre, 2020). COMINTER’s efforts, as well as close relations with Hugo 
Chavez and other governments, bolstered (and often diminished) the group’s efforts abroad 
(The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011). Today, the FARC, as a political 
party, continues to use a combination of traditional and modern means to disseminate its 
views, such as hosting websites, releasing videos, and leveraging social media. For 
instance, Iván Márquez, a former commander who served as a negotiator in the 2016-peace 
process, released a video in mid-2019 calling on his followers to take up arms against the 
government.79 The FARC party, to which Márquez belonged since its inception, has 
adapted, and maintains social media accounts, as well as several “sister” accounts, on 
platforms such as Twitter and YouTube, where they communicate their political platform 
to domestic and international audiences. Their President, Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri (aka 
Timochenko), also has separate profiles on various social media platforms, such as 
Facebook and Twitter, to communicate the party’s political and social positions. 
Like in other contexts (Haim, Forthcoming; McAdam, 1986; Pye, 1950; Sageman, 
2004), in-person social relations (i.e., non-digital) served as critical conduits of information 
for the FARC during its insurgency. Its semi-distributed command system enabled the 
FARC to create informal, information-sharing ties in both urban and rural areas through 
political, informant, recruitment, and other networks. Though the extent to which the 
FARC embedded in local, rural populations varied over the years, it largely drew most of 
its recruits, information, and other resources from this segment of the population, whether 
it be voluntarily or through coercion (Metelits, 2010). It sought to establish a presence in 
Colombia’s cities during its existence as well. For instance, following the wave of targeted 
assassinations of UP members in the late-1990s, the FARC created the Clandestine 
Colombian Communist Party (PCCC) and the Bolivarian Movement for the New Colombia 
(MBNC) to establish militant presence in urban areas through which it could recruit 
members and informants, carry out operations, and espouse their organization’s ideas 
(Cunningham et al., 2013; International Crisis Group, 2009). The FARC also had worked 
 
79 See BBC article titled, “Colombia ex-FARC Rebel Iván Márquez Issues Call to Arms,” (Accessed 
May 20, 2020) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-49508411  
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with urban gangs and criminal organizations (e.g., bandas criminales - BACRIM80), 
including those comprised of minors, to cooperate in the drug trade and serve as informants 
(Metelits, 2010).  
The way with which the FARC interacted with local populations, and acquired 
information, varied during its existence as an insurgent organization. Metelits’s (2010) 
insightful work contends the FARC shifted from a largely contractual relationship with 
civilians through the mid-1990s, to a more coercive one in its later years. Initially, the 
FARC relied on its deep roots in rural parts of Colombia to access food, shelter, protection, 
and information from peasant communities. She claims the FARC’s behavior toward 
noncombatants, however, changed with the emergence of paramilitary forces during the 
late-1990s, namely the AUC. While not entirely new FARC behavior, the AUC’s 
emergence led it to increasingly commit human rights abuses, stop enforcing judicial 
processes, kidnap civilians indiscriminately, extort noncombatants, and corrupt civilians 
and politicians. Moreover, the FARC forged on-and-off relations with other insurgent 
organizations such as the ELN, collaborated with criminal organizations, and associated 
with several militias (e.g., MBNC), which made up large portions of their support 
networks, helped them run their drug trade, and embed in local populations to serve as 
informants and extort noncombatants (Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, 
2020; Metelits, 2010; Stanford University, 2019).  
E. DATA AND BOUNDARIES 
This study is based on official, unclassified Colombian Government reports on 
demobilized FARC fighters.81 The approximately 200 “Demobilization Reports,” which 
were provided by the Colombian National Police’s Intelligence Directorate (DIPOL) and 
cover the 2000–2011 timeframe, offer unique insight into relations among various types of 
actors in areas in which active competition took place between the FARC and the 
government. They include information about former FARC members who entered the 
 
80 For more information, see Insight Crimes’ website, https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/
inside-colombias-bacrim/. 
81 This study followed all institutional review board (IRB) protocols and received approval.  
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government’s demobilization program prior to the 2016-accords, which was designed to 
enable FARC members to leave the organization’s ranks and enter civil society. The 
documents contain relevant attribute data about demobilized fighters, as well as other 
FARC members, noncombatants, and government personnel (e.g., police and military), 
such as the city from which they came, the FARC unit they left (if applicable), and other 
attribute data, such as physical characteristics (e.g., height and weight). More importantly, 
they offer information about the formal hierarchy of many FARC units along with rich data 
on informal relationships among demobilized individuals, FARC members/leaders, militia 
members, civilians/local leaders (e.g., mayors and governors), as well as government actors 
(e.g., police, military, and government civilian employees).  
To investigate the dynamic interplay of competing networks, this study applies a 
longitudinal complete network design. Several criteria guided the choice of network 
boundaries.82 Specifically, this study focuses on the operational level interactions in the 
Southern Bloc’s geographic area of operations during the January 2002-April 2003 
timeframe. The operational level is defined as the level of COIN that sits between strategic 
and tactical levels and is the level at which practitioners employ forces and assets to 
accomplish strategic goals through operations. While the lines between the three levels are 
often blurred, the operational level is conceptualized as below the strategic level, which 
focuses on defining and supporting national policy, and above the tactical level, where 
individual battles, engagements, and interactions take place (United States Government, 
2018b). Because operational environments encompass tactical activities83 across several 
areas of operation, the network data includes actors and ties from geographically dispersed 
units, such as FARC fronts and Colombian Army battalions, operating within and across 
departments (i.e., states) in southern Colombia. These boundaries, therefore, stop short of 
directly capturing national level—that is, strategic networks—spanning multiple FARC 
blocs, and as a result, the data set does not include high level government officials or 
 
82 This study applies an etic/nominalist perspective to defining network boundaries whereby I define 
them, as opposed to an emic/realist approach whereby members of a population of interest define them 
(Cunningham et al., 2016).  
83 The tactical level is where the actions of Soldiers, civilians, insurgents, and other actors, at a local 
level, such as in an area of operation, have immediate effects in an area of responsibility.  
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members of the FARC’s Estado Mayor or Secretariat unless they participated in 
operational level activities.  
The FARC’s Southern Bloc, a historically prominent command, operated heavily 
in southern Colombia during the timeframe, which is period when the FARC remained 
relatively powerful, yet faced several, substantial setbacks (International Crisis Group, 
2005, 2008; Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, 2020; Stanford University, 
2019). Several of the FARC’s prominent leaders, such as Joaquin Gomez and Milton de 
Jesus Toncel Redondo, commanded the Southern Bloc and some of FARC’s deadliest 
fronts, such as the Teofilo Forero Mobile Column (TFMC), fell under the command. The 
timeframe encompasses when the FARC started facing considerable pressure as a newly 
designated, foreign terrorist organization while large sums of U.S. dollars began targeting 
the Colombian drug trade, of which the FARC played a considerable part. Competition 
between the Colombian Government and the FARC ratcheted up, too, following the 
group’s latest peak in the late-1990s. The Uribe administration, for example, increased 
military operations against the FARC, including against the Southern Bloc and its networks 
during this time (International Crisis Group, 2008; Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency 
Centre, 2020).  
This study examines the co-evolution of two competing, intertwined networks: 
authority information-sharing and insurgent information-sharing networks. The former is 
comprised of several types of actors, including government personnel, civilians, militia 
members, and then-active and demobilized FARC members, who exchanged information 
to serve the Colombian Government’s COIN efforts, such as offering actionable and 
“insider” information about the FARC. The latter network consists of similar types of 
actors, including government personnel (e.g., local police), who exchanged information to 
support the FARC’s objectives, such as conducting intelligence operations on its behalf. 
As described in the next chapter, many individuals embedded in both networks 
simultaneously, and at different times.  
Drawing from Monge and Contractor’s (2003, p. 3) description of communication 
networks, as well as Kadushin’s (2012, pp. 39–42) notion of informal ties, this analysis 
defines information-sharing relations as informal connections created by the flow of 
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messages among individuals.84 It is important to note three points about this definition. 
First, it is consistent with extant COIN literature’s emphasis on the importance of in-person 
relations in insurgent warfare (Cleveland et al., 2018; Department of the Army, 2017; 
Department of the Navy, 2017; Kilcullen, 2010; McAdam, 1999; Pye, 1950; Sageman, 
2004). Second, and related to the first point, is that these ties should not be confused with 
online, social media interactions. While social media is often used to disseminate narratives 
to larger audiences, mobilize populations, and can serve as a place where recruitment 
begins for nefarious networks (Benigni et al., 2017; Hassanpour, 2014), additional research 
is needed to examine its role in operational level social networks, as well as online and 
offline relational dynamics in insurgent warfare (Kane et al., 2014; Robins, 2015). For 
instance, there is no evidence that social media played a role at the operational level in this 
particular case study.85 In fact, all interactions take place in face-to-face contexts or 
through other traditional means of sharing information, such as through the passing of 
intelligence reports from one person to another.86 Third, because this is archival research, 
this study is unable assess the veracity of information passed through interactions as well 
as capture message quantity (i.e., Shannon information), impact (e.g., pragmatic 
information), and meaning (i.e., semantic information) (Haken & Portugali, 2016). It does, 
however, consider the frequency and duration of interactions (i.e., how many times two 
individuals shared information and for how long) to attempt to model “enduring” patterns 
 
84 This definition does not incorporate what happens with the information (e.g., processing, exploiting, 
and disseminating), but simply establishes a tie between two individuals if the interaction meets this 
definition.  
85 No evidence suggests the FARC used social media platforms during this time frame for operational 
purposes. For instance, the FARC’s Twitter page states it joined the platform in 2012. Future studies, 
however, may want to incorporate online, digitally based relationships with offline networks in operational 
environments.  
86 The demobilization reports included identifiable information about the demobs, report authors, and 
recipients of the information extracted from demobilization interviews. For example, government 
interviewers would write and address demobilization memos and reports containing information that could 
have intelligence value, such as FARC members exchanging information, operating together, etc. 
Government personnel would send documents to other government personnel (e.g., military, police, 
civilian) who often responded with their own reports containing pertinent information, thus creating a 
mutual information exchange. The reports, therefore, offered granular information about government 
information-sharing networks.  
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of ties and address issues pertaining to informant accuracy (Bernard et al., 1984; Robins, 
2015). 
Like with Monge and Contractor (2003, p. 3), the term “messages” is used in a 
broad sense here to refer to data, information, knowledge, and facts about the conflict that 
move from one person in a network to another. While the exact content of most messages 
is often indiscernible in the reports, they offer enough description and context to categorize 
interactions into insurgent, authority, or both networks. For instance, the reports describe 
information exchanges between FARC members and civilians in small towns during FARC 
patrols in which the latter provided actionable information about government troop 
movement to insurgents, in which case, all actors and relations were coded as part of the 
insurgent network. The coding procedure does not attempt to understand an individual’s 
intent for sharing information.  
As indicated in the reports, appearing with many information-sharing relations are 
interactions among family members, and other relations one could define as formal ties, 
collaborators, close friends, and co-membership ties. This natural “bundling” of various 
type of relations is related to both role and content multiplexity, whereby one or more actor 
roles, such as “superior” and “subordinate,” or “FARC member,” creates opportunities for 
a number of different “flows,” including information exchanges (Kadushin, 2012, pp. 35–
36). However, this research did not infer the presence of an information-sharing tie based 
on the presence of another type; that is, this study only recorded a tie between two 
individuals when the interaction met the definition outlined above. For example, many low-
ranking FARC members (e.g., guerrillas) within Southern Bloc fronts had little, to no 
contact with front and bloc leadership.87 In other words, this study did not purposely 
capture formal military, insurgent, or civilian structures, but sometimes includes 
overlapping formal ties based on the opportunities they create for information exchanges.  
 
87 Another common example is demobilized members who describe their family members (e.g., 
names, locations) in their demobilization report, but who have not seen or communicated with their family 
for years, or since they joined the FARC. By including family members, especially family ties among large 
families, the data would be biased towards them.  
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The network data set is comprised of 357 actors and an average of 471 information-
sharing ties per time wave, as well as attribute data, such as an individual’s department 
(i.e., state), gender, and micro affiliation (e.g., FARC Front, Military Unit). The networks 
were coded as unweighted (i.e., binary) and nondirected relational data over four, four-
month time waves from January 2002-April 2003.88 In terms of actors, the data structuring 
procedure assigned time codes to each individual based on the month in which they first 
appeared in a network during the January 2002-April 2003 time frame. Many individuals 
entered a network (e.g., insurgent) well before January 2002. However, no individuals left 
the network permanently (e.g., died) during the time frame and in cases when people 
switched sides, the individuals were coded as remaining in the larger, social system. In 
terms of ties, this analysis assigned time codes to each interaction in the data set to indicate 
when information exchanges took place between pairs of individuals. The coding 
procedure considered the duration of each relationship as the time from when two 
individuals first shared information, to the last time they did in the reports, which permitted 
the analysis to capture “enduring” ties rather than one-time interactions.89 Finally, this 
study supplemented the demobilization reports with open-source data to fill in important 
information gaps and provide context about FARC fronts.  
F. STOCHASTIC ACTOR ORIENTED MODELS (SAOMS) 
SAOMs are models designed to represent network dynamics and evaluate them 
based on the paradigm of statistical inference (Ripley et al., 2021; Snijders et al., 2010; 
Snijders, 1996, 2005; Steglich et al., 2006). Like other stochastic network models, such as 
 
88 While the reports made many details about authority network-based interactions available (e.g., 
who initiated an interaction), they did not offer the same level of granularity for insurgent-based ties.  
89 As Chapter 5 explains, because SAOMs model network evolution (and co-evolution), the RSiena 
manual recommends users ensure that actor and tie “turnover” are not too high. Consequently, it 
recommends that networks maintain Jaccard index, which is a measure of stability, of at least .20 between 
waves (Ripley et al., 2021). A few examples of one-time interactions appear in the data, but all of this 
analysis’ Jaccard indices were well above the recommended threshold. The four waves were January-April 
2002, May-August 2002, September-December 2002, and January-April 2003.  
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ERGMs,90 a common way to employ SAOMs is to treat observed networks as dependent 
variables and incorporate network dynamics, as driven by different tendencies, into models 
as independent variables (e.g., structural effects reflecting social processes, actor variables, 
and dyadic (or tie-based) variables). This approach captures how the network itself helps 
explain its own dynamics through interdependent ties and feedback processes; that is, it 
accounts for self-organizing processes that, along with actor characteristics and behaviors 
(e.g., attitude, performance), help drive evolutionary processes and undergird emergent 
structures. Actor characteristics can serve as dependent variables in both model classes too, 
such as with diffusion studies. Both model classes, therefore, permit researchers to test 
hypotheses about underlying network tendencies, while controlling for others (Lusher et 
al., 2013; Snijders et al., 2010).  
However, while both SAOMs and ERGMs offer advantages over each other 
depending on the study (Block et al., 2019; Leifeld & Cranmer, 2018), this research 
employs SAOMs to model multilevel co-evolutionary dynamics for the FARC case study 
for two reasons. The first is that SAOMs more explicitly focus on actors, whereas ERGMs, 
which are still valid for modeling social structures in which agency is important, are best 
characterized as tie-based models. This difference means that for SAOMs, one interprets 
parameters as tendencies of actors, whereas in most cases with ERGMs, researchers 
interpret parameters as tendencies conditioned on the rest of the graph (Block et al., 2019; 
Leifeld & Cranmer, 2018).91 For instance, ERGMs calculate network statistics, such as 
reciprocity, as the count of the effect over all dyads in a network, while SAOMs would 
compute it from the perspective of each vertex (Leifeld & Cranmer, 2018, p. 5). The 
 
90 Interestingly, Monge and Contractor (2003) argue that P* models, from which ERGMs developed, 
can be useful for testing theories from a MTML framework. In simple terms, the ERGM is a probabilistic 
model for networks that researchers can use for link prediction and testing theories regarding tie formation 
in empirical networks. For more information, see Lusher et al.’s (2013) excellent book on ERGMs, which 
offers both technical and non-technical descriptions of ERGMs.  
91 There are debates about this, however. The difference between the models in terms of the primacy 
of actors is less of a major difference than the names of the models suggest. While Block et al. (2019, p. 
233) contend that SAOMs are more appropriate for actor-based hypotheses and theories, Leifeld and 
Cranmer (2018, p. 7) argue that ERGMs, namely the temporal extension known as temporal exponential 
random graph models (TERGMs), remain compatible with actor-based theories even though they do not 
assume “per se that actors make these decisions.” They both agree that ERGMs are likely more suited for 
networks in which agency does not play a role.  
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second, and more important reason, is that SAOMs, unlike ERGMs, enable the estimation 
of multiple interdependent network processes for longitudinal network data. While 
ERGMs have variants designed to examine either multiplex or temporal networks (e.g., 
TERGMs and STERGMs92), they have not yet been extended to model longitudinal, 
multiplex networks (Leifeld & Cranmer, 2018).  
The goal of SAOMs is to model empirical data on patterns of ties and behaviors 
and to identify a set of social processes that most likely reflect actor decisions. However, 
the authors are explicit that, “actor oriented does not imply the assumption that the actors 
make decisions in any real sense,” nor do they “reflect a commitment to any particular 
theory of action elaborated in the scientific disciplines” (Ripley et al., 2021, p. 9). Rather, 
this model class’s objective is to help researchers explore and develop theories of networks 
at multiple network levels, recognizing that, like other regression models, SAOMs do not 
solve casual questions to modeling alone (Ripley et al., 2021). A major distinction between 
SAOMs and other forms of “agent-based” models often used in complex adaptive systems 
research is the former is designed to model empirical network data.  
Researchers use RSiena (Ripley et al., 2021) to try to reproduce features from one 
observation to the next. The process begins by designing models comprised of aspects of 
structure and behavior based on theoretically derived and/or empirical observations, such 
as triadic closure and homophily. Analysts represent empirical, social networks and 
attributes as dynamically changing variables over discrete time waves, whereby the 
statistical modeling, using method of moments, seeks to minimize the differences between 
expected values and observed values (Snijders, 1996, 2005; Warren, 2016). 
Because one cannot obtain expected values directly, SAOMs leverage the Robbin’s 
Monro Markov-chain Monte Carlo algorithm (MCMC) to run simulations about tie 
 
92 Both TERGMs and separable temporal ERGMs are meant for modeling relational dynamics using 
the ERGM framework.  
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changes between time points.93 This approach simulates data between two observations by 
interpreting an empirical network as the culmination of a series of unobserved changes 
based on the decisions of actors (Elmer et al., 2017; Snijders et al., 2010; Warren, 2016). 
At discrete time moments between waves, each actor assesses (i.e., controls) all possible 
potential changes of an outgoing tie and an attribute to evaluate if they should create, drop, 
maintain the tie, or whether they should increase, decrease, or keep an attribute at a 
previous level (Elmer et al., 2017).94 The change process occurs in two, stochastic sub-
processes determined by two functions. The rate function indicates the frequency by which 
actors execute a “mini-step” (i.e., how many changes), whereas the objective function 
represents the probability that an actor will change a tie given a chance (i.e., what changes) 
(Elmer et al., 2017).95 The actors are myopically rational in the sense “that they maximize 
utility with stochastic error,” as well as “that they condition their choices on the current 
network structure rather than attempting to make predictions about the future structure of 
the networks” (Warren, 2016).  
One can test hypotheses about actor tendencies while controlling for others. The 
simulations identify models that minimize the divergences between the simulated data and 
observed data by establishing parameter values as weights for each factor across all waves. 
This approach permits analysts to evaluate network statistics built into the model by taking 
the parameter weights from the simulations and by running additional simulations. During 
 
93 A dynamic network can be interpreted as the result of a Markov process. This assumption means 
“that at any point in time, the state of the network determines probabilistically its further evolution, and 
there are no additional effects of the earlier past” (Snijders et al., 2010, p. 45). All relevant information is 
included in the current state. This assumption seems to have implications for the study of networks as 
“complex adaptive systems,” which are non-Markovian by nature (Rickles et al., 2007). Snijders et al. 
(2010, p. 45) argue that this assumption can be made “more plausible by choosing meaningful independent 
variables that incorporate relevant information from the past.” 
94 A few points are worth noting here about assumptions regarding actors and tie dynamics. First, 
SAOMs assume that “actors have full information about the network and the other actors” (Snijders et al., 
2010, p. 46). Second, “no more than one tie can change at any moment” between panels; that is, tie changes 
are not coordinated, and depend on each other only sequentially, via the changing configuration of the 
whole network (Snijders et al., 2010, p. 46). Finally, ties “are not brief events, but rather states with a 
tendency to endure over time” (Snijders et al., 2010, p. 45) in other words, ties gradually change and do not 
resemble events such as a meeting at a single point in time. 
95 The objective function can be expressed in a similar manner as a generalized linear model in which 
the probability an actor will change a tie is expressed in a combination of effects. The probability of a tie 
change is calculated as the sum of a set of effects each with a corresponding weight. The effects may be 
endogenous, exogenous, or a combination (Cunningham et al., 2016) 
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the latter step, parameters are held constant to estimate covariance among the factors as 
well as uncertainty associated with each parameter estimate (Warren, 2016).  
Subsequently, researchers can assess a model’s fit using goodness of fit (GOF) 
tests. This process helps one assess the extent to which observed data is compatible with 
the models developed and fitted for a study. The GOF test uses common structural 
tendencies in social networks, implemented as a menu of “auxiliary statistics,” to evaluate 
a model’s ability to account for them “in general” (Lospinoso & Snijders, 2019; Ruth M. 
Ripley et al., 2021). Examples of such tendencies include degree distributions, various 
forms of triads (i.e., triad census), and geodesic distances.96 This procedure takes one of 
these auxiliary statistics, which are not explicitly included in a model, and compares its 
observed value in a network with its estimated conditional distribution generated by the 
simulations during analysis.  
While there is no “rule” as to what an auxiliary statistic’s p-value should be, it is 
recommended that they should be near or above 0.05.97 When an auxiliary statistic’s p-
value is well below 0.05, it suggests the constructed model is of poor fit in the sense that it 
does not account well for certain patterns or tendencies that it should and that one should 
consider revising the model (e.g., extending the model with certain triads). Conversely, 
when an auxiliary statistic’s p-value is above that threshold, it suggests the model is not 
ignoring potentially important network patterns that reflect social processes.98 RSiena 
permits analysts with the ability to plot the simulated auxiliary statistics versus the 
observed ones to get an idea about where the fit is poor (see Chapter 5). Finally, the GOF 
procedure offers a Mahalanobis distance (lower is better) for each auxiliary statistic to give 
researchers an idea about which model extensions/changes could produce a better fit 
(Lospinoso & Snijders, 2019; Ruth M. Ripley et al., 2021). 
 
96 Lospinoso and Snijders (2019) describe degree distributions as the count of nodes with n ties. Triad 
census is used to account for 16 (for directed data) possible subgraphs containing three nodes and edges 
between them, while geodesic distance accounts for the lengths of the shortest paths between all nodes.  
97 For instance, Ripley et al. (2021, p. 59) state, “The customary value of p=0.05 may be used as a 
threshold determining whether fit is adequate, but this threshold is of even less importance here than it is in 
the case of regular hypothesis testing.” 
98 As described in Chapter 5, for instance, the isolates and anti-near isolates variables were included 
after initial model procedures to improve fit for degree distributions in one or both networks.  
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Two broad types of co-evolution models exist within the SAOM framework: one 
meant to enable the analysis of a network (or networks) co-evolving with actor behaviors, 
and another, designed to examine multiple, co-evolving social networks (Snijders et al., 
2007, 2013; Steglich et al., 2006). Many researchers use the first extension to untangle, and 
assess the extent to which, social influence, social selection, and purely structural processes 
drive an empirical network’s dynamics (Snijders et al., 2007). This approach incorporates 
the same framework as “traditional” SAOMs by modeling actor choices in terms of tie and 
behavioral dynamics through a series of micro steps, yet integrates structural and 
behavioral models in a subsequent phase (Steglich et al., 2006). The second approach, or 
the co-evolution of multiplex networks, is relatively new in which a model represents the 
internal dynamics of each network as well as dependencies between networks. Snijders et 
al. (2013) used this approach to examine how a network of MBA students, comprised of 
friendship and advice relations, co-evolve with employment preferences (e.g., 
organizations). They find that friendship relations mediate the tendencies of reciprocation 
and homophily in advice relations. Fujimoto et al. (2018) take a similar approach to study 
generative mechanisms linking sports activities to friendship dynamics. While these 
studies have focused on the joint dynamics of two-mode99 and one-mode networks, the 
models permit the study of co-evolving one-mode networks, such as authority information-
sharing and insurgent information-sharing networks (Snijders et al., 2013).  
This study leverages the multiplex SAOM to examine dependencies between 
competing networks in insurgent warfare. This analytic approach produces three categories 
of parameters: uniplex ones for each network that reflect intra-network, self-organizing 
processes in each network; actor level, or covariate parameters to show effects for actor 
characteristics on individual networks; and, multiplex parameters that represent co-
evolutionary, social processes between the two competing networks (Fujimoto et al., 2018; 
Huitsing et al., 2014; Rambaran et al., 2015; Ripley et al., 2021; Snijders et al., 2013). As 
with standard SAOMs, the models treat the networks as dependent variables, while 
 
99 Two-mode network data consist of two types of actor/node classes. For instance, a network 
comprised of individuals and organizations is a two-mode network. One-mode network data are relations 
among a single type of actor, for example, friendship relations among individuals.  
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structural processes at various levels (e.g., actor, dyad, triad) and covariate effects serve as 
independent variables for estimating intra-network, self-organizing effects. One can obtain 
the multiplex parameters after combining the networks into a multiplex system, and 
subsequently testing for one network’s effects on the creation, maintenance, or dissolution 
of ties in the other.100  
G. OPERATIONALIZING THE MODEL 
1. Network Evolution Effects—Self-Organization and Attribute-Based 
Processes 
This analysis considers the combined, authority and insurgent information-sharing 
ties as a co-evolutionary system consisting of two dependent networks in Colombia. It 
designed two models that are outlined in the following section and in Chapter 5. Model 1 
consists of uniplex effects to test hypotheses related to self-organizing, as well as includes 
actor covariate effects as control variables.101 Model 2 builds upon Model 1 by 
incorporating multiplex effects to test for co-evolutionary-based hypotheses. The density 
effect is the most basic one and controls for the tendency for individuals to form ties.102 
While it may give some information about such a tendency, it is similar to a constant (a.k.a., 
intercept) term and is often not interpreted on its own (Ferriani et al., 2013; Warren, 2016). 
To test the information closure hypothesis in both networks, the models include a transitive 
triads effect to account for the proclivity of pairs of individuals to share information when 
they share a mutual contact. The geometrically weighted edgewise shared partners, or 
GWESP effect, is included to test the information cluster hypothesis, whereby individuals 
who share multiple contacts ultimately share information with one another. Finally, the 
models include the Activity + Popularity effect to test the information hubs hypothesis 
whereby well-connected individuals continue to acquire new contacts.  
 
100 This study focuses on the creation and maintenance of ties, which is a standard approach for using 
SAOMs (Ripley et al., 2021).  
101 For effect equations, see Ripley et al. (2021). 
102 Note that all effect terms in italics are common SNA terms and are those that RSiena uses in its 
menu of possible network effects. 
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This analysis includes several actor covariates to control for various forms of 
homophily and spatial effects. The Same Gender covariate controls for the propensity of 
individuals with the same gender to form and maintain ties with one another. Same 
Geography controls for the role of geography in the likelihood that pairs will form and 
maintain connections (i.e., propinquity effect), whereas Same Affiliation controls for 
individuals’ primary affiliation on tie formation. This analysis considers seven types of 
affiliations, including Colombian Armed Forces, Civilians, FARC members, Government 
Civilians, Justice Department personnel, FARC Militia members, and Colombian National 
Police personnel (see the appendix for definitions). Lastly, the Same Demobilization Status 
covariate controls for the tendency of individuals who participated in the Colombian 
Government’s Demobilization Program to form ties with other individuals who did the 
same.  
2. Network Co-Evolution Effects  
To test the information multiplexity hypothesis, this analysis includes the 
Insurgent-> Government effect, which is formally RSiena’s crprod effect (Ripley et al., 
2021, p. 153). The model contains a GWESP-mixed effect to test the mixed information 
cluster hypothesis, whereby one network “closes” the other. To test for the competitive hub 
hypothesis, this analysis includes three versions of the Mixed Activity + Popularity effect, 
which is officially known as RSiena’ InPopIntnX effect (Ripley et al., 2021, p. 160). This 
effect weights the Activity + Popularity effect by three covariates, implemented here as to 
whether individuals were civilians, insurgents, or militia.103 The three versions of this 
effect, when used for nondirected data like in this study, consider the extent to which these 
types of actors establish connections with well-connected individuals in one network, who 
in turn, become well-connected in the other. Table 1 summarizes the effects, their graphic 
expression, related hypothesis, and interpretation.  
 
103 As Chapter 5 highlights, the models had to drop the government version, as well as several other 
effects, due to convergence issues.  
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Table 1. Summary of Model Effects and Hypotheses 
 
 
H. RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
Two types of reliability are particularly important for this study and the 
identification of relational ties from one actor to others: informant accuracy and inter-rater 
(or inter-coder) reliability. Informant accuracy refers to the association between what 
people do and their recollection of those actions, which has implications for the reliability 
of information contained in the demobilization reports (Bernard et al., 1984; Robins, 2015). 
In a series of studies throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Russ Bernard, Lee Sailer, and Peter 
Killworth (commonly referred to as the “BKS studies”) made several claims about the 
unreliable nature of communication-based ties, including that informants’ recollections are 
often inaccurate when compared to their actual behaviors, even with the maintenance of 
personal logs or notes (Robins, 2015). To address this issue, this study draws from Freeman 
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and Romney (1987) by focusing on recurring or “enduring” patterns of interaction, rather 
than event-based (i.e., one-time), information exchanges. As previously described, the 
coding and modeling procedures focused on interactions among individuals that, from the 
first time pairs interacted to the last, often spanned several months. This study, as described 
in Chapter 5, uses the Jaccard index to assess the “stability” of networks across time waves. 
All indices are above RSiena’s recommended threshold of .20 for both networks.104  
The second issue regarding reliability is inter-coder/inter-rater reliability. This form 
assesses the degree to which coders classify relations and attributes consistently. While this 
study does not leverage multiple coders, and therefore cannot obtain an inter-coder 
reliability statistic, the principle remains the same for single coder studies. To ensure 
consistent coding, this research followed strict definitions for categorizing relational and 
attribute data (see appendix), as well as conducted periodic “spot checks” throughout the 
coding process.  
In social network research, generalization (i.e., external validity) is not 
straightforward in large part because the notion of a population is poorly defined (Robins, 
2015). While there are social network designs, namely ego network studies, that consist of 
randomly sampled participants from a given population whereby one can make inferences 
to a population, many studies, including this one, use complete network designs. This 
dissertation’s focus on social processes underlying co-evolving, competing networks in 
insurgent warfare means the “population” for this study consists of the nodes and ties that 
make up the system comprised of the two competing networks. By testing for social 
processes using SAOMs, this analysis can make claims about tendencies within and 
between the two networks (Lusher et al., 2013; Robins, 2015). This point means that this 
study’s findings cannot be generalized to the FARC’s network outside of the chosen 
 
104 As previously stated, many of these relations bundle with information exchanges. This approach, 
therefore, aligns with the notion of “social structure,” which refers to enduring patterns of interaction, as 
well as aligns with the models used here that assume ties are enduring states rather than brief events 
(Snijders et al., 2010; Steglich et al., 2006). The ties are binarized for modeling purposes, though they may 
represent more than one interaction. Finally, as Robins (2015) points out, there remains much research to 
be done regarding the measurement of social ties, especially as it pertains to reliability. He states (2015, p. 
119), “We do not have methods akin to a network factor analysis that can aggregate multiple name 
generators in a compelling way.”  
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boundaries, nor can they be generalized to other insurgencies. Similarly, the identification 
of co-evolutionary social processes in social systems in insurgent warfare is not intended 
to make causal claims about them, in large part, because of dependencies and feedback 
within such systems. It is important, therefore, to reemphasize those social processes reflect 
“tendencies” of network dynamics within existing structure, rather than suggest casual 
claims about social systems in insurgent warfare. Nonetheless, the results here may inform 





This chapter presents descriptive statistics and the results of two models that offer 
insights into the co-evolutionary processes that can undergird competing social networks in 
insurgent warfare. Using standard SNA statistics, such as density and average degree 
(definitions offered in the next section), the descriptive section highlights the insurgent and 
authority information-sharing networks’ global patterns during each time period. Though 
both networks remained relatively decentralized and sparse, they followed contrasting 
evolutionary patterns at a macro level. For instance, the insurgent network progressively 
decentralized while the authority network did the opposite. The descriptive section illustrates 
that the competing networks formed a larger social system via overlapping relations among 
a variety of actors, including when “demobs” shared information with both sides and 
government personnel shared information with insurgents. As a result, the combined social 
system took on unique global characteristics from the individual networks, such as the extent 
to which it centralized around information brokers.  
The findings in the modeling section describe the evolution of each network via self-
organizing processes and actor attributes, as well as how the competing networks co-evolved. 
While the insurgent and authority networks exhibited contrasting macro patterns over time, 
similar self-organizing social processes helped drive their evolution. For example, “hubs” 
emerged in both networks whereby well-connected individuals continued to acquire new 
information-sharing contacts. More importantly, and consistent with co-evolutionary 
research, the modeling results demonstrate that the dynamics in one network help drive 
dynamics in the other and at multiple network levels (Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; Lusher et 
al., 2013; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Porter, 2006; Ripley et al., 2021). Specifically, the 
insurgent network had a direct effect on the authority network at the dyad level, whereas the 
latter had a direct effect on the former at a degree level. 
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B. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS—GLOBAL PATTERNS 
1. Authority and Insurgent Information-Sharing Networks 
Table 2 provides several, global descriptive statistics for the two networks during 
each time period.105 Density is a measure used to reflect the extent to which a network is 
interconnected. Formally, it is the proportion of observed ties to the number of potential ties 
among actors in a network.106 Average degree is another measure often used to indicate a 
network’s interconnectedness (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). This measure is calculated as the 
sum of ties in a network divided by the number of actors in it (Everton, 2012). For instance, 
the average degree of a network consisting of 50 communication links among 25 individuals 
is 2 (50/25), which indicates that, on average, each individual communicates with two other 
people. While average degree can be misleading when social networks are locally dense and 
globally sparse, it offers a useful glance into global interconnectedness. As indicated by both 
measures in Table 2, the authority network became increasingly dense over time (from 0.001 
to 0.004), whereas the insurgent network followed an opposite trend (from 0.006 to 0.004). 
Both networks, however, were sparse throughout the waves.  
The next measures in Table 2 reflect forms of network centralization. It is the ratio 
of the actual differences in all actor centrality scores from the highest score divided by a 
theoretical maximum107 for a network of that size and number of connections (Wasserman 
& Faust, 1994). The index ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 and attempts to capture the extent to which 
a network is “dominated” by a single actor, several individuals, or nobody. An index of 1.0 
indicates a centralized network in which a single actor scores highly in a selected centrality 
measure when others do not. The assumption is that relatively central individuals are likely 
to maintain some form of relative advantage over others. An index of 0.0 implies a 
decentralized network in which all actors are relatively equal in terms of their centrality 
scores, suggesting no single actor possesses unique structural advantages over other actors. 
 
105 As described in Chapter 4, this analysis treated all networks as dichotomized (i.e., binary) and 
symmetric networks.  
106 See Appendix for all statistic formulas.  
107 The theoretical maximum is the maximum possible sum of differences in actor centrality for a 
network of that size and number of ties (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  
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Certainly, what it means to “dominate” a network depends on the centrality measure on 
which the index is calculated. Many forms of centrality exist, and thus many centralization 
indices do too, so one has to be explicit about how centralization is measured and interpreted. 
This analysis leverages betweenness and degree centralization, which reflect variation in 
actor betweenness centrality108 and degree centrality scores, respectively. Conceptually, the 
former implies the distribution of information brokers throughout a network, while the latter 
highlights whether a few individuals maintain relatively more information sharing 
connections than others. Both provide context about the distribution of potential influence 
over the flow of information in each network (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011).  
The authority network, as both centralization indices show, appears to have become 
increasingly centralized over the time. The indices suggest a handful of individuals became 
progressively more connected (i.e., degree centralization increased from 0.031 to 0.118) as 
well as strengthened their positions as information brokers (i.e., betweenness centralization 
increased from 0.004 to 0.095). However, the authority network remained fairly 
decentralized throughout the waves whereby no single actor, or “central controller,” 
dominated the network. The opposite trends emerged in the insurgent information-sharing 
network. It decentralized over time whereby actors became increasingly more equal in terms 
of their potential positional advantages regarding the flow of information in the network. 
Specifically, degree centralization decreased from 0.079 in the first wave to 0.061 in the last, 
while betweenness centralization decreased from 0.093 to 0.044 over time. It too was 




108 Betweenness centrality “measures the extent to which each actor lies on the shortest path between 
all other actors in a network” (Everton, 2012, p. 13). The assumption is that actors who sit directly between 
many others are in a structural position that gives them the opportunity to control the flow of information 
and resources flowing through a network. Degree centrality is simply the count of each actor’s connections. 
Individuals with many connections may possess advantages in a network (Everton, 2012; Robins, 2015; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Insurgent and Authority Networks 
Authority Info Network Insurgent Info Network 
 W1  W2  W3  W4  W1  W2  W3  W4 
Social System (N = 357 Actors) 
Density 0.001  0.002  0.003  0.004  0.006  0.006  0.005  0.004 
Average 
Degree 0.381 
 0.723  1.053  1.35  2.078  1.989  1.787  1.406 
Degree 
Centralization 0.031 
 0.057  0.065  0.118  0.079  0.068  0.063  0.061 
Betweenness 
Centralization 0.004 
 0.029  0.054  0.095  0.093  0.097  0.081  0.044 
Number Ties  68  129  188  241  371  355  319  251 
 # Created  83  119   85     27   12   24  
 #Dissolved   22   60   32     43   48   92  
 #Stable Ties  46   69  156    328  307  227  
Jaccard Index  0.305  0.278  0.571    0.824  0.837  0.662  
Note: W1-W4 in the columns reflect the four-month time slices/waves from January 2002–April 
2003.  
 
The next few statistics in Table 2 capture tie changes in the two networks over time. 
The number of ties reflects how many information-sharing relations existed in each network 
during each wave, while the various types of tie changes provides greater detail about how 
many ties were created, dissolved, or stable (i.e., maintained) for each network between 
waves. The Jaccard index is the proportion of “stable” relations compared to the total number 
of newly created, dissolved, and maintained ties (Huitsing et al., 2014; Ripley et al., 2021). 
Because SAOMs model network evolution (and co-evolution), the RSiena manual 
recommends a Jaccard index of at least 0.20 between waves to ensure that “turnover” is not 
too high and that networks evolve gradually rather than change from rapid, event-based 
dynamics (Ripley et al., 2021). As Table 2 shows, these data meet this standard (all indices 
are greater than 0.27). The insurgent network, in particular, maintained high Jaccard indices 
(or structural stability) despite individuals leaving through the demobilization program 
(indices range from 0.662 to 0.837).  
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1. Global Social System Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the social system comprised of both 
authority and insurgent information-sharing networks. The measures for global 
interconnectivity indicate that the larger social system was sparse (i.e., density ranges from 
0.07 to 0.08) and that, on average, individuals only maintained approximately two to three 
information sharing contacts during the January 2002-April 2003 time frame (i.e., average 
degree). Like the individual networks, the overall system was relatively decentralized in 
terms of the number of information sharing contacts (i.e., degree centralization ranges from 
0.060 to 0.114); however, it was far more centralized in terms of information brokers than 
the individual networks (i.e., betweenness centralization increases from 0.132 in the first 
wave to 0.260 in the final wave), suggesting that progressively a handful of individuals 
became better positioned as information brokers.109 Finally, the overall system remained 
“stable” (Jaccard indices >.2) across the four time slices in the sense that many relations 
endured between waves.  
Table 3 contains an additional set of statistics to illustrate actor diversity and 
dynamics in the combined social system. Specifically, the affiliation statistics indicate the 
percentage of actors in each wave whose primary affiliation meets the definition of one of 
seven attribute categories.110 The FARC, representing a range of 32–40% of actors across 
waves, and the Colombian Armed Forces, maintaining 20% of the individuals over time, 
accounted for the majority of people in the social system. Government Personnel (i.e., 
civilian, government employees) (6%), Justice Department staff (10%), Police (7%), FARC 
militia (7-9%), and Civilians (8-18%) represent smaller proportions of actors. Table 3 also 
shows that while many individuals’ affiliations remained constant (e.g., Armed Forces, 
 
109 Interestingly, only a single demob ranks in the top-ten for betweenness centrality throughout the 
four waves, whereas most of the highly ranked individuals were FARC leadership and military personnel.  
110 As discussed in Chapter 2, individuals may serve the interests of both insurgent and government 
networks even though they may have a primary affiliation, such as civilian, insurgent, or government 
personnel. This attribute indicates each individual’s primary, or most obvious affiliation. For example, 
several Colombian police officers who shared information with the FARC were coded as police officers 
even though they might be law enforcement and supporting insurgents. The code book appendix provides 
definitions for all categories.  
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Government Personnel, Justice, and Police), many others changed over time. For instance, 
civilians made up 8% of all actors in the first wave, but 18% in the fourth.  
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Social System—Combined Authority and 
Insurgent Networks 
 W1  W2  W3  W4 
Density 0.007  0.007  0.008  0.008 
Average Degree 2.392  2.639  2.768  2.745 
Degree Centralization 0.078  0.066  0.060  0.114 
Betweenness 
Centralization 0.132 
 0.221  0.151  0.260 
#Ties  427  471  494  490 
 #Created    109   130   107  
 #Dissolved    65   107   111  
 #Stable   362   364   383  
Jaccard Index  0.675  0.606  0.637  
Affiliation        
Armed Forces 20%  20%  20%  20% 
Gov. Personnel  6%   6%   6%   6% 
Justice  10%  10%  10%  10% 
Police  7%   7%   7%   7% 
FARC 40%  39%  35%  32% 
Militia  9%   8%   8%   7% 
Civilians  8%  10%  15%   18% 
 
To supplement the descriptive statistics, Figure 14 depicts a composite visualization 
of the competing networks from January 2002-April 2003. While the insurgent (red) and 
authority (green) information-sharing networks remain modular (i.e., separated) and had 
relatively little overlap, the networks intertwined through the actions of various actors.111 
Examples of such actions include civilians (e.g., local politicians) offering information to 
competing actors/networks; FARC insurgents or self-identified militia members 
demobilizing and giving information to authorities; FARC members operating and acquiring 
 
111 Using the quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) test, the correlation between the networks was 
very weak (0.036) and statistically significant (Everton, 2012; Robins, 2015). 
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information on behalf of the government; and government personnel sharing information 
with the FARC or members of its militias.  
 
Note the gray nodes reflect individuals (n=357) and the lines represent insurgent (red) and 
authority (green) information-sharing ties.  
Figure 14. Colombia: FARC and Authority Social System 
The Venn diagram in Figure 15 depicts the number of actors who established ties in 
each network, or both. It shows that 150 actors (42%), who were mostly FARC and militia 
members, formed and maintained only insurgent information-sharing relations. Likewise, 
149 actors (~42%) established and kept authority information-sharing ties only, most of 
whom were government personnel (e.g., members of armed forces). Most importantly, the 
diagram shows that 58 individuals (16%) formed information-sharing relations with both 
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social networks, which offers empirical evidence that competing social networks intertwine 
in insurgent warfare and, in part, make up each other’s social environment. 
 
Figure 15. Venn Diagram—Insurgent, Authority, and Both 
C. INTRODUCTION TO MODEL RESULTS - SAOMS 
As described in Chapter 4, the modeling of multilevel, social networks can be sorted 
into uniplex, covariate, and multiplex effects (Fujimoto et al., 2018; Huitsing et al., 2014; 
Rambaran et al., 2015; Ripley et al., 2021). The first category, or uniplex structural effects, 
reflect self-organizing processes in which changes in a network depend on itself at various 
network levels (Huitsing et al., 2014; Ripley et al., 2021; Robins, 2015; Snijders et al., 2010). 
The effects outlined in Table 3 include the tendency for individuals to form ties and share 
information (i.e., density); the propensity of triadic closure whereby individuals who share a 
single contact begin sharing information (i.e., transitive triads); the formation of “higher-
order” clusters (i.e., beyond triad level) whereby individuals who share multiple contacts 
begin sharing information (i.e., geometrically weighted edgewise shared partners, or 
121 
GWESP); and the inclination for well-connected individuals to continue to acquire additional 
information sharing contacts (i.e., Activity + Popularity).112  
The second category, or covariate effects, model how changes in a network depends 
on the characteristics or attributes of the individuals within it. Both models include these 
effects to control for various forms of homophily on tie formation, which is a well-
documented category of processes in which individuals with “similar” characteristics (e.g., 
same gender or affiliation) are more likely to form and maintain a tie than not (Lawrence & 
Shah, 2020; McPherson et al., 2001). Similarly, the models also include a geographic-based 
effect to account for a “propinquity effect,” which, when in reference to spatial distance, 
suggests geographic location plays an important role in the likelihood that two individuals 
will form a connection (Adams et al., 2012; Daraganova et al., 2012).113 Finally, the 
multiplex effects show co-evolutionary social processes and account for how changes in one 
network depend on the other at different network levels (Ripley et al., 2021). While these 
effects are this chapter’s focus, it will describe self-organizing and covariate results to 
illustrate intra-network evolutionary processes and to offer a baseline with which to compare 
the role of co-evolutionary processes. Model 1 reflects the baseline model, whereas Model 2 
incorporates co-evolutionary effects.  
A few points are worth noting before proceeding to the results. First, both models 
converged appropriately (Ripley et al., 2021). This assessment is based on observing 
independent variable t-ratios and a model’s overall maximum convergence ratio, both of 
which RSiena provides for users during modeling. Together they are designed to help assess 
whether a model fits the data appropriately. The t-ratio for each independent variable is a 
combination of the average deviation and standard deviations of the deviations between the 
observed values (e.g., closed triads) and the simulated values of statistics (Ripley et al., 
2021). RSiena recommends that t-ratios for each independent variable (e.g., Transitive 
Triads, Activity + Popularity) are below 0.1. The overall maximum convergence ratio is the 
 
112 RSiena offers users to ability to include many types of network effects like these. This list is not 
exhaustive but reflects those relevant to this research.  
113 This effect can refer to social proximity, too. However, this study uses it to capture spatial 
distance.  
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maximum value of the average deviation divided by the standard deviation. RSiena’s states 
that overall maximum convergence ratios should be =<0.25 (Ripley et al., 2021, p. 66).  
Also, problems with model fit and convergence, in part, informed the models’ 
variable selection. Note the differences in independent variables for each network in Models 
1 and 2. This analysis attempted to maintain the same theoretically-driven variables for both 
networks but had to add some based on GOF tests that suggested models did not account 
well for degree distributions in one or both networks. Specifically, the models include effects 
to account for the proclivity of isolated individuals in the authority network to remain that 
way by avoiding information sharing with others (i.e., isolates114), and the tendency for 
those who have few connections (n=2) in both networks to keep few contacts (i.e., anti near-
isolates).  
In other cases, this analysis had to drop some variables to get the models to converge 
appropriately. For instance, both models do not include several effects for the insurgent 
information-sharing network that reflect potentially relevant evolutionary and co-
evolutionary processes (e.g., no isolates variable in the insurgent network models). While 
convergence issues are broadly the culprit for their exclusion, the reasons behind the omitted 
variable’s role in convergence depends on several factors, including extreme correlations 
with other variables or the fact that some were not observed frequently (or at all) in the data 
set.115 This challenge was particularly noticeable for the insurgent network whereby only a 
single multiplex effect (i.e., Mixed Activity + Popularity (Civilian)) could be modeled to 
permit convergence.  
 
114 This effect and the anti near-isolates effects were included only after initial goodness of fit (GOF) 
tests indicated that isolates existed and for which models should account.  
115 For instance, Model 1 does not include a homophilous effect for “demobilization” in the insurgent 
network because pairs of demobs in this context did not establish insurgent information-sharing ties once 
they had left the FARC or their militias. Put simply, one cannot model networks based on patterns that do 
not exist in the empirical data set. 
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D. SELF-ORGANIZATION AND ACTOR ATTRIBUTES—UNIVARIATE 
AND COVARIATE EFFECTS 
1. Authority Information-Sharing Networks 
The results for Model 1 in Table 3 reflect effects related to self-organizing social 
processes and actor attributes (i.e., covariates) that help drive each network’s evolution 
without accounting for co-evolutionary processes.116 Odds ratios (OR) are provided in the 
text for many estimates to support interpretation. Beginning with the authority information-
sharing network,117 it appears actors within it largely avoided establishing and maintaining 
information-sharing ties with others (i.e.., density). This result (Est. = -5.991, p <0.01) 
suggests that while individuals acting on behalf of the government had the potential to form 
information sharing ties with a variety of other individuals (e.g., government employees, 
military, civilians, militia, FARC), often they did not. However, it is important to keep in 
mind two points when interpreting the density effect. The first is that statistical procedure 
considers all types of actors (e.g., insurgents) as potential information-sharing partners, so 
the likelihood is low that deeply embedded government personnel would form ties with 
adversaries. The second, and arguably more important point, is that density essentially acts 
as a control variable for all other effects and is often not all that meaningful (Pasquaretta et 
al., 2016; Warren, 2016). 
The tendency for closure-related processes (i.e., transitive triads and GWESP) within 
the authority network depends on the level of analysis. At the triad level, individuals had an 
aversion to sharing informing with others who maintained only a single contact with them 
(Est. = -2.239, p<0.01). While triadic closure is common in a variety of contexts (Kadushin, 
2012), the results here do not provide support for the information closure hypothesis. 
However, the authority network exhibited a tendency for “higher-order” closure processes 
(i.e., GWESP) whereby pairs of actors were far more likely to share information with others 
when they shared multiple contacts (Est. = 4.692, p<0.01). In fact, when holding all other 
 
116 All p-values were calculated using Wald-type tests. RSiena offers functions to enable this step 
(Ripley et al., 2021, pp. 90–94).  
117 The column titled, “Authority Network,” indicates results for the authority network as the 
dependent variable, whereas the “Insurgent Network” column shows results for the insurgent network as 
the dependent variable.  
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variables constant, these individuals were 109 times more likely (OR = 109.07) to form a 
direct tie than those who did not share multiple contacts. The positive and statistically 
significant result provides support for the information cluster hypothesis. Interestingly, when 
considered together, the results for these multilevel, “closure” related processes may say 
something about the importance of trust and “extra vetting” when it comes to sharing 
information with others in insurgent warfare.118  
Related to the notion of clustering is the potential presence of network “hubs.”119 
Table 3 shows that the Activity + Popularity variable is positive and statistically significant 
(Est. = 0.124, p<0.01), which offers support for the information hubs hypothesis. This result 
suggests that well-connected individuals continued to acquire and maintain new information 
sharing contacts, albeit only slightly more likely do so than those who were not well-
connected (OR = 1.13). The demobilization reports highlight that several, experienced 
military personnel (e.g., Colonels) and government civilians repeatedly engaged in 
information sharing with others about former insurgents, former militia members, and key 
civilians. This result aligns well with findings in other contexts regarding the presence of 
“hubs” developed through social processes, such as preferential attachment, as well as 
emergence of clusters in networks (Barabási, 2016; Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003; Capra, 
1996; Robins, 2015).  
The last two effects, which were included to obtain model convergence, offer details 
into the other side of spectrum on actor ties; that is, the tendency for individuals with few, to 
no contacts to remain that way. The isolates effect indicates that many actors did not share 
information on behalf of the authorities (Est. = 3.962, p<0.01); that is, isolated individuals 
were almost fifty-three times (OR = 52.56) more likely to avoid forming a new tie than non-
isolates. As stated before, the model considers insurgents and militia members, including 
deeply embedded ones who are less likely to share government information than others, as 
potential information sources or targets. Yet, when individuals maintained a single 
 
118 It is clear in the demobilization reports that Colombian government personnel were aware that 
some “played both sides.” In fact, several of the questions that interviewers asked demobs pertained to their 
knowledge of government personnel supporting the FARC.  
119 Because these data are nondirected, a hub in this context is simply well-connected actors. The use 
of the term here is not the same as Kleinberg’s (1999) measure of “hubs and authorities.”  
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relationship through which information could flow, there was a high probability (anti-near 
isolates, Est. = 1.285, p<0.01) they would establish an additional contact and become more 
embedded in the network over time—the odds of doing so, holding all other variables 
constant, were nearly four times (OR = 3.61) greater than not sharing information with 
additional people in the authority network. When considered together, these two outcomes 
could suggest that while there might have been barriers for individuals to engage the network 
initially (i.e., “get their foot in the door”), there were mechanisms to keep individuals sharing 
information once they did. Finally, there were several significant covariate effects that 
controlled for the role of homophily in the network. Specifically, operating in the same 
geographic area (Est. = 1.213, p<0.01), maintaining the same affiliation (Est. = 0.333, 
p<0.05), and participating in the demobilization program (Est. = 1.057, p<0.01) enabled the 
formation of authority information-sharing connections.120 Gender did not have an effect in 
the formation of ties in the authority network.  
 
120 In other words, the odds of two individuals in the same geographic area forming an authority 
information-sharing tie were three times (odds ratio = 3.36) greater than those who were not located in the 
same location. Those who shared the same affiliation were 1.40 times more likely to share information than 
those who did not, while those participating in the demobilization program were almost three times (odds 
ratio = 2.88) more likely exchange information for authorities than those who did not participate in it.  
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Table 4. Self-Organization and Actor Attributes—SAOMs Univariate and 
Covariate Effects 
 
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (two-sided) 
 
2. Insurgent Information-Sharing Networks 
The insurgent information-sharing network exhibited similar evolutionary, self-
organizing social processes as its competitor. It too displays a strong propensity away from 
establishing information-sharing relations within the broader social system comprised of 
multiple types of actors (i.e., density, Est. = -10.070, p<0.01). As described earlier, however, 
it is a challenging effect to interpret for several reasons. Keeping those in mind, it is 
interesting to note that several examples exist in which government personnel (i.e., armed 
forces, government civilians, justice, and police), who make up approximately 45% of 
networked actors, established and maintained insurgent information-sharing ties during the 
January 2002-April 2003 time frame. For instance, several police officers in one of the local 
police departments in southern Colombia provided information to the FARC for most of the 
time frame of interest.  
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Like the authority network, the insurgent information-sharing network’s tendency for 
closure-related processes is mixed depending on the level of analysis. The transitive triads 
coefficient is positive (Est. = 0.135), but statistically insignificant, so it does not provide 
support for the information closure hypothesis. Yet, the GWESP result indicates the insurgent 
network displayed a tendency for “higher-order” closure whereby those acting on its behalf 
were far likely to share information with others when they had several, shared contacts 
between them (Est. = 2.796, p<0.01). In other words, when holding all other variables 
constant, these individuals were sixteen times more likely (OR = 16.39) to establish and 
maintain a direct tie than those who did not share multiple contacts. Similar to the authority 
network, this supports the information cluster hypothesis. This finding also aligns with 
research on social movements and “dark networks” that emphasize the important role of 
preexisting connections and trust for individuals who consider engaging in high-risk 
activities (Lofland & Stark, 1965; McAdam, 1986; Sageman, 2004).  
As with the authority network, it appears well-connected actors, or “hubs,” continued 
to establish and maintain ties throughout the waves, which offers support for the information 
hubs hypothesis (Activity + Popularity, Est. = 0.115, p<0.01). The insurgent network’s most 
well-connected actors across the waves included front leadership, well-connected militia 
members, and local politicians (e.g., city mayors). Though only slightly more likely to form 
additional contacts than those in different situations (OR = 1.12), preferential attachment is 
possibly an underlying process whereby well-connected individuals, who likely possess a lot 
of information, continue to acquire new contacts and information (Barabási, 2016; Robins, 
2015). This model dropped the isolates variable for the insurgent network due to convergence 
issues. Yet, like the authority network, individuals were much more likely—about ten times 
more so than those in other social positions (odds ratio = 10.58)—to establish additional ties 
and become increasingly embedded in the network over time when they possessed at least 
one preexisting tie (anti-near isolates, Est. = 2.359, p<0.01). Finally, the results for 
homophily are mixed. Table 3 shows evidence for the influence of geography (Est. = 1.163, 
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p<0.01) as well as affiliation-based homophily (Est. = 3.533, p<0.01),121 but a tendency 
away from homophily based on gender (Est. = -0.596, p<0.01). The FARC’s demographic 
composition in which male and female members often served in the same unit is a likely 
explanation for the negative and statistically significant effect for gender.  
E. CO-EVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL PROCESSES—MULTIPLEX EFFECTS 
Table 4 depicts the results for Model 2, which incorporates multiplex, or co-
evolutionary effects into a model. While the addition of these effects does not “explain away” 
any of the baseline evolutionary effects for either network, the results demonstrate that the 
dynamics in one network help drive the dynamics in the other. Like Model 1, however, the 
results depend on the level of analysis. Beginning with the authority network (i.e., dependent 
variable), there is a direct effect of insurgent ties on the formation and maintenance of 
government ties at the dyad level (Insurgent=>Government, Est. = 2.643, p<0.01). The 
results show that individuals involved in insurgent information-sharing ties were fourteen 
times (odds ratio = 14.05) more likely to establish authority-information sharing ties than 
who were not (e.g., isolates and authorities). This supports information multiplexity 
hypothesis and indicates that the presence of insurgent ties between pairs of actors often led 
to government information-sharing ties.122 Some of this result is likely due to the context in 
which a government-led demobilization program enticed FARC and militia members to lay 
down their weapons and reintegrate into Colombian society. It also fits into a broader pattern 
during the early-2000s in which the FARC became “weaker” from a high point in the late-
1990s after facing several setbacks, such as diminishing popular support (e.g., “No Más” 
protests and backlash from kidnappings and killings), the creation of “Plan Colombia” in 
2000, failed peace talks with Colombian Government, and the election of an aggressive, then-
President Uribe (Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, 2020; Stanford University, 
2019). Civilians engaged in insurgent information-sharing ties likely contributed to this 
 
121 The odds of two individuals in the same location forming an insurgent tie were three times (odds 
ratio = 3.19) higher than those who were not, while those who shared the same affiliation were thirty-four 
times (odds ratio = 34.23) more likely to share information than those who did not.  
122 Model 2 did not converge when accounting for the authority network’s direct effect on the 
insurgent network at the dyad level (i.e., government => insurgent).  
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outcome, too. The demobilization reports illustrate that many civilians had tenuous ties to 
the FARC and their militias, often forced upon them via threats of violence, but who 
participated in the program in order to seek protection and benefits from the government.  
Table 5. SAOM Results 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 (two-sided) 
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The results for closure-related processes and several degree level effects indicate the 
insurgent network (i.e., independent variable) did not have direct effects on the authority 
network (i.e., dependent variable) at those levels. As shown in Table 4, Model 2 includes a 
GWESP-Mixed variable to capture the former. The coefficient is negative (Est. = -0.803) and 
statistically insignificant and therefore does not lend support to the mixed information cluster 
hypothesis that the government would find ways to embed in insurgent clusters. At the degree 
level, Model 2 includes three effects that account for competition over well-connected 
individuals. The three Mixed-Activity + Popularity effects reflect the tendency for civilians, 
insurgents, or militia members to have established ties with well-connected actors in the 
insurgent network who subsequently became well-connected, or share information with 
many others, in the authorities’ network as well. In all three cases, the effects are negative 
but only the insurgent (Est. = -0.820, p<0.01) and militia (Est. =     -0.329, p<0.05) 
coefficients are statistically significant. These results do not support the competitive hub 
hypothesis and rather indicate there was a tendency for insurgents and militia to have avoided 
well-connected individuals who could have put them at risk by sharing share information 
with the government. Viewed from a different perspective, it indicates that the government, 
outside of the demobilization program, did not compete effectively to establish contacts with 
well-connected people in the insurgent network.  
The Mixed-Activity + Popularity (Civilian) coefficient in Table 4’s last column 
indicates the authority information-sharing network (i.e., independent variable) exhibited a 
direct effect on the insurgent network (i.e., dependent variable) at the degree level.123 The 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant (Est. = 2.028, p<0.01) and supports the 
competitive hubs hypothesis with respect to civilians. This result implies there was a tendency 
for civilians in the authority network to establish ties with well-connected individuals who 
become attractive contacts for insurgents and their affiliates. Put differently, individuals in 
the authority network with many civilian contacts were eight times (odds ratio = 7.60) more 
likely to share information with insurgents than those without such characteristics. It suggests 
 
123 As previously stated, several explanatory variables included in the insurgent network model 
prevented it from converging. Many versions of this model were run to swap out the civilian version with 
militia and insurgent versions but were unsuccessful.  
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that insurgents tended to compete effectively for individuals who had many civilian contacts 
by establishing information-sharing relations with them. Compared to the authorities’ efforts 
to compete for well-connected individuals, it appears the FARC and its affiliates placed more 
emphasis on competing for civilians outside their social circle than the Colombian authorities 
did at that time and location. The FARC’s ideological roots (i.e., Marxist-Leninism) and 
emphasis on guerrilla warfare offer context for this perspective. This does not suggest, 
however, that the FARC were “nice” to populations in their interactions; in fact, the FARC’s 
Southern Bloc threatened, kidnapped, and killed many civilians during that time who would 
not cooperate with them. Rather, it is important to recall that, at that time, the FARC faced 
several major setbacks in their competition with the government (Jane’s World Terrorism 
and Insurgency Centre, 2020; Marks, 2010). This point suggests it is likely the FARC 
established ties with well-connected individuals within the authority network, specifically 
those with many civilian contacts, in order to acquire information in a competition with a 
government who had the momentum.  
F. GOODNESS OF FIT (GOF)  
This analysis assessed each model’s fit using “goodness of fit” (GOF) procedure 
implemented in the RSiena package. As previously described, a model should be able to 
replicate features that are included in the model, as well as those that are not. To assess model 
fit, this analysis included GOF tests for degree distribution (i.e., indegree124), triad census, 
and geodesic distances for both insurgent and authority networks.125 As described in Chapter 
4, the GOF test uses common structural tendencies in social networks, implemented as a set 
of “auxiliary statistics,” to evaluate a model’s ability to account for them (Lospinoso & 
Snijders, 2019; Ripley et al., 2021). RSiena’s manual recommends an auxiliary statistic’s p-
value is near or above 0.05. While the analysis conducted GOF tests for both models, it will 
 
124 The indegree distribution is the distribution of ties that actors receive. Because this is nondirected 
data, this check helps account for simple degree distributions; that is, it ignores the direction of ties.  
125 Fitting each network separately rather than the larger social system is consistent with existing 
studies that have employed GOF tests for multiplex networks (Fujimoto et al., 2018; Huitsing et al., 2014; 
Rambaran et al., 2015). 
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focus on Model 2 because it includes self-organizing, covariate, and co-evolutionary 
effects.126  
The GOF results in Model 2 show the authority network fits degree distribution 
sufficiently (p = 0.036) and does much better with triad census (p = 1) and geodesic distances 
(p = 0.573). The insurgent network is a good fit for all three auxiliary statistics in the sense 
that all three p-values are greater than 0.05. Figure 16 depicts plots demonstrating GOF tests 
for Model 2 for the three auxiliary statistics and for each network. The red lines indicate the 
observed values, whereas the violin plots represent the simulated statistics. The dotted lines 
reflect the 95th percentile banks while the p-value is located at the bottom of the plot 
(Lospinoso & Snijders, 2019). For example, looking at the insurgent network, the model does 
an excellent job accounting for the distribution of actor connections (i.e., degree distribution), 
as well as for various types of triads commonly found in networks; however, simulated 
distributions for the number of pairs with geodesic distances between 4 and 5 are somewhat 
lower than the observed frequencies.  
 
126 In Model 1, the authority network is a good fit for all three auxiliary statistics (indegree p-value = 
0.11; triad census p-value = 0.988; and geodesic distances p-value = 0.394), whereas the insurgent network 




Figure 16. Model 2 Goodness of Fit  
G. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The empirical data show that the insurgent and authority information-sharing 
networks intertwined to make up a larger social system comprised of various types of 
actors, including civilians, insurgents, and government personnel. Consistent with COIN 
literature, they did not partition themselves into distinct networks (Department of the 
Army, 2017; Gventer, 2014; Herrington, 1982; Kilcullen, 2013; U.S. Marine Corps, 2017). 
The descriptive statistics, including those depicted in the Venn diagram (Figure 15), reveal 
that a choice of network boundaries based on affiliation categories would not have captured 
this key aspect of the social system. Moreover, the composite statistics for the larger system 
reflect that it had some unique characteristics from the individual networks, such as the 
extent to which it was centralized around brokers (i.e., betweenness centralization). While 
these are insights that can be found in multiplex networks in many contexts (Ferriani et al., 
2013; Kadushin, 2012; Robins, 2015), they are points often ignored in the analysis of social 
networks in insurgent warfare. As COIN literature illustrates, the inability to create an 
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accurate depiction of an operational environment can have serious consequences 
(Cleveland et al., 2018; Department of the Army, 2014, 2017).  
The two information sharing networks exhibited similar multilevel, evolutionary 
social processes despite differing global patterns. For instance, the insurgent network 
became increasingly sparse and decentralized over time, while the authority network did 
the opposite (albeit still decentralized). At the triad and cluster levels, individuals within 
each network tended to avoid sharing information with others in their social circles (i.e., 
closure) unless they shared multiple contacts. These results, which provide support for the 
information cluster hypothesis but not the information closure hypothesis, are insightful 
for the study of multilevel dynamics and nested patterns of interaction. They show that 
similar social processes can occur at one level but not another. Also, they may indicate the 
importance of trust in information sharing in insurgent warfare. Individuals in both 
networks might not have felt comfortable sharing information with others unless they had 
fully vetted them via multiple contacts. Many insurgent warfare contexts, including in 
Colombia at that time, are replete with examples of individuals “switching sides” or 
“playing both sides,” which is a pattern that poses serious risks for individuals sharing 
information with defectors (Kilcullen, 2013; Kuehl, 2009; Metelits, 2010; Montgomery & 
McWilliams, 2009; Wilson, 2006). This risk was not limited to one side of the conflict, 
either. The demobilization reports showed that both the FARC and the authorities were 
concerned about their affiliates offering information to their adversaries.127 Interestingly, 
it was also highly likely that individuals would become increasingly integrated into each 
network over time once they had joined (i.e., anti-near isolates).  
Hubs tended to emerge in both networks, too. In this context, hubs acquired 
information contacts and, in turn, established more contacts through which they could 
acquire or disseminate information through social interactions. The results for both 
networks provide support for the information hubs hypothesis. That is not to say these hubs 
“controlled” either network, let alone the larger social system comprised of the two 
 
127 For instance, the reports discuss many examples of FARC leadership who targeted rank and file 
members who they suspected of “collaborating” with the government. In terms of the government, the 
reports explicitly covered each demob’s knowledge of government personnel collaborating with insurgents.  
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networks. In fact, the combined system was decentralized even though it was relatively 
more centralized in terms of betweenness centralization than the individual networks. 
Finally, affiliation homophily and geography played a significant role in tie formation and 
maintenance in both networks. 
The findings highlight underlying co-evolutionary effects between two competing, 
information-sharing networks in this insurgent warfare context. They show that individuals 
in the broader social system acted and/or reacted to local their social environments, which 
in part were comprised of competing structures. The outcomes are consistent with existing 
literature on co-evolution, as well as its multilevel nature (Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; 
Huitsing et al., 2014; Lusher et al., 2013; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Porter, 2006). In this 
study, the insurgent network had a direct effect on the authority network at the dyad level, 
whereas the authority network had a direct effect on the insurgent network at the degree 
level. The former result, which provides support for the information multiplexity 
hypothesis, illustrates that many of those embedded in the insurgent network often “played 
both sides,” at least temporarily, and helped intertwine the networks and contribute to the 
authority network’s dynamics when they joined it. Model 2, however, did not converge 
when accounting for the authority network’s direct effect on the insurgent network at the 
dyad level.  
The latter co-evolutionary outcome lends support for the competitive hubs 
hypothesis and shows that civilians who were embedded in the authority network tended 
to establish contacts with well-connected hubs, who in turn, established many insurgent 
ties. Insurgents and militia members, however, did not have the same proclivity, which 
does not offer support for the hypothesis. This finding for civilians is interesting, though, 
in the context of information sharing in insurgent warfare. While many civilians established 
authority information-sharing ties with government-based hubs, it turns out this was risky 
in the sense that the latter often ended up sharing information with insurgent contacts. 
Taken together, the presence of the two multilevel, co-evolutionary effects highlight the 
importance of treating competing networks as part of the same social system, as well as 
illustrates the important role that hubs and civilians can play in the competition for 
information in insurgent warfare.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This study began by noting that extant literature has addressed empirical insurgent 
networks inadequately, insufficiently accounting for insurgent warfare’s unique 
characteristics. Specifically, existing structural studies of insurgencies—those that seek to 
understand emergent social system patterns—have failed to capture the overlapping nature 
of competing, information-sharing networks in such contexts. This study addressed three 
bodies of relevant research, including COIN theory, complex adaptive systems, and social 
network research, all of which offer useful perspectives for understanding emergent social 
system patterns in insurgent warfare. Guided by Monge and Contractor’s (2003) MTML 
framework, it identified several natural points of synthesis among these domains. This 
framework integrates complex adaptive systems and social network research around co-
evolution and the two bodies’ shared concepts closely related to it: namely, network 
emergence and self-organization. It argued that both self-organizing and co-evolutionary, 
social processes—the ways by which individuals form connections—help drive network 
dynamics at multiple network levels. It drew on longitudinal network data from official, 
Colombian demobilization reports, as well as leveraged multiplex SAOMs in order to 
examine how competing information-sharing networks can co-evolve in insurgent warfare.  
This analysis uncovered empirical support for several, but not all, of the hypotheses 
outlined in Chapter 3. It tested several hypotheses about intra-network, self-organizing 
social processes, and inter-network, co-evolutionary ones. In particular, it found similar 
self-organizing social processes helped drive internal dynamics of both authority and 
insurgent networks at the degree and cluster levels. Both networks showed a tendency for 
information-sharing hubs to emerge (i.e., degree level), whereby well-connected 
individuals tended to continue to acquire new information-sharing contacts. Also, the two 
networks showed a proclivity toward closure at a cluster level in which individuals tended 
to share information with others when they shared multiple contacts. Interestingly, the two 
networks exhibited contrasting global evolutionary patterns in some regards (e.g., 
betweenness centralization), which aligned well with emergence literature that claims 
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global patterns are not the mere sum of patterns at lower levels (Corning, 2002; Goldstein, 
1999; Holland, 1998; Lichtenstein, 2000; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Padgett & Powell, 
2012; Wycisk et al., 2008).  
It tested for dyadic multiplexity (i.e., the presence of one tie leads to another), 
multilevel closure (i.e., triad and cluster levels) and the emergence of hubs (i.e., degree 
level) between the competing networks. In this case study, the insurgent network had a 
direct effect on the authority network at a dyad level, whereas the authority network had a 
direct effect on the insurgent network at a degree level. The former co-evolutionary result 
illustrated that many of those embedded in the FARC network often “played both sides,” 
including demobs and civilians. The latter finding indicated that civilians who were 
embedded in the authority network tended to establish contacts with well-connected hubs, 
who in turn, established many insurgent ties.  
The analysis extends previous research in at least four ways. First, it addressed 
empirical, insurgent networks explicitly, which the “dark network” literature has largely 
ignored. To date, much of this literature has focused on criminal and terrorist networks 
(Cunningham et al., 2016; Everton, 2012; Gerdes, 2015; Morselli, 2014), in part, due to a 
lack of access to relevant data on insurgent networks. For example, while researchers 
studying criminal networks have been able to access unclassified, closed source data 
(Bright et al., 2019; Diviák et al., 2019; Morselli, 2014; Papachristos et al., 2013; 
Papachristos & Smith, 2014), this has not been the case with insurgent networks. A 
consequence is that extant research has not examined social processes that can drive 
insurgent network dynamics at an operational level. To address this gap, this study built a 
unique data set from official, unclassified reports that offered rich data on informal 
relationships among a variety of actors, enabling the identification of social processes that 
contributed to network dynamics in Colombia. Moreover, this study captured detailed, 
operational level network data about the FARC’s competitor: the Colombian Government. 
Extant literature generally has not incorporated empirical, authority networks into analyses 
either, albeit a few exceptions exist for other types of “dark networks” (Diviák et al., 2019; 
Kenney, 2007; Papachristos & Smith, 2014; Stys et al., 2020).  
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Second, this study analyzed empirical insurgent networks from a perspective that 
is consistent with COIN and insurgency literature. It mapped and analyzed two, competing 
information-sharing networks at an operational level. Chapter 2 pointed out that lines 
between insurgent networks and other types of networks are often murky, in part, because 
they overlap with legitimate social circles (Department of the Army, 2014, 2017; Diviák 
et al., 2019; Herrington, 1982; Kilcullen, 2013; Papachristos & Smith, 2014; Stys et al., 
2020; United States Government, 2016; U.S. Marine Corps, 2017). This characteristic, 
which brings the notion of open systems to the forefront, makes it difficult to classify 
individuals into neat network categories, such as insurgent, civilian, and government 
networks. While official U.S. publications on COIN (Department of the Army, 2014, 2017; 
United States Government, 2016; U.S. Marine Corps, 2017), as well as other related works 
(Cleveland et al., 2018; Gventer, 2014; Herrington, 1982; Kilcullen, 2013), offer some of 
the most useful descriptions of social networks in operational environments to date, in part, 
because the authors have real-life, practical experience, they have failed to pay explicit 
attention to the heart of the problem: boundary specification. This study addressed this gap 
by treating competing insurgent and authority networks as multiplex ties within the same 
social system. Consistent with COIN literature, the empirical data showed that individuals 
did not partition themselves neatly into distinct networks, suggesting that a choice of 
network boundaries based on affiliation categories (e.g., civilian, insurgent, government) 
would have missed important interdependencies between the networks.  
Likewise, it focused on information-sharing networks. COIN and insurgency 
literature claim that forming personal relations with a populace, specifically through in-
person information exchanges, is critical in determining a conflict’s outcome (Cleveland 
et al., 2018; Department of the Army, 2014; Galula, 2006; Guevara, 2007; Kilcullen, 2010, 
2013; Marighella, 2002; Taber, 2002; Tse-Tung, 1989). Yet, existing research has failed to 
focus on such networks in insurgent warfare contexts. This study demonstrated empirically 
that information-sharing among a variety of individuals (e.g., civilians and insurgents) 
ultimately intertwined two adversaries who competed for the same populace. Examples in 
this case study included civilians and local politicians offering information to competing 
actors/networks; FARC insurgents or self-identified militia members demobilizing and 
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providing information to authorities; FARC members operating and acquiring information 
on behalf of the government; and government personnel sharing information with the 
FARC or members of its militias. Interestingly, while the networks did not overlap 
substantially, information-sharing on one side of the conflict had an impact on the 
information-sharing structure in the other.  
Third, this dissertation extended the application of the MTML framework to co-
evolving social networks in insurgent warfare. As described in previous chapters, the 
framework synthesizes complex adaptive systems and social network research, which, in 
turn, helped address gaps in the study insurgent networks. The former perspective aided 
analysis from a standpoint on system boundaries that is consistent with insurgency and 
counterinsurgency literature: namely, social systems that encompass open and competitive, 
information-sharing social networks that are comprised of dynamic social beings, 
specifically combatants and noncombatants, who influence and react to their social 
environment. This perspective offered a more realistic depiction of social systems in 
insurgent warfare than existing social network literature on “dark networks.” Social 
network research’s central contribution was its emphasis on identifying social processes 
underlying empirical social systems. Also, guided by this domain, this study applied the 
MTML framework explicitly with the use of SAOMs to study insurgent networks, which 
have become a prominent model class in social network research; however, extant research 
leveraging the models has paid little attention to the framework.  
Fourth, it identified the presence of specific multilevel, co-evolutionary effects 
between empirical, social networks in insurgent warfare. While complex adaptive systems 
and social network research have much to offer on co-evolution, they have largely ignored 
the concept in such contexts. Consistent with extant literature in several domains, it framed 
each network as part of the other’s social environment whereby co-evolution exists in the 
sense that there are mutual and concurrent effects on each other at various levels, often 
triggered by some need (e.g., information) (Huitsing et al., 2014; Monge & Contractor, 
2003; Porter, 2006; Rambaran et al., 2015; Volberda & Lewin, 2003). In this study, 
information sharing interactions in one network had a direct effect on the structure of the 
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other, even while controlling for intra-network tendencies, such as self-organizing and 
other social processes (e.g., homophily).  
The presence of co-evolutionary social process in an insurgent warfare context has 
important implications for practitioners, too. As FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (Department of 
the Army, 2014, p. 20) states, “counterinsurgents must gather, analyze, and disseminate 
civil information pertaining to the population.” Information from noncombatants, which 
counterinsurgents can process into intelligence, is thought to help improve both offensive 
and defensive operational effectiveness because it helps them understand the identity, 
networks, and locations of insurgents (Galula, 1964; Kalyvas, 2006; McCormick, 
Forthcoming). This study’s results support existing literature that emphasizes the important 
role that civilians can play in insurgent warfare. They suggest that practitioners should 
continue to focus on information-sharing relations with civilians, as well as continue to 
emphasize the potential role that a variety of other actors (e.g., politicians, foreign partners) 
can play in insurgent warfare (Department of the Army, 2014, 2017; United States 
Government, 2016; U.S. Marine Corps, 2017).  
Similarly, the study highlights practitioners must take extra care with boundary 
specification. Though it is almost certain that military leadership, as was the case with 
Colombians, considers how adversarial networks might intersect and compromise their 
own unit’s networks, including through foreign partners, civilians, and rouge government 
officials, they should frame competing social networks as part of the same system, rather 
than treat them as distinct from one another. Social system literature (Benbya & McKelvey, 
2006; Cilliers, 2001; Lichtenstein, 2000; Monge & Contractor, 2003; Padgett & Powell, 
2012; Porter, 2006; Sawyer, 2005), as well as some COIN literature (Cleveland et al., 2018; 
Department of the Army, 2014, 2017; Kilcullen, 2013; U.S. Marine Corps, 2017) and the 
co-evolutionary effects found in this study, demonstrate practitioners should not consider 
insurgent networks as completely external structures onto which they implement strategies. 
While it is clear that the removal of individuals from networks can affect an adversary’s 
network (Bakker et al., 2012; Carley et al., 2003; Everton, 2012; Roberts & Everton, 2011), 
co-evolutionary processes among information-sharing networks indicate that non-violent 
interactions can affect an enemy network’s structure, too. Though this perspective may 
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create more burden for practitioners (e.g., data collection), joint publications and other 
official documentation should, at a minimum, ensure personnel recognize the limitations 
of approaches that treat “friendly,” “threat,” and “neutral” structures as separate networks, 
such as the common practice of assigning color codes to networks (e.g., “blue,” “green,” 
“white,” and “red” networks).  
Consequently, this analysis has implications for relational data structuring and 
storage as well. Some of the military’s commonly used enterprise systems, such as i2/
Analyst Notebook128 and Palantir,129 should create ontologies and coding scheme options 
that encourage practitioners to embrace vague boundaries of social networks in competitive 
contexts rather than create rudimentary categories.130 All too often technical systems force 
analysts into coding decisions that oversimplify some aspects of social systems in irregular 
warfare contexts, like insurgent warfare. For instance, some information systems obligate 
users to categorize entities based on affiliations and roles, such as “terrorist,” “politician,” 
or “law enforcement” categories. The fact that some individuals, as seen in this analysis, 
such as local Colombian law enforcement, can “play both sides” and maintain multiple 
roles and affiliations, suggests binary approaches can be problematic. As primary 
stakeholders, operational level decision-makers will have to adopt a more nuanced 
perspective about insurgent networks, as well as incorporate it into their guidance regarding 
collection, storage, and analysis of them. 
B. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study is not without its limitations. An obvious limitation is that it is highly 
unlikely that the Colombian Government collected network data with informant accuracy 
in mind (Bernard et al., 1984; Freeman & Romney, 1987; Robins, 2015). This issue refers 
to the association between what people do and their recollection of those actions, which 
has implications for the reliability of information contained in the demobilization reports. 
 
128 For more information, see https://www.ibm.com/products/i2-analysts-notebook-premium. 
129 Like i2, Palantir has several products. See, https://www.palantir.com/. 
130 This point is anecdotal and based on my experience and conversations with many practitioners 
regarding several information systems. 
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Nevertheless, this study’s emphasis on enduring patterns of ties, rather than event-based, 
information exchanges, as well as the timing of the interviews in which demobs were 
interviewed within days of their leaving the insurgent network, mitigated this limitation ( 
Freeman & Romney, 1987; Robins, 2015). Similarly, the demobilization reports paid little 
attention to defining relational categories commonly seen throughout the reports, such as 
“associate” ties. Proper training on issues regarding network data coding and ensuring 
inter-coder reliability would have helped to overcome this limitation.131 This study’s 
emphasis on two, information-sharing structures alleviated this concern in the sense that it 
did not intend to capture other, and often poorly defined, relational categories in the 
demobilization reports.  
Another limitation is that it was unable to capture the type and veracity of the 
information exchanged through interactions. Many relations took place long before 
individuals participated in the demobilization program and most did not elaborate on what 
information they exchanged in past interactions. For instance, many demobs described that 
they exchanged information with their commanders during operations several months prior 
to leaving the FARC but did not elaborate on the details of their conversations. This gap 
means that it was impossible to assess if demobs provided accurate information to the 
government about their past relationships, or if they offered inaccurate or misleading 
information for reasons such as simply obtaining benefits from the demobilization program 
or for more nefarious reasons, such as collecting intelligence for the FARC. While the 
ability to assess individuals’ motivations could have played an important role in coding 
decisions (i.e., if a tie should be coded as “authority” or “insurgent”), the demobilization 
reports and supplementary open source data did not offer that level of detail. 
As noted in Chapter 4, self-organizing and co-evolutionary social processes may 
differ in other insurgent warfare contexts. Future research could be directed at other case 
studies in which insurgencies possess different characteristics than the FARC insurgency. 
This analysis pointed out that no two insurgencies are identical and several factors help 
 
131 While it is possible government personnel received such training, it is highly unlikely based on 
engagements with them.  
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shape it, including its relationship with authorities it seeks to replace, whether it is rural or 
urban, its ideology, and the nature of the external and internal support it receives 
(Department of the Army, 2014; Galula, 2006). While this study’s results may inform 
hypotheses in future studies, these factors suggest different social processes could be at 
play in other contexts.  
Another contextual factor future research should consider is accounting for other 
types of relations that may co-evolve with information-sharing relations. It is possible that 
financial ties and/or trust-based relations, however defined, as well as digital (e.g., social 
media) networks, co-evolve with information-sharing ties as defined here. Future research 
should consider examining competition between three or more networks as well. This 
perspective may capture aspects of Gventer’s (2014) notion of “honeycomb” conflicts 
whereby multiple insurgents networks compete with authorities and one another. These 
approaches might be become more feasible as social network models, such as SAOMs, 
become more sophisticated.  
Finally, future social network research should consider addressing co-evolution in 
at least two other competitive contexts in which adversarial networks may overlap. The 
first is competition between opposing social media networks. For instance, Russian 
activities on Twitter during the 2016 election included concerted efforts to capitalize on 
contentious issues in the U.S. (Mueller III, 2019), which begs questions about Russian-
based accounts’ roles in intertwining otherwise disconnected users and communities on the 
platform by “weaponizing” polarizing issues. The second context in which this study’s 
framework could offer value is great power competition (GPC). For example, through 
efforts like its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has 
gained leverage in key economic sectors, political networks, and regions across the globe, 
including in U.S. aligned countries (Lawrence & Sutter, 2021; Meia Nouwens, 2021; 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020; Sutter et al., 2021). Future research could be 
directed at understanding how U.S. and Chinese aligned commercial networks intertwine 
and compete in key strategic areas, as well as co-evolve in response to each other’s actions.  
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 APPENDIX A. CODEBOOK 
A. RELATIONS 
Information-Sharing - informal connections that are created by the flow of 
messages among individuals. 
B. ATTRIBUTES 
Demobilized—This dynamic, dummy variable indicates the time wave(s) during 
which an individual was involved in the demobilization program.  
Coding Scheme: 
 0. No 
 1. Yes 
Affiliation—This dynamic variable indicates the waves during which an individual 
is a member of one of seven categories. Note this analysis treated some of these as binary 
variables for some effects (e.g., civilian hubs).  
Coding Scheme: 
1. Armed Forces—individuals employed by the Colombian Armed Forces (e.g., 
Colombian Navy, Army). 
2. Civilian—individuals who did not meet any of the other definitions. Elected 
politicians were coded as civilians.  
3. FARC—individuals who self-identified or who were explicitly stated as a 
member of the FARC. 
4. Government Employee—individuals employed by the Colombian Government 
but  who were not a member of the armed forces, police, or Justice Department.  
5. Justice Department—individuals explicitly stated as an employee of Colombia’s 
Justice Department. 
146 
6. Militia (FARC)—individuals who self-identified or were explicitly stated as 
member of FARC’s militia or community action boards.  
7. Police—individuals employed by any law enforcement organization, with the 
exception of the Justice Department.  
Gender—This categorical variable represents, as stated in the source documents, 




Department—The primary department (i.e., state) in Colombia in which an 
individual operated. Note some individuals operated in the Southern Bloc’s territory 















 APPENDIX B. RSIENA CODE 
This dissertation leveraged and modified existing code from open source scripts at 
RSiena’s website (https://www.stats.ox.ac.uk/~snijders/siena/). Due to IRB 
considerations, the data are not shown here.  
C. LOAD PACKAGES 




D. LOAD AND PREP DATA 
The next step is to import your network data for each time wave. In this case, I have 
four time slices for both the “authority information-sharing network” and the “insurgent 
information-sharing network.” All files have been saved in Pajek format (.net) and are 
treated as non-directed networks. Also note that I have used “government” interchangeably 










Use the sienaDependent function to establish each network as a dependent 
variable. The argument dim defines the dimensions of the networks (357 actors by 357 
actors) and states how many time waves you have for each one (n=4). 
insurgent <- sienaDependent(array(c(insurt1.net, 
                                    insurt2.net, 
                                    insurt3.net, 
                                    insurt4.net),  
                                    dim=c(357,357,4))) 
 
government <- sienaDependent(array(c(gov1.net, 
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                                     gov2.net, 
                                     gov3.net, 
                                     gov4.net),  
                                     dim=c(357,357,4))) 
Import attributes to represent actor covariates. Here, I began with the “time 
varying” attributes (i.e., those that change over time) and used varCovar to establish each 
one as a time varying covariate. 
affiliation <- as.matrix(read.csv(“Affiliation.csv,” header=T)) # Affil
iation attribute.  
aff<-varCovar (affiliation) 
 
demobilization <- as.matrix(read.csv(“Demob.csv”,header=T)) # Demobiliz
ation attribute.  
demob <- varCovar(demobilization) 
 
civilian <- as.matrix(read.csv(“Civilian.csv”,header=T)) # Civilian att
ribute.  
civ <- varCovar(civilian) 
 
farc<- as.matrix(read.csv(“FARC.csv”,header=T)) # FARC attribute.  
farc <- varCovar(farc) 
 
militia<- as.matrix(read.csv(“Militia.csv”,header=T)) # Militia attribu
te.  
militia <- varCovar(militia) 
Next, I will bring in the constant covariates (i.e., those that do not change over time) 
and use the coCovar to define them as such (Note the “government” attribute is treated as 
constant because there were not any changes in the underlying data). 
gender <- as.matrix(read.csv(“Gender.csv,” header=T)) # Gender attribut
e.  
gen <- coCovar(gender [,1]) 
 
department <- as.matrix(read.csv(“Department.csv,” header=T)) #Location
/department attribute.  
dep <- coCovar(department [,1]) 
 
gov_att <- as.matrix(read.csv(“Government.csv,” header=T)) # Government 
attribute.  
gov_att <- coCovar(gov_att [,1]) 
The next step is to create a composite data object comprised of network and 
attribute data. 
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comp_data <- sienaDataCreate(government,  
                             insurgent,  
                             aff,  
                             demob,  
                             gen,  
                             dep,  
                             civ, 
                             farc, 
                             militia, 
                             gov_att) 
comp_data #View your object with this command.  
E. SETUP DATA FOR MODELING 
You can get descriptive statistics for each time wave and examine your data to 
ensure it meets the recommended guidelines in RSiena’s manual (Ripley et al., 2021). 
print01Report(comp_data, modelname=“Multiplex-illustration(myModels - 4 
Waves)”) 
The getEffects function identifies and describes which independent variables are 
available in your data (i.e., network configurations, such as triadic closure and between-
network effects). 
comp_effects <- getEffects(comp_data)  
 
View(comp_effects) 
F. SPECIFY MODEL 
Now, establish the models with the includeEffects function. Note the name= 
argument indicates the dependent variable. Recall from the dissertation that some 
independent variables had to be dropped and added based on goodness of fit (GOF) checks 
and convergence issues. 






tiInIso2, isolateNet,degPlus, name=“government”) 
 
#Actor covariates 
comp_effects<-includeEffects(comp_effects, sameX, name = “insurgent”,in
teraction1 = “gen”) 
comp_effects<-includeEffects(comp_effects, sameX, name = “government”,i
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nteraction1 = “gen”) 
comp_effects<-includeEffects(comp_effects, sameX, name = “insurgent”,in
teraction1 = “dep”) 
comp_effects<-includeEffects(comp_effects, sameX, name = “government,” 
interaction1 = “dep”) 
comp_effects<-includeEffects(comp_effects, sameX, name = “insurgent”,in
teraction1 = “aff”) 
comp_effects<-includeEffects(comp_effects, sameX, name = “government”,i
nteraction1 = “aff”) 
comp_effects<-includeEffects(comp_effects, sameX, name = “government”,i
nteraction1 = “demob”) 
comp_effects 
Use the sienaAlgorithmCreate function to create an object with algorithm 
specifications. 
ExampleAlgo <- sienaAlgorithmCreate(useStdInits = FALSE, 
                                    projname=“Mplex-illustr (four-month
)-M1 - atts,” seed=123) 
                                     
G. ESTIMATE MODEL 
We can estimate the model now that we have set up everything. You can use 
prevAns if you do not get model convergence at first and returnDeps helps with GOF 
checks later. For more information, see Ripley et al. (2021). 
mod1 <- siena07(ExampleAlgo, 
                data=comp_data, 
                effects=comp_effects,  
                returnDeps=TRUE) 
mod1 
mod1<- siena07(ExampleAlgo, 
               data=comp_data, 
               effects=comp_effects, 
               prevAns=mod1,  
               returnDeps =TRUE) 
You can check the model results using the summary function. Users can do a 
collinearity check here as well. 
summary(mod1)  
H. WALD TEST 
To obtain p-values, users can divide the estimate by its standard error or use the 
Multipar.RSiena function to run a Wald test. Here, I have done the latter (though, 
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actually, I did both) and I have broken it out by each variable rather than combine them 
into a list. 
Multipar.RSiena(mod1, 1) 
Multipar.RSiena(mod1, 2) 
Multipar.RSiena(mod1, 3) # and so on, for each variable. Here I’ve put 
only the first three.  
I. GOODNESS OF FIT 
Next, users can use the sienaGOF function to check if models do a good job 
capturing common tendencies of actors in networks (in general). I begin with degree 
distributions below for the insurgent network, followed by the authority network. My data 
are non-directed but IndegreeDistribution will still work for this assessment. 
#Insurgent 
gof1.deg_ins <- sienaGOF(mod1,  
                         verbose=TRUE, 
                         varName=“insurgent,”  
                         IndegreeDistribution, 




gof1.deg_gov <- sienaGOF(mod1,  
                         verbose=TRUE, 
                         varName=“government,”  
                         IndegreeDistribution, 
                         join = T) 
gof1.deg_gov 
plot(gof1.deg_gov) 
Now, use the following code for triad census. 
#First create the function (again, borrowed from RSiena’s website) 
TriadCensus <- function(i, data, sims, wave, groupName, varName, levls=
1:16){ 
  unloadNamespace(“igraph”) # to avoid package clashes 
  require(sna) 
  require(network) 
  x <- networkExtraction(i, data, sims, wave, groupName, varName) 
  if (network.edgecount(x) <= 0){x <- symmetrize(x)} 
  # because else triad.census(x) will lead to an error 
  tc <- sna::triad.census(x)[1,levls] 
  # triad names are transferred automatically 




gof.tc_ins <- sienaGOF(mod1,  
                       verbose=TRUE,  
                       varName=“insurgent,”  
                       TriadCensus) 
gof.tc_ins 
plot(gof.tc_ins, scale=TRUE, center=TRUE) 
#Government network 
gof.tc_gov <- sienaGOF(mod1,  
                       verbose=TRUE,  
                       varName=“government,”  




plot(gof.tc_gov, scale=TRUE, center=TRUE) 
Finally, consider geodesic distributions. Like much of the code in this appendix, 
this function is borrowed from RSiena’s website. 
GeodesicDistribution <- function (i, data, sims, period, groupName, 
                                  varName, levls=c(1:5,Inf), cumulative
=TRUE, ...) { 
  x <- networkExtraction(i, data, sims, period, groupName, varName) 
  require(sna) 
  a <- sna::geodist(symmetrize(x))$gdist 
  if (cumulative) 
  { 
    gdi <- sapply(levls, function(i){ sum(a<=i) }) 
  } 
  else 
  { 
    gdi <- sapply(levls, function(i){ sum(a==i) }) 
  } 
  names(gdi) <- as.character(levls) 
  gdi 
} 
Here is a GOF check for geodesic distribution pertaining to the insurgent network. 
#Insurgent  
gof.gd_INS <- sienaGOF(mod1,  
                       verbose=TRUE,  
                       varName=“insurgent,”  
                       GeodesicDistribution, 
                       join=T,  
                       cumulative=F, 
                       returnDeps=TRUE)  
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gof.gd_INS 
plot(gof.gd_INS, scale=TRUE, center=TRUE) 
Now, check the authority network. 
#Authority 
gof.gd_GOV <- sienaGOF(mod1,  
                       verbose=TRUE,  
                       varName=“government,”  
                       GeodesicDistribution, 
                       join=T,  
                       cumulative=F, 
                       returnDeps=TRUE)  
gof.gd_GOV 
plot(gof.gd_GOV, scale=TRUE, center=TRUE) 
J. MODEL 2: CO-EVOLUTION MODEL 
Begin by including effects into the model. Recall that the code below reflects the 
final effects after many iterations checking for multicollinearity, goodness of fit, etc. 
Again, the name= argument identifies the dependent variable/network. 
#Self-organizing effects 
comp_effects<- includeEffects(comp_effects,  
                              density, 
                              transTriads, 
                              gwesp, 
                              antiInIso2,  
                              degPlus,  
                              name=“insurgent”) 
 
comp_effects <- includeEffects(comp_effects, 
                               density, 
                               transTriads, 
                               gwesp, 
                               antiInIso2, 
                               degPlus,  
                               isolateNet, 
                               name=“government”) 
Next, include the actor covariates. 
comp_effects<-includeEffects(comp_effects, sameX, name = “insurgent”,in
teraction1 = “gen”) 
comp_effects<-includeEffects(comp_effects, sameX, name = “government”,i
nteraction1 = “gen”) 
comp_effects<-includeEffects(comp_effects, sameX, name = “insurgent”,in
teraction1 = “dep”) 
comp_effects<-includeEffects(comp_effects, sameX, name = “government,” 
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interaction1 = “dep”) 
comp_effects<-includeEffects(comp_effects, sameX, name = “insurgent”,in
teraction1 = “aff”) 
comp_effects<-includeEffects(comp_effects, sameX, name = “government”,i
nteraction1 = “aff”) 
comp_effects<-includeEffects(comp_effects, sameX, name = “government”,i
nteraction1 = “demob”) 
The code below includes between-network, or co-evolutionary effects. 
#Insurgent effect on authority (insurgent==>authority) 
comp_effects <- includeEffects(comp_effects, 
                               crprod, 
                               name=“government”, 
                               interaction1=“insurgent”)#Gov effect on 
insurgent 
 
#Insurgent effect on authority (cluster-level) 
comp_effects <- includeEffects(comp_effects, 
                               gwespMix, 
                               name=“government”, 
                               interaction1=“insurgent”)# Insurgent eff
ect on government at cluster level.  
 
#Various hub-related processes  
comp_effects <- includeEffects(comp_effects, 
                               inPopIntnX, 
                               name=“government”, 
                               interaction1=“insurgent”, 
                               interaction2 = “civ”) 
 
comp_effects <- includeEffects(comp_effects, 
                               inPopIntnX, 
                               name=“government”, 
                               interaction1=“insurgent”, 
                               interaction2 = “farc”) #Note I use the t
erm “insurgent” rather than “FARC” in the dissertation results section.  
comp_effects <- includeEffects(comp_effects, 
                               inPopIntnX, 
                               name=“government”, 
                               interaction1=“insurgent”, 
                               interaction2 = “militia”) 
 
comp_effects <- includeEffects(comp_effects, 
                               inPopIntnX, 
                               name=“insurgent”, 
                               interaction1=“government”, 
                               interaction2 = “civ”) 
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K. CO-EVOLUTION GOODNESS OF FIT 
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